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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 Background and Research Context   
 
This doctoral dissertation examines risk and transition disclosures by Finnish listed firms 
in the IFRS era. The adoption of IFRS was one of the biggest steps in the history of 
accounting towards harmonized and comparable financial statements between firms 
across countries and continents. The European Parliament and Council stipulated in 
2002 that firms the securities of which are admitted to trading on a regulated market of 
any Member State of the European Union, shall prepare their consolidated financial 
statements in conformity with the International Financial Reporting Standards for each 
financial year starting on or after January 1, 2005. This transition was challenging for 
many firms and stakeholders because they were not used to the principles-based 
accounting approach applied in the IFRS. Hence high-quality financial reporting was 
vital in particular at the beginning of the IFRS era when managers, investors, and 
national regulatory bodies tried to adapt to new reporting requirements. 
 The research problem of this dissertation is linked to corporate disclosure 
literature. From the existing research we know that in perfect markets there would not be 
any information asymmetry and need to regulate corporate financial reporting because 
firms would have unconditional incentives to disclose all private information to 
investors (e.g., Milgrom, 1981; Admati & Pfleiderer, 2000). However, we are living in 
imperfect market settings in which market frictions (e.g., agency and information 
problems) generate direct and indirect costs for firms. The discretionary disclosure 
model suggests that the production and dissemination of private information is the major 
source of direct costs (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986). Discretion on the part of 
managers is harmful to society because it increases the potential for opportunistic 
behavior and the extent of informational externalities (Bassen et al., 2010; Beyer et al., 
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2010). Reducing the adverse effects of managerial discretion is the primary motive for 
disclosure regulation. 
 There are alternative ways to control corporate reporting practices such as 
standards and recommendations. It is important to obtain more information on different 
ways to influence the quality of corporate reporting because disclosure regulation may 
also result in significant costs for some firms (e.g., Bushee & Leuz, 2005). 
Consequently, in the IFRS era it is not advisable to require firms to report on issues 
which are not useful to their stakeholders, especially to investors, which are the main 
end-users of IFRS reports. At the moment, there is considerable room for additional 
research regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of disclosure laws, standards, 
guidance, and recommendations in improving the quality of financial reporting.  
 High-quality narrative communication in the non-financial statement sections of 
annual reports is important to make company reporting more useful to investors (e.g., 
AICPA, 1994a; FASB, 2001; CICA, 2009). However, standard-setters face a taxing 
challenge in deciding how these sections could be regulated most effectively. Standard-
setting is very much concerned with making correct decisions about the right level of 
detail in disclosure standards (Schipper, 2003). If standard-setters set out disclosure 
requirements that are too restrictive, they receive highly comparable information which 
includes mostly boilerplate discussion that lacks relevance to investors. In contrast, if 
standard-setters do not require disclosure on a specific issue, some firms will not 
voluntarily disclose anything. 
 Risk disclosure is one example of an information item which includes a great 
deal of narrative descriptions, and which is usually provided outside corporate financial 
statements in the management discussion and analyses section. Accounting literature 
demonstrates that there is a significant gap in risk information between firms and their 
stakeholders (Roulstone, 1999; Kajüter, 2001; Linsley & Shrives, 2006). However, there 
is to date little if any research evidence concerning the impact of risk disclosure 
regulation on quality (see, Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). Studies examining this issue are 
needed because it is otherwise difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of detailed risk 
guidance in an environment in which managers have several disclosure motives. 
Although the extant research documents the importance of reporting incentives as a 
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determinant of accounting quality (e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Leuz, 2003; Ball & 
Shivakumar, 2005; Dobler, 2008; Dobler et al., 2011), we do not have evidence that a 
detailed national risk disclosure standard can improve the quality of corporate overall 
risk reviews.  
 Starting with Amir and Lev (1996), many scholars have documented that 
narrative disclosures are useful to investors (e.g., Abrahamson & Amir, 1996; Kothari et 
al., 2009; Demers & Vega, 2010). Jorgensen & Kirschenheiter (2003) model managerial 
equilibrium strategies for voluntarily disclosing information about firm risks and show 
that a disclosing firm benefits from risk reporting. However, there is only meager 
evidence on the usefulness of firms’ overall risk reviews to investors. Although recent 
academic work has shown increased attention in corporate risk reporting, research has 
focused mostly on examining the regulatory and non-regulatory determinants of risk 
disclosure (e.g., Elmy et al., 1998; Roulstone, 1999; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley 
& Shrives, 2006, Dobler et al., 2011) or the value relevance of disclosures on market 
risks (e.g., Rajgopal, 1999; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Jorion, 2002; Lim & Tan, 2007). 
Concurrent studies on overall risk disclosures in the US have provided evidence that 
these disclosures are informative to investors despite the reporting deficiencies (Huang, 
2011; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2013). However, in spite of the rules-
based accounting environment there is not any comprehensive guidance on overall 
corporate risk disclosures in the US. Hence, additional evidence on the usefulness of 
overall risk reviews in countries with different levels of risk disclosure regulation will be 
needed. 
 Another area of corporate disclosure literature that needs further evidence is the 
relation between voluntary, recommended, and mandatory disclosure. Previously, many 
studies have concentrated on voluntary disclosure (e.g., Cooke, 1989; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993; Cahan et al., 2005). Others have examined compliance with mandatory 
disclosure requirements (e.g., Inchausti, 1997; Gray & Street, 2002), and more 
specifically, the impact of corporate-governance quality on disclosures on the transition 
to IFRS (Kent & Stewart, 2008). In the light of prior consolidated evidence on voluntary 
and mandatory disclosure and on their differences (e.g., Kanto & Schadewitz, 1997; Al-
Razeen & Karbahari, 2004), it seems evident that the quality of mandatory disclosure 
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associates with the level of reporting and disclosure requirements, whereas voluntary 
disclosure is driven by the disclosure incentives of managers such as the reduction of 
agency costs and asymmetric information. However, only a few of the existing studies 
have provided evidence on the compliance of firms with disclosure recommendations 
(cf., Mangena & Tauringana, 2007).  
 From the perspective of the society, regulators’ attempts to control corporate 
disclosure should increase its usefulness to investors and other stakeholders. This means 
that disclosure requirements should increase the quality of financial reporting (e.g., 
increased relevance and comparability) and also, that the benefits of disclosure standards 
should exceed the costs of setting and complying with them. Previous literature 
describes various disclosure-measurement frameworks as an attempt to more effectively 
measure differences in the quality of financial reporting (e.g., Beattie et al., 2004; 
Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Beck et al., 2010). While 
recognizing the inherent conceptual difficulties of measuring disclosure quality in a 
complete, valid, and reliable manner (see, Botosan, 2004), it is important to understand 
that certain quality indicators developed in the existing related literature may provide 
useful approximations of some important aspects of the quality of risk disclosure. 
However, the accounting literature needs further testing of new empirical quality 
measures of disclosure to progress in that area.   
 To summarize, the existing literature provides only meager evidence of the 
impact of regulation on the quality of risk disclosure, or of the impact of authoritative 
disclosure recommendations on reporting by firms. Furthermore, we do not have 
evidence of the consequences of corporate overall risk reviews on stock markets in 
different regulatory environments. Also, the non-regulatory determinants of risk and 
transition disclosures need additional research. Finally, although the existing accounting 
literature documents some methods to examine the quality of disclosure, we are only 
beginning to understand these issues more deeply.  
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1.2 Objectives and Scope  
 
The research problem of this doctoral dissertation is to examine how Finnish listed firms 
disclose their risks and IFRS transition in the IFRS era. Overall, the objective of the 
dissertation is to answer the following research questions: 
 
RQ1: Can a detailed national risk disclosure standard improve the quality of firms’ 
overall risk reviews under IFRS? 
 
RQ2: Does the quality of risk disclosure provided by firms in their annual reports 
affect information asymmetry between the management and investors?  
 
RQ3: Do certain contingency factors such as firm riskiness, investor interest, and 
market condition affect the usefulness of annual risk disclosures to investors? 
 
RQ4: In relation to the transition disclosure recommendation of the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR), is the behavior of firms more similar 
to voluntary or to mandatory disclosure? 
 
 RQ5: What are the non-regulatory determinants of risk and transition disclosures?  
 
 Each research question is answered in the following essays. The contributions of 
these essays are combined in this dissertation summary. Each essay examines disclosure 
by Finnish listed firms. Finland is part of the Scandinavian institutional setting, where 
investor protection is lower than in the Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g., US and UK) but 
higher than in southern Europe (e.g., Greece and Italy) (La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et 
al., 2000).  
 Finland has a rules-based accounting tradition like the US and several continental 
European countries. In recent years, IFRS adopters have been forced to adjust 
themselves to the principles-based accounting schema which emphasizes firms’ own 
judgment. With regard to overall risk disclosures, the IASB has published voluntary 
guidance for management commentary which also provides general level guidance for 
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corporate risk disclosures. However, firms and their auditors have substantial 
responsibility for the quality of their overall risk reviews in the IFRS world. Similarly, 
although the US accounting standards are strictly rules-based and FRR No. 48 stipulates 
market risk disclosures, the SEC provides only general level guidance for overall risk 
reviews. By examining risk disclosures which are mainly given in a narrative format, 
this dissertation deepens our understanding of reporting by firms in an area which may 
be guided ambiguously under both reporting approaches. 
 This dissertation analyses the research questions in a unique setting in which the 
regulator attempts to impact risk and transition disclosures of firms. This is so because 
the detailed Finnish risk disclosure requirements are advanced in international 
comparison, and because transitions between old and new reporting systems are always 
challenging from the perspective of investor communication. Also the active role of the 
Finnish regulatory bodies and the specific characteristics of the Finnish stock market 
make the setting distinctive.  
 In December 2003, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) 
published Recommendation for Additional Guidance Regarding the Transition to IFRS 
where it specified how the listed firms are recommended to manage their disclosure on 
the adoption of IFRS. CESR considered it essential that the transition is carefully 
monitored by regulators to ensure that every company continues to meet its reporting 
requirements and that investors are able to understand the effect of the new reporting 
standards on the financial position of listed companies (CESR, 2003). After the CESR 
had released its recommendation, the Finnish Financial Supervision Authority (FIN-
FSA) recommended that Finnish listed firms follow the recommendation.  
 With regard to risk disclosure guidance, in 2006 the Finnish Accounting Practice 
Board published a new detailed risk disclosure standard which describes how firms 
should assess significant risks in their operating and financial reviews (FAPB, 2006). It 
provides a comprehensive view on the expected quality of risk reporting and also 
includes illustrative disclosure examples. The standard specifies the risk disclosure 
requirements of the Finnish Accounting Act, which are provided on a very general level 
without any guidance for implementation. Nevertheless, the act is still principles-based 
because it allows firms latitude in deciding on their risk disclosure policies.   
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 The features of the Helsinki Stock Exchange are also interesting. The Finnish 
stock market has evolved considerably during the last few decades. The general 
internationalization and deregulation of the financial markets started in the early 1980s - 
a few years later than in the other Nordic countries. The process proceeded gradually 
from liberalization of the money market to abolishment of all restrictions on capital 
movements to and from Finland. Finally, in 1993 the restrictions on foreign ownership 
of Finnish stocks were removed. For international investors, small markets are 
interesting because they may provide considerable diversification benefits although the 
co-movements between Finnish and global market may have increased in the latter half 
of the 1990s (Kallunki et al., 1997). 
 Share trading in Finland concentrates on the largest companies. Thin markets 
increase volatility and reduce liquidity, especially among smaller firms. The low number 
of trades also typically results in a larger spread between the two quotes. Despite the low 
trading volume, Finnish stock market research suggests that several fundamentals such 
as earnings, macroeconomic factors, and financial leverage are important determinants 
of stock prices in Finland (Kallunki et al., 1997). 
 The relation of each essay to the research questions above and to each other is 
illustrated in figure 1. Essay 1 answers research question 1 and 5. It focuses on the 
regulatory and non-regulatory determinants of risk disclosure, that is, on the supply side 
of financial information production. Essay 2 continues in the area of risk disclosures by 
answering research questions 2 and 3. This study focuses on the usefulness of risk 
disclosures to investors, that is, on the demand side of financial information production. 
Finally, essay 3 examines transition disclosure by Finnish listed firms and answers 
research questions 4 and 5. Compliance with disclosure guidance and/or 
recommendations relates to both essays 1 and 3. Essay 1 focuses on a detailed disclosure 
standard which specifies the law. Essay 3 examines the efficiency of authoritative 
disclosure recommendation in an environment in which the regulator pursues fast 
disclosure improvements. All essays analyze disclosure in the IFRS era, in other words, 
in conjunction with the adoption of IFRS (essay 3) or immediately after it (essays 1 and 
2).  
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Figure 1: The Structure of the Dissertation: Relation between the Research  
 Questions and the Essays 
 
 
 
 
 In this dissertation two essays focus on risk disclosure and one on transition 
disclosure. There are several interconnections between the essays. First, all of them 
relate to financial reporting by firms after attempts by regulators to improve its quality. 
Second, both forms of disclosure are essential for valuation of firms. Investors need 
high-quality risk disclosure continuously. Transition disclosure is important for 
understanding the impact of a unique information shock on firms’ accounting numbers 
and risks. The accounting policies adopted by firms should not affect their security 
prices, as long as these policies have no differential cash flow effects, the applied 
policies are disclosed, and sufficient information on the various transition policies is 
available (Beaver, 1973). Third, in recent decades the risk disclosure requirements have 
undergone constant change, which makes the entire information item very transitory in 
nature. Finally, monitoring of the quality of investor information has a central role in the 
activities of both regulatory bodies (CESR/ESMA, FIN-FSA) which were interested in 
Finnish listed firms’ transition disclosure. High-quality risk disclosure is at the core of 
investor information in stock markets.   
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1.3 Concepts and Definitions  
  
The essays of this dissertation intertwine around corporate and information risk. Risks 
are at the core of business. On the one hand, it is impossible to be successful without 
taking any risks. Perceiving the relevant risks makes it easier to plan and implement 
winning strategies in organizations. On the other hand, sensible risk management is 
important for every firm. Investors want to be aware of corporate risks, disclosures of 
which provide information on the uncertainties of future cash flows. This justifies the 
need for high-quality risk disclosures. In practice managers have a better understanding 
than investors of the risks of their firms and hence investors have to take information 
risk into account in their decision-making. Information risk increases around the 
adoption of new financial reporting practices which highlights the need for high-quality 
risk and transition disclosures.   
 In this research risk disclosure means all information that firms provide in the 
risk reviews of their annual reports. Risk disclosure is information which describes the 
major risks of firms and the expected economic impact of these risks on future 
performance. This information also includes forward-looking information that helps 
external investors to build up a point estimate of future cash flows, information on the 
sources of uncertainty surrounding forecasts of the firm’s future cash flows, and 
information on the sources of non-diversifiable risk that should be included in the cost of 
capital. In addition, historical information about the actions taken to face risks and 
forward-looking information on programs planned for facing risks are taken into 
account. This research focuses on firms’ overall risk disclosures which by definition 
means firms’ reporting on several risk topics (e.g., strategic risks, operations risks, 
financial risks, damage risks, risk management, and other risks) in the same report. 
 The concept transition disclosure refers to firms’ disclosure of the effects of the 
transition to IFRS. Transition disclosure clarifies the impact of technical changes on 
accounting numbers and hence is an important tool for investors who interpret the IFRS-
based financial statements and corporate information risk. Recommended disclosure 
means compliance by firms with the disclosure recommendations, and more specifically, 
with the CESR transition disclosure recommendation. Mandatory disclosure denotes 
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compliance by firms with the mandatory disclosure requirements and voluntary 
disclosure reporting of voluntary issues that are not specified in any guidance or 
recommendation. By the concept regulatory determinants of disclosure, we mean 
disclosure improvements which derive from the pressures caused by the efforts of 
regulators to impact reporting. Non-regulatory determinants of disclosure denote 
disclosure factors which influence the quality of disclosure but do no stem from 
regulatory pressures. They include disclosure incentives and corporate governance 
factors. Quality of disclosure refers to information which is reliable and relevant to 
investors. Effectiveness refers to the desired impact of the disclosure guidance or 
recommendation. Efficiency denotes the cost-efficiency of the implementation phase of 
the guidance or recommendation.1  
 Lastly, the main regulatory bodies of this doctoral dissertation are discussed. The 
Finnish Accounting Practice Board (FAPB) provides guidance on the application of the 
Finnish Accounting Act. Its purpose is to promote appropriate compliance with the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The guidance of the FAPB is 
mandatory because it specifies the law. Although Finnish listed firms follow the IFRS, 
they are obliged to publish an operating and financial review in their parent company 
financial statements according to the Finnish Accounting Act. Consequently, the new 
disclosure standard also influences the risk reporting of those Finnish listed firms that 
prepare their financial statements according to IFRS. 
 The Committee of the European Securities Regulators (CESR) was established to 
deepen the cooperation between national securities regulators and for harmonizing 
supervision of the European financial markets. CESR had a subcommittee in every 
member state of the European Union. The Finnish subcommittee of the CESR was 
CESR-Fin. Together, the subcommittees of the CESR formulated various 
recommendations to increase harmonization in the European financial markets. CESR 
did not have the authority to impose sanctions if a firm failed to comply with its 
recommendations. In 2011 the CESR was replaced by the European Securities Markets 
Authority (ESMA), which is part of the European System of Financial Supervision. 
                                                 
1 For instance, in essay 3 the CESR disclosure recommendation brought about improvements in disclosure 
(effectiveness) but was also enforced cost-efficiently (efficiency). 
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 Similarly to the SEC in the US, the Finnish Financial Supervision Authority 
(FIN-FSA) supervises financial markets in Finland. If the FIN-FSA notices that a listed 
firm does not meet the disclosure requirements of the securities market, it investigates 
the matter and requests an explanation. Such cases are usually resolved after the firm has 
responded, although stricter sanctions are sometimes needed. Moreover, the FIN-FSA 
publishes binding and non-binding local standards and informs firms about international 
recommendations such as the CESR disclosure recommendation. The FIN-FSA cannot 
impose any direct sanctions on firms which do not follow disclosure recommendations. 
However, it may attempt to improve recommended disclosure by firms by actively 
providing information on disclosure recommendations. Moreover, the FIN-FSA 
sometimes sends private letters to firms and thereby encourages them to make the 
recommended disclosures. It should also be taken into account that if a disclosure item 
recommended by the CESR must also be disclosed on the basis of the existing disclosure 
requirements of the Securities Market Act, FIN-FSA can impose sanctions on firms 
which fail to comply. The FIN-FSA has been in charge of supervising the IFRS 
reporting of Finnish listed firms from 2005 onward, and in this work it can also impose 
direct sanctions on firms which do not follow the standards. 
 
 
1.4 Research process  
 
This research falls within the scope of well-established traditions in financial accounting 
research. Kakkuri-Knuuttila & Heinlahti (2006) argue that when research follows well-
known traditions in a field, it is not necessary to explain the underlying philosophical 
assumptions in great detail. Hence, the ontological and epistemological foundations of 
the dissertation are discussed rather briefly. Ontologically, this dissertation builds on the 
position that reality is objective and it is a natural phenomenon. Hence, information on a 
phenomenon can be obtained by observing. Considering this view against the historical 
development of financial accounting research, it can be said that this dissertation follows 
the dominant methodological point of view, which is strongly positivist. It follows a 
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weak form of realism which suggests that theories are utilitarian entities which have 
value only if they generate empirical generalizations which can be subjected to real and 
decisive empirical tests (Ryan et al., 2002, 112). 
 In each essay the main research method is multivariate regression analysis. Also, 
descriptive statistics, mean and median tests, correlation analysis, and canonical 
correlation analysis are used in the empirical tests. In essays 1 and 3, the empirical 
measures of disclosure are regressed on several explanatory factors. In essay 2, the 
empirical measure of disclosure is one of the explanatory factors. Empirical measures of 
disclosure are computed by constructing a disclosure framework/index and by using 
hand-collected data. The sample firms in every essay are Finnish listed firms.   
 In essay 1, which examines the determinants of the quality of risk disclosure, the 
study sample consists of the 2005 and 2006 annual report risk disclosures by 99 firms. In 
the empirical analyses the observations are pooled across 2005 and 2006; thus there are 
198 firm-year observations in the final sample. The matched paired sample design (i.e., 
disclosure of each sample firm before and after the new standard) makes it possible to 
effectively control for that the results are not driven by potentially omitted factors such 
as the effects of the economic environment, which are not attributable to the financial 
reporting system. The approach is similar to that employed by Barth et al. (2008). In this 
essay the empirical indicators of the quality of risk disclosure are quantity of disclosure 
(cf., Abraham & Cox, 2007), coverage of disclosure (cf., Beattie et al., 2004), and the 
semantic properties of disclosure (cf., Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 
2007; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008). The overall validity and reliability of disclosure 
quality measurement is ensured by using factor analysis to summarize the quality 
indicators into a composite measure of quality. The risk disclosure data are collated from 
two sources of 2005 and 2006 annual reports. The first source is the operating and 
financial review sections of the firms. The second is the overall risk reviews of the 
annual reports published in separate risk sections, notes to the financial statements, and 
corporate governance sections. The reliability of coding was assured by coding a pilot 
sample and by analyzing the inter-rater reliability of coding. The values for the 
accounting variables and stock market data were retrieved from the Thomson One 
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Banker Financial database. The foreign ownership data were collected manually from 
the register of Euroclear Finland Oy.  
 In essay 2, which examines the economic consequences of quality of risk 
disclosure, we analyze the risk reporting of more than 300 firm-year observations in a 
four year panel covering the fiscal years 2006-2009. The study period encompasses 
different market conditions because the 2005 and 2006 annual reports were published 
during rising stock markets, the 2007 annual reports during falling stock markets, and 
the 2008 annual reports during recovering stock markets after a crash. The impact of risk 
disclosure is analyzed along two dimensions, quantity and coverage (cf., Beattie et al., 
2004; Abraham & Cox, 2007). Principal component analysis is used to construct a 
measure for the composite quality of risk disclosure. The risk disclosure data are 
collated from the same sources as in essay 1. Also, the reliability check of the coding is 
similar. Other data were retrieved from the Thomson One Banker Financial and IBES 
databases and from the register of Euroclear Finland Oy. Congruent with the existing 
literature, bid-ask spread and trading volume were used as empirical indicators for 
information asymmetry (see, Leutz & Verrecchia, 2000; Leutz, 2003).   
 In essay 3, which examines the determinants of IFRS transition disclosure, we 
analyze the transition disclosures of 85 firms in 2004 and 88 firms in 2005. In total, 173 
firm-year observations remain in the final sample for the empirical tests. We examine 
transition disclosure that was published in 2004 and 2005 before first-time adoption of 
IFRS by the firms. The disclosure data for 2004 were collected from financial statement 
releases, financial statements, and annual reports for 2003, which were published in 
2004. Similarly, the disclosure data for 2005 include financial statement releases, 
financial statements, and annual reports for 2004, but also separate IFRS stock exchange 
releases published in 2005 before the first interim reports. On the basis of the transition 
disclosure scores of the firms, two disclosure indices were created; one for 
recommended disclosure and one for voluntary disclosure. Regarding the explanatory 
variables, the values for the disclosure incentives were retrieved from the Thomson One 
Banker Worldscope, IBES History, and Datastream databases. The data for the corporate 
governance variables were collected manually from the annual reports of the firms. 
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 The remainder of this doctoral dissertation is organized as follows. Part I 
discusses the research overview in which the theoretical foundations are described in 
section 2, followed by the results in section 3, and discussion in section 4. Part II 
comprises the essays.  
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2  THEORETICAL FOUNDATION  
 
 
 
This section discusses the various aspects of corporate disclosure theory and the existing 
empirical evidence. The corporate information environment is a very complex issue in 
which several tensions may influence managers’ reporting choices and voluntary 
disclosure motives. Corporate disclosures may be beneficial for several stakeholders for 
several purposes. The valuation and stewardship roles of accounting information are the 
most commonly discussed purposes in the literature. The existing literature considers 
various reasons for unwillingness on the part of managers to disclose all their private 
information to investors and other stakeholders. For example, the harm caused by 
information asymmetry and externalities justify regulation of disclosure. There is 
empirical evidence on both voluntary and mandatory disclosures. Nevertheless, the 
existing literature has not yet found the most proper way to measure the quality of 
disclosure. The issues discussed above will be examined next. We then present the 
theoretical framework of the dissertation.  
 
 
2.1 The Corporate Information Environment 
 
Scott (2009, 68) defines information as evidence that will potentially impact an 
individual’s decision. Beyer et al. (2010) point out two important roles of accounting 
information in market-based economies: The valuation (ex-ante) and stewardship (ex-
post) roles. The valuation role helps shareholders and creditors to evaluate the return 
potential of investment targets whereas the stewardship role makes it possible to monitor 
how effectively managers use the invested capital. Gjesdal (1981) and Scott (2009, 14) 
emphasize that the fundamental problem of financial accounting theory is that the best 
way to measure net income depends on whether we try to control adverse selection or 
moral hazard. Consequently, the corporate information environment is largely 
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endogenously developed as a consequence of information asymmetries and agency 
problems between management and investors (Beyer et al., 2010, 297). The valuation 
role of accounting information is also called the decision-usefulness approach and it has 
been adopted (instead of the stewardship role) by major accounting standard-setting 
bodies such as the IASB and the FASB. This can be seen from the conceptual 
frameworks, which emphasize the role of financial reporting in providing relevant and 
reliable information to investors (Scott, 2009).2 
 The adverse selection problem may arise if someone (e.g., management) has an 
information advantage over someone else (e.g., investors) (Scott, 2009, 13). The 
problem was first presented by Akerlof (1970), who analyzed the market mechanism in 
the car market.3 Typically, it is caused by managerial unwillingness and/or failures to 
disclose all relevant information to stakeholders. The primary disadvantage of adverse 
selection is that under asymmetric information investors value both good and bad 
business ideas at an average level. This may lead to the misvaluation of firms in stock 
markets because investors are prone to undervalue good firms and overvalue bad ones. 
Consequently, the gap between the market value and the fundamental value of firms 
increases and the capital markets do not function optimally. Information imbalance is 
one cause of market frictions which will be discussed later in this review.  
 Moral hazard is another symptom of the information problems in capital markets 
(Lambert, 2001). Scott (2009, 14) defines it as a type of information asymmetry 
whereby certain people can observe their efforts in fulfilling business transactions but 
other people cannot. In other words, the separation of ownership and control makes it 
difficult for shareholders (principal) to monitor the efforts of managers (agent) 
(Lambert, 2001). This increases the incentives of managers to reduce their effort and 
may also adversely affect the efficiency of the economy as a whole. 
 Fama (1970) suggests that in an efficient (semi-strong efficiency) securities 
market, security prices always reflect all publicly known information on the firms. Scott 
(2009, 98) highlights the concept full disclosure in the context of securities market 
                                                 
2 The decision problems of financial statement users are at the core of the decision-usefulness approach. 
Single-person decision theory, portfolio investment decision theory, and the theory of investment provide 
explanations for factors that influence investors’ decision problems (Scott, 2009). 
3 Akerlof used the term ‘lemons problem’ to describe the information asymmetry problem in the car 
markets. 
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efficiency. Accordingly, investors value the information content of disclosure but do not 
care whether the information is provided in financial statements or supplementary 
disclosures. In other words, as Beaver (1973) states, corporate accounting policies 
should not influence the value of the firms if they have the same cash flow effects, the 
applied policies are disclosed, and sufficient transition information is provided on the 
policy differences (Beaver, 1973). From the perspective of the topic of this doctoral 
dissertation, the concept full disclosure is important because it provides justification for 
studying supplementary disclosures by firms on their risks and the IFRS transition 
effects. Because of information asymmetry problems, such as adverse selection and 
inside information, investors will include an information risk premium in their required 
return which decreases firms’ market values. By improving financial reporting (for 
example through risk disclosures) firms can reduce adverse selection and information 
risk and thereby, narrow the gap between the efficient market price and the fundamental 
value of a firm (Scott, 2009, 116-117).  A good example of a ‘full-disclosure accounting 
standard’ is the requirement to provide management discussion and analysis to assist 
investors in interpreting corporate financial statements.4  
 Gibbins et al. (1990) use the grounded theory approach and develop a framework 
for managers’ financial disclosures in the corporate information environment. They 
show how the management of corporate financial disclosure is a function of 
opportunism, ritualism, policies, and processes. Gibbins et al. (1990) argue that firms 
have a stable two-dimensional internal preference for managing disclosures. The first 
dimension covers an obviously uncritical acceptance of rules and norms, whereas the 
second dimension refers to the propensity of managers to achieve firm-specific 
advantage via their disclosure policies. The authors suggest that both market and firm-
specific factors (e.g., internal politics) influence managers’ preferences. Managers may 
manage information itself but can also influence its timing and interpretation. The final 
disclosure decision is influenced by the perceived opportunities and norms of that 
                                                 
4 The Finnish Accounting Act stipulates that all listed firms shall incorporate an operating and financial 
review section (OFR) into their financial statements. Conceptually, this is similar to the management 
discussion and analysis section (MD&A) regulated by the SEC in the United States, and the management 
commentary (MC) section suggested by the IASB. However, the OFR is issued by the board of directors, 
whereas the MD&A and MC are issued by the management. Both disclosure standards require firms to 
provide a narrative explanation of their performance, financial condition, and future prospects. The 
purpose is to guide investors in interpreting the firm’s financial statements (Scott, 2009, 119). 
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moment. Also, several other factors such as organizational structure, external demand 
for information, external mediators, and consultants impact the manager’s disclosure 
choice.  
 
 
2.2 The Link between Contracting and Financial Accounting 
 Policies 
 
The investor decision-based and efficient market-oriented theories have been questioned 
since the 1970s (e.g., Zeff, 1978; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978; Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986, Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). Zeff (1978) argues that accounting policies can 
impact managers’ real decisions and thus have economic consequences which affect 
firm value although differences between the policies do not have any cash flow effect. 
He supports his arguments with examples which describe how business, industry 
associations, and government have tried to influence standard-setters. Because the right 
way to measure net income depends on the purpose of the end-user (cf., the fundamental 
problem of financial accounting theory), accounting literature lacks a theory that 
provides assistance in the selection of accounting policy. We know, however, that a 
tradeoff between relevance and reliability will be needed when switching between 
policies. Accounting policy preferences differ between interest groups and hence 
standard-setting bodies also have to take political issues into account in their decision-
making. In practice, standard-setters have tried to simplify their decision-making by 
bringing different interest groups onto their boards and by publishing exposure drafts for 
comments before release of the final standards (Scott, 2009, 276).   
 Positive accounting theory (PAT) is one way to describe why accounting policies 
matter. PAT tries to predict how the managers of the firms choose accounting policies 
and how they respond to new proposals by standard-setters (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978; 
Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Healy & Palepu (2001) sum up that the PAT literature 
concentrates on examination of contracting in explaining managers’ accounting choices 
when there are agency problems caused by information asymmetry. Compensation 
contracts are made between management and shareholders, and debt contracts between 
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shareholders and creditors. In addition, PAT also takes into account managers’ political 
considerations such as avoidance of taxes and harmful regulatory interventions. 
 Watts & Zimmerman (1978) introduced PAT and suggested that its precondition 
is the understanding of managers’ incentives. They proposed that individuals want to 
maximize their own utility and hence managers lobby for accounting standards that 
serve their interests. The predictions of PAT can be summed up through three 
hypotheses. Usually these hypotheses are given in their opportunistic form, which takes 
into account the possibility of conflict between managers’ own interests and the best 
interest of the firm (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). The 
bonus plan hypothesis suggests that managers of firms with bonus plans have an 
incentive to adopt accounting policies that move reported earnings from future periods 
to the current period. The debt covenant hypothesis states that if the probability of 
violation of firms’ accounting-based debt covenants is high, it is more probable that the 
firms’ managers will adopt accounting policies that increase current earnings at the 
expense of future earnings. The political cost hypothesis proposes that if a firm has high 
political costs, it is more probable that it will adopt accounting policies that defer 
reported earnings from current to future periods.  
 Agency theory relates to PAT because agency costs are one element of 
contracting costs (Scott, 2009, 323). Armstrong et al. (2010) suggest that information 
imbalance before and/or during the contracting relationship is the reason for numerous 
forms of agency conflicts. Moreover, in conditions where there is no information 
imbalance, the efficiency of contracting can be improved by decreasing uncertainty 
relating to firms’ current state and future prospects.  
 Jensen & Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship as a contract model 
where a principal (shareholders) hire an agent (manager) to run the business on their 
behalf by delegating some decision-making authority to the agent. However, taking into 
account the utility maximization objective of both parties, it is probable that the agent 
will not always act in the principal’s best interest. Optimal compensation and debt 
contracts can be used to alleviate this agency problem (Healy & Palepu, 2001).5 
Frequent and high-quality disclosure provided by the agent to the principal is vital for 
                                                 
5 The moral hazard problem may also occur in contracts between lenders and managers (Scott, 2009, 332).  
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optimal contracts. Otherwise, the principal is unable to monitor the agent’s compliance 
with the contract and to evaluate her/his performance as a manager. Also, proper 
working of the board of directors may reduce agency problems because its duty is to 
monitor and discipline the manager. Finally, information intermediaries may reduce 
agency problems because they follow the firms carefully and may thus reveal managers’ 
misuse of firms’ resources (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  
 Agency problems generate costs. Jensen & Meckling (1976) suggest that agency 
costs consist of the monitoring costs of the principal, the bonding costs of the agent, and 
the residual loss. Principals bear the monitoring costs of their efforts to align the 
incentives of contracting parties via properly formed contracts. They can for example 
include budget restrictions, compensation policies, and operating rules in the contracts. 
Bonding costs are borne by agents when they promise to avoid actions which are 
harmful to the principal and/or when they are responsible for compensating the principal 
for such actions. Finally, residual loss describes the principal’s reduction in welfare (in 
dollars) caused by the difference between the agent’s decisions and those that would be 
optimal from the viewpoint of the principal. 
 Jensen & Meckling (1976) show that shareholders are able to forecast the 
misalignment of the agent’s and principal’s interest in competitive market settings and 
can hence take this expected cost into consideration in executive compensation 
contracts. Because this reduces the compensation paid to managers, they bear the 
expected cost of their wealth transfer from shareholders. Congruently, potential creditors 
anticipate that shareholders may have a motive to take self-serving actions at their 
expense. Creditors therefore raise the prices of the bonds and the shareholders carry the 
costs of their expected wealth transfers from creditors.   
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2.3 The Voluntary Disclosure Theory and Empirical Evidence 
 
2.3.1  The Unraveling Result Theorem and Its Assumptions 
 
Voluntary disclosure literature examines managers’ disclosure incentives in the stock 
markets (see, Healy & Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010). Hence, it complements positive 
accounting literature and assists in obtaining a detailed view of the role of information in 
the capital markets. 
 The theoretical models of the early corporate disclosure literature rest on the 
unraveling result theorem. It proposes that investors will follow a minimum principle of 
valuation if managers decide to withhold their private information (Grossman & Hart, 
1980; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Jovanovic, 1982; Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; 
Wagenhofer, 1990). Consequently, investors will value firms at the lowest possible 
level, taking into account the voluntary disclosures. In this situation managers are 
willing to disclose all relevant positive and negative information and full disclosure of 
private information is an equilibrium strategy. Thus, there is no need for disclosure 
regulation. However, the existing literature questions the predictions of the unraveling 
result theorem in imperfect corporate information environments (e.g., Dye, 1985; Dye, 
1986; Einhorn & Ziv, 2008). It provides a rationale for why managers do not disclose 
everything and why they are prone to prefer positive news to negative news. Beyer et al. 
(2010, 301-304) review the following six factors which influence managers’ willingness 
to withhold some of their private information: disclosure costs, probabilistic information 
endowment, uncertain investor response, uncertain disclosure incentives, non-verifiable 
disclosure, and ex-ante commitment to disclosure strategies. 
 Disclosure costs. The unraveling result theorem does not work if disclosure 
generates costs for the firm. The first condition of the unraveling result theorem is the 
costless disclosure. If disclosure is costly (e.g., costs of releasing an annual report), the 
manager of a firm trying to maximize firm market value will disclose information only if 
it is sufficiently positive (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982, Verrecchia, 1983; Verrecchia, 1990; 
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Dye, 1986, Lanen & Verrecchia, 1987).6 Managers’ unwillingness to disclose is a signal 
to rational investors of low and risky asset values. However, managers’ disclosure 
equilibrium may be less than full disclosure because by withholding information they 
can avoid the costs of incremental disclosures and thus the firm’s overall payoff may be 
higher.   
 Disclosure may also have indirect costs resulting from the release of proprietary 
information. Scott (2009, 445) suggests that proprietary information will have a direct 
impact on a firm’s future cash flows (e.g., information on intangible assets such as 
patents, disclosure on forthcoming strategic initiatives). Non-proprietary information 
includes disclosure that does not have a direct impact on firms’ cash flows. It contains, 
for instance, financial statements and earnings forecasts. However, also this kind of 
information may become proprietary in nature if it encourages new entrants to the 
industry. Beyer et al. (2010, 301) underline that proprietary information is costly 
because of its informativeness. They suggest that because non-disclosure may also be 
informative, the costs of disclosure are dependent on third parties’ reactions to 
managers’ decisions to provide or withhold information. Recent proprietary information 
models discuss partial disclosure equilibrium (Fischer & Verrecchia, 2004; Arya et al., 
2010) or consider different types of disclosure costs simultaneously (Suijs, 2005). 
Interestingly, Suijs (2005) examines the partial disclosure equilibrium of firms in a 
voluntary disclosure environment that includes both a fixed disclosure cost and a 
variable proprietary cost. He shows that in this setting, firms may voluntarily reveal bad 
private information to the public.    
 Probabilistic information endowment. The unraveling result theorem does not 
hold if investors are unaware that the manager has private information. If managers 
recognize unawareness on the part of investors, they are prone to withhold negative 
news (e.g., Dye, 1985; Jung & Kwon, 1988; Penno, 1997, Pae, 2002). Moreover, 
managers can time their disclosures strategically by providing good news earlier than 
bad news and by clustering their disclosures in time (Dye & Sridhar, 1995; Einhorn & 
Ziv, 2008; Acharya et al., 2011). 
                                                 
6 According to Jorgensen & Kirschenheiter (2003) positive information gives investors favorable signals 
on the values and riskiness of firms' assets. 
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 Uncertain investor response. To be valid, the unraveling result theorem requires 
that every investor has a uniform interpretation and reaction to managers’ 
disclosure/non-disclosure and that managers can predict the behavior of investors. The 
existing theoretical models demonstrate that investors have a significant role in a firm’s 
disclosure strategies because their characteristics mainly determine disclosure decisions 
(e.g., Fishman & Hagerty, 2003; Suijs, 2007). Moreover, Dye & Sridhar (2002) show 
that investors’ reactions to managers’ disclosures may help management itself to gain 
new information from investors. Thus, corporate disclosures may also be used to acquire 
new information from stock markets.  
 Uncertain disclosure incentives. The unraveling result theorem also requires that 
managers aim at maximizing the firm’s market capitalization and investors are aware of 
this target. However, Aboody & Kasznik (2000) demonstrate that in reality, managers 
may sometimes also have a motive to minimize stock prices, for example when they are 
rewarded with stock options. Hence, if investors are uncertain about managers’ reporting 
objectives, they may price the firm at some weighted average of good and bad news and 
full disclosure equilibrium will not be achieved (Einhorn, 2007). 
 Non-verifiable disclosure. The full disclosure of firms predicted by the 
unraveling result theorem will not be achieved if firms disclose untruthfully. Beyer et al. 
(2010, 303) point out that firms may also share information via informal communication 
channels where they do not necessarily have to tell the whole truth. The existing 
literature suggests that investors’ interpretations of (possibly untruthful) voluntary 
disclosures and managers’ disclosure strategies depend largely on the costs of 
misrepresentation.7  
 Cheap-talk models demonstrate managers’ propensity to disclose 
opportunistically according to their objectives if misreporting does not result in any 
direct costs. Stocken (2000) argues that this kind of boilerplate disclosure is irrelevant to 
investors because it does not reflect the private information of managers. However, the 
incentives of managers and investors (or other stakeholders) may sometimes be only 
partially misaligned, which may increase the informativeness of managers’ disclosures 
                                                 
7 Boilerplate disclosure and impression management are other terms which have been used in the existing 
literature to describe and/or discuss non-verifiable disclosures. 
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(Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Gigler, 1994). The cheap-talk models demonstrate the 
complexity of the corporate information environment. Managers’ disclosure decisions 
are endogenously determined by the threat of competitors and forthcoming 
communication possibilities (Beyer et al., 2010, 303). Gigler (1994) shows that in some 
cases, the proprietary nature of managers’ private information may even increase the 
probability of voluntary disclosure. With respect to the topic of this doctoral dissertation, 
it is also important to note that cheap-talk models can also be applied to mandatory 
disclosure settings (Fischer & Stocken, 2001).  
 Costly state falsification models propose that managers have incentives for 
disclosure because cheap talk is costly to managers. More specifically, the costs of 
untruthful disclosure are usually considered to be related to the extent of the difference 
between the true and reported value of managers’ private information. However, due to 
the complexity of the corporate information environment, managers sometimes withhold 
their private information despite the costs of reporting distortions (see, Korn, 2004; 
Beyer & Guttman, 2012; Einhorn & Ziv, 2012). 
 Ex-ante commitment to disclosure strategies. The last condition of the unraveling 
result theorem is that managers cannot commit their disclosure policy ex-ante, that is, 
before they obtain private information (Beyer et al., 2010, 304). Verrecchia (2001) 
provides a good example of this by demonstrating a Cournot duopoly in which one firm 
knows the demand, others are totally unaware of it, and the selling price of the 
equilibrium is positive. In this situation those managers who make an ex-ante 
commitment to disclosure strategy decide not to disclose, whereas those who do not 
make such a commitment disclose all their private information. If managers can make an 
ex-ante commitment to disclosure it may reduce welfare in society because of reduced 
risk sharing opportunities. Overall, the existing models help us to understand how the 
costs and benefits of disclosure determine managers’ ex-ante disclosures. They show 
that ex-ante and ex-post optimal disclosures may differ and hence different mechanisms 
will be needed to ensure that managers commit to the ex-ante optimal disclosure 
policies. Corporate governance structures and regulation can be used in this work (Beyer 
et al., 2010, 304). 
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2.3.2  Managers’ Voluntary Disclosure Motives 
 
Healy & Palepu (2001) and Beyer et al. (2010) review several motives that have been 
provided in the existing literature as incentives for voluntary disclosure. Next we 
examine these factors more in detail. 
 Capital market transactions. Managers may have an incentive to improve 
disclosure if they consider raising money from the equity or debt markets in the near 
future. This is so because additional disclosures alleviate the adverse selection problem 
and hence the information risk component of the firm’s cost of capital lowers (cf., 
Akerlof, 1970; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Barry & Brown, 1985; Barry & Brown, 1986). 
This has a positive impact on the market value of the firm and helps managers to issue 
new equity and debt at favorable rates (Healy and Palepu, 1993).8 The positive 
association between disclosure quality and capital market transactions is documented in 
several empirical studies (e.g., Ruland et al., 1990; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Marquardt 
& Wiedman, 1998; Healy et al., 1999; Lang & Lundholm 2000). However, the manager 
who considers raising private debt is not necessarily highly motivated for public 
voluntary disclosure. Gibbins et al. (1992) suggest that high proprietary costs provide 
incentives to use private debt or internal financing and thus to avoid public disclosure. 
 Corporate control contest and stock-based compensation. Managers may use 
voluntary disclosure to prevent the undervaluation of the firm and to explain low 
earnings. Prior literature shows that poor stock performance increases the threat of job 
loss (Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach 1988). Another consequence of low stock prices is 
the increased probability of hostile takeovers, which usually lead to replacement of the 
existing CEO (Palepu, 1986; Morck et al., 1990). The stock compensation hypothesis 
suggests that when the manager’s reward is tied to some stock-based compensation plan, 
managers who consider trading their stock holdings have an incentive to disclose private 
                                                 
8 Generally speaking, managers may have various incentives for influencing the market valuation of the 
firm in addition to those discussed in this review. The inadequacy and incompleteness of information are 
reflected in the cost of capital as a premium above the risk-free rate of return and the economic risk 
premium (Elliott & Jacobson, 1994). Because of the information asymmetry component of the firm’s cost 
of capital, its market value is always lower than its fundamental value in imperfect market settings (Scott, 
2009). However, misvaluation exists when the market value is higher/lower than its true value (Lev, 
1992). Firms may become overvalued for example if a manager lies and provides overly positive 
information on the future prospects of the firm; this hinders efforts by investors to assess the economic 
risk premium of the firm correctly and increases the litigation risk of the manager.  
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information to comply with insider trading rules, to increase liquidity, and to correct 
undervaluation of the firm. The existing managers are also motivated to correct the 
misvaluation of the firm by providing voluntary information to decrease the contracting 
costs with the new managers, and thus to increase the efficiency of contracting (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001). There is empirical evidence that the disclosure strategies of the managers 
are influenced by their intent to sell/buy their companies’ securities (Noe, 1999) and to 
time their disclosures opportunistically to maximize stock option awards (Aboody & 
Kasznik, 2000). Interestingly, Nagar et al. (2003) demonstrate that equity-based 
incentives may also increase managers’ motives to release bad news.  
 Proprietary costs. Manager’s disclosures may generate proprietary costs to the 
firm if such disclosures are harmful to its competitive position in the product markets 
(Verrecchia, 1983; Verrecchia, 2001; Dye, 2001).9 Proprietary costs are a good example 
of negative externalities from high-quality disclosures. The proprietary costs theory 
assumes that managers and shareholders have the same interests and hence voluntary 
disclosures will always be credible. The impact of proprietary costs on managers’ 
disclosure strategies depend on whether their inside information may be utilized by the 
existing competitors or possible new entrants and whether firms’ competitive edge rests 
on price or long-run capacity decisions (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Proprietary information 
usually has a direct impact on a firm’s cash flows but may also have an indirect 
influence if it encourages new entrants to markets (Scott, 2009).10 The disadvantages of 
proprietary information may vary across disclosed items. For instance, segment 
information reveals a firm’s most profitable businesses and hence a manager in a firm 
with varying business segments may be motivated to withhold detailed information from 
competitors (Hayes & Lundholm, 1996). Empirical evidence on the impact of 
                                                 
9 Verrecchia’s (1983) discretionary disclosure model helps us to understand managers’ voluntary 
disclosure strategies when investors have rational expectations from their reporting incentives. He 
demonstrates that managers reflect their disclosure choices against a point (the threshold level of 
disclosure) which determines whether or not they disclose some inside information to investors. 
Verrecchia’s model demonstrates that the greater the proprietary costs associated with the disclosure of 
information, the less negatively investors react to the managers’ decision to withhold that information.  
10 For example, Elliot & Jacobson (1994) suggest that proprietary information includes evidence of 
technological and managerial innovations (e.g., production processes, more effective quality-improvement 
techniques, marketing approaches), strategies, plans, and tactics (e.g., planned product development, new 
market targeting), and operations (e.g., segment sales and production cost figures, workforce statistics). 
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proprietary costs on managers’ disclosure strategies is mixed and there is no clear 
evidence whether proprietary costs decrease managers’ disclosure incentives (cf., 
Bamber & Cheon, 1998; Eng & Mak, 2003; Botosan & Stanford, 2005; Verrecchia & 
Weber, 2006; Berger & Hann, 2007; Troberg et al., 2010). Healy & Palepu (2001) point 
out that the proprietary cost hypothesis can also be used to explain managers’ reactions 
to other externalities from information disclosure such as the political and contracting 
costs.  
 Liquidity. Information asymmetry reduces liquidity because investors are aware 
that some firms which do not make voluntary disclosures are potential lemons (cf., 
Akerlof, 1970). Liquidity consists of market depth and bid-ask spread components. 
When a firm withholds information, investors protect themselves by increasing the 
spread of the firm’s share. Moreover, high information asymmetry may also reduce the 
number of shares that investors want to buy or sell on the market (Scott, 2009, 480). 
Several theoretical papers predict a positive association between voluntary disclosure 
and stock liquidity (e.g., Copeland & Galai, 1983; Glosten & Milgrom, 1985; Diamond 
& Verrecchia, 1991; Kim & Verrecchia, 1994; Easley & O’Hara, 2004). Improved 
disclosure quality and liquidity also increase institutional investors’ interest in the firm, 
which further enhances liquidity (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Kim & Verrecchia, 
1994). The existing empirical literature provides evidence which is consistent with the 
liquidity hypothesis. For example bid-ask spread and trading volume have been used as 
measures of information asymmetry in these papers (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; 
Welker, 1995; Healy et al., 1999; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000). 
 Cost of capital. Increased levels of voluntary disclosure are expected to reduce 
the information asymmetry component of the firm’s cost of capital. This has a positive 
impact on the firm’s value and hence additional disclosures may be a strategic tool for a 
value maximizing manager. Easley & O’Hara (2004) argue that the precision and 
quantity of the accounting information is negatively related to a firm’s cost of capital. 
They argue that private information influences the risk faced by uninformed investors, 
whereas better informed investors can adapt to new information and make the needed 
changes to their investment portfolios. On the contrary, Hughes et al. (2007) suggests 
that in large economies the information risk related to idiosyncratic factors can be 
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entirely diversified and should not have any systematic impact on the cost of capital. 
Also, Lambert et al. (2007) contend that the information risk of the Easley & O’Hara 
(2004) model can be diversified when there are a large number of investors on the stock 
market. Lambert et al. (2012) suggest that information precision and information 
asymmetry are the components of information quality. They state that better corporate 
disclosure decreases the cost of capital because the average precision of investors’ 
information increases, not because information asymmetry decreases. Christensen et al. 
(2010) and Bertomeu et al. (2011) have also brought their contribution to this discussion. 
Several empirical papers examine the predictions of the existing theoretical models (e.g., 
Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Francis et al., 2005; Leone et 
al., 2007; Francis et al., 2008) and find some support which is in line with the 
hypothesis. However, the pricing effect of information asymmetry remains controversial 
(see, Botosan, 2006; Artiach & Clarkson, 2011) and recent literature suggests that earlier 
research evidence may be driven by imperfect research design choices, inaccurate 
measures of cost of capital, and important omitted variables (Aboody et al., 2005; 
Easton & Monahan, 2005; Hou & Robinson, 2006; Easton & Sommers, 2007; Cohen, 
2008).  
 Litigation costs. Healy & Palepu (2001) propose that the litigation risk can 
increase or decrease managers’ financial disclosures. On the one hand, the threat of 
shareholder litigation because of inadequate and/or untimely disclosures may increase 
managers’ motives to disclosure voluntarily. In line with this statement, Skinner (1994) 
suggests that managers have an incentive to disclose bad earnings news early to reduce 
litigation costs. On the other hand, the risk of litigation may also have a negative effect 
on managers’ disclosure decisions relating to forward-looking information. This is so 
because in some institutional settings managers do not trust the legal system to make a 
distinction between their unexpected forecast error and deliberate bias, and are hence 
worried about the litigation costs of inaccurate forecasts made in good faith (Healy & 
Palepu, 2001). Skinner’s (1994, 1997) empirical findings demonstrate that firms with 
negative earnings news are more like to be sued, are more willing to pre-disclose bad 
earnings news, and have lower litigation costs. On the contrary, Francis et al. (1994) 
finds that early disclosures do not prevent litigation costs. There is also some evidence 
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that managers are more willing to disclose earnings forecasts in less litigious 
institutional settings (Baginski et al., 2002). The most recent literature has discussed the 
limitations of earlier papers and provided some evidence that litigation costs influence 
managers’ decision-making (Field et al., 2005, Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009; Lowry, 
2009). 
 Signaling. Signaling models describe managers’ incentives to reveal inside 
information on firms’ quality differences, and hence to mitigate the problems of 
information asymmetry.11 Signaling theory presumes that giving signals is cheaper for 
successful than unsuccessful managers; this makes signals a credible proxy for a 
manager’s performance and increase their value in the managerial labor markets (Scott, 
2009, 457). Fama (1980) suggests that the managerial labor markets can control the 
moral hazard problem. If managers succeed in building a good reputation on the market, 
their future compensation is likely to increase. In line with these arguments, Trueman 
(1986) states that talented managers have an incentive to provide voluntary earnings 
forecasts to signal their type. Both direct and indirect signals are considered in the 
existing literature (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Hughes, 1986; Titman & Trueman, 1986; Datar 
et al., 1991, Healy & Palepu, 1993) such as direct disclosure, audit quality, forecast 
quality, capital structure, dividend policy, and accounting policy. Both direct and 
indirect signals can be used to reduce the risk of adverse selection, although as Healy & 
Palepu (1995) demonstrate, the impact of indirect signals can be very slow. From the 
standard-setting perspective it is important to note that for signals to be applicable, 
managers must have a choice. Accordingly, reducing the latitude to choose disclosure 
policy may reduce its signaling content (Scott, 2009, 458).   
 Corporate governance. Decisions by managers to disclose information 
voluntarily to outside investors may also be motivated by the corporate governance 
mechanisms of the firm. The existing literature provides evidence of the relationship 
between several corporate governance factors and the quality of corporate financial 
                                                 
11 Spence (1973) developed the signaling theory to describe managers’ decision-making in the labor 
market. He stated that high-productivity people want to have a higher education than low-productivity 
people. Thus employers may take employees’ education as a signal of their productivity and pay a higher 
salary to more educated employees. Spence also showed that there is an equilibrium at which employers 
can rely on the job applicant’s education as a credible signal of their capabilities.   
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disclosures. The factors examined include ownership structure, outside directors’ 
reputation, and board independence (e.g., Healy et al., 1999; Fan & Wong, 2002; Eng & 
Mak, 2003; Bushman et al., 2004; Ajinkya et al., 2005; García-Meca & Sánchez-
Ballesta, 2010; Florence & Thomas, 2012). The evidence is somehow mixed but shows 
that certain governance factors are associated with managers’ disclosure policies. For 
example, the meta-analysis of García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) documents that 
board independence and voluntary disclosure are positively associated only in countries 
with high investor protection rights. Bens (2002) also finds that voluntary disclosures 
and shareholders’ efforts to monitor managers are positively associated, which suggests 
that monitoring and voluntary disclosure complement each other. Finally, Hope & 
Thomas (2008) demonstrate that financial disclosures can be used to ensure that the 
manager’s actions are congruent with the preferences of the shareholders. Overall, 
because of the endogenous nature of the corporate information environment, it is 
difficult to solve the issue of causality and endogeneity in the papers discussed above 
(Beyer et al., 2010).  
 Public interest. Lang and Lundholm (1996) suggest that managers may increase 
information intermediation via voluntary disclosures. If the mandatory disclosure 
requirements of the GAAP are inadequate for revealing managers’ inside information, 
they can lower the information acquisition costs of the analysts through voluntary 
disclosures. On the one hand, extended disclosures may arouse the interest of financial 
analysts and hence increase their dissemination of information on the firm in the 
investment markets and media. On the other hand, improved voluntary disclosures may 
also reduce the need of sophisticated investors for the services of analysts.  
 Other empirical evidence. The previous voluntary disclosure literature provides 
empirical evidence on several determinants of managers’ voluntary disclosures. Many of 
them reflect managers’ disclosure motives discussed above. Consequently, they are 
somehow related to the need of managers of certain types of firms to reduce the adverse 
effect of the consequences of information asymmetry. The positive impact of firm size 
on the level of voluntary disclosure has been documented since the earliest disclosure 
studies (e.g., Cerf, 1961; Buzby, 1975; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; Lang 
& Lundholm, 1993; Hossain et al., 1995). Cooke (1989) and Hossain et al. (1995) 
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demonstrate that listing status explains greater voluntary disclosure, whereas Cerf (1961) 
does not find any difference between the disclosures of firms traded on the New York or 
American Stock Exchanges and those traded on the OTC market. Also, the impact of 
profitability (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Leuz, 2000; Prencipe, 2004), capital structure 
(Meek et al., 1995; Eng & Mak, 2003), prospects for growth (Kanto & Schadewitz, 
1997), and globalization (Cahan et al., 2005) on voluntary disclosures has been 
demonstrated in the existing literature. There is also cross-country evidence on the effect 
of legal origin, national culture, and reporting incentives on the functioning of capital 
markets and on the quality of firms’ financial reporting (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997; La 
Porta et al., 2000; Ball et al., 2003; Hope, 2003a; Rahman et al., 2010). 
 
2.3.3  Justification for Regulation   
 
Healy & Palepu (2001) assert that perfectly working auditing and accounting regulations 
force managers to disclose changes on the performance and prospects of their firms to 
outside investors. However, accounting regulations and auditing are usually imperfect. 
This encourages managers to consider carefully whether or not to reveal their inside 
information to equity and debt investors because additional disclosures may reduce their 
ability to manage reported performance for contracting, political, or corporate 
governance reasons.  
 The unraveling result theorem discussed in the preceding section suggests that in 
perfect markets managers have unconditional incentives to disclose all private 
information to outside investors. Otherwise they might not be able to raise scarce capital 
from the markets. In this kind of perfect environment there is no need for disclosure 
regulation (e.g., Milgrom, 1981; Admati & Pfleiderer, 2000). The view is consistent 
with the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics provided in the 
microeconomics literature, which suggests that equilibrium allocations are Pareto 
optimal or efficient, and that optimal allocations can be sustained at equilibrium for 
some distribution of endowments. It suggests that competitive markets have a tendency 
to allocate resources efficiently, in other words, Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ is at 
work. 
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 Although corporate disclosures are regulated via several laws and there is also 
some empirical evidence that disclosure regulation reduces information asymmetry (e.g., 
Bushee & Leuz, 2005; McLaughlin & Safieddine, 2008), there is no unifying theory of 
mandatory disclosure (Dye, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). One probable reason is that the 
benefits and costs of regulation depend on how we value the preferences of different 
constituents (Beyer et al., 2010, 315). Several market frictions that exist in imperfect 
settings may influence managers’ disclosure decision (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 
1986). Market frictions are caused for example by transaction costs, taxes, regulation, 
and agency and information problems (DeGennaro & Robotti, 2007). Information 
problems relate to various types of misrepresentations and failures to disclose relevant 
information to investors. Market frictions are harmful to firms because they may 
generate direct and indirect costs. The production and dissemination of private 
information is the major source of direct costs whereas indirect costs arise from 
proprietary or legal costs (Bassen et al., 2010).  
 The discretionary disclosure model (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986) can be 
used to understand the need for regulation in imperfect market settings. Accordingly, 
managers decide whether to disclose or withhold information solely on the basis of the 
costs and benefits of disclosure.12 Discretion in disclosure may be problematic because it 
easily increases the opportunistic behavior of managers. Another disadvantage of 
discretion is that it may lead to financial (informational) externalities.13  
 Financial externalities. Financial (informational) externalities occur when 
managers’ disclosures reveal indirect information on other firms’ performance and 
prospects (Beyer et al., 2010, 315). Consequently, they influence investors’ perceptions 
on the relations between firms in the market by helping them to use one firm’s 
disclosures as an indirect signal of other firms’ values (Foster, 1981; Detemple, 2002). 
For example, intra-industry information transfer may lead to informational externalities. 
Withholding information because of informational externality may have a negative 
                                                 
12 One assumption of this trade-off theorem is that managers’ objective is to maximize the firm’s stock 
price. Consequently, this theory is valid only when agency problems do not hinder realization of this 
maximization objective (cf., Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
13 An externality is an action taken by a firm that generates benefits or costs to other firms and from which 
the firm responsible for the action does not receive revenue or is not charged. Firms which benefit from an 
externality are free-riders (Scott, 2009, 462). 
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impact on social welfare at the aggregate level. This problem can be alleviated through 
mandatory disclosure requirements (e.g., Dye, 1990; Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991; 
Admati & Pfleiderer, 2000). In addition to financial externalities, Beyer et al. (2010, 
315-316) review the following three justifications for disclosure regulation in prior 
literature: real externalities, agency costs, and economies of scale.  
 Real externalities. A manager’s disclosures may also impact other managers’ real 
decisions, hence creating real externalities. This is closely linked to the proprietary costs 
of the firm discussed in the preceding section. For example, a manager’s prospective 
disclosures may attract new entrants to the market or impact other managers’ strategic 
decisions (Vives, 1984; Darrough, 1993; Pae, 2000; Kanodia et al., 2000; Pae, 2002; 
Hughes et al., 2002). This may affect the firm’s future cash flows and hence the manager 
has an incentive to withhold that information. Regulation will be needed to ascertain that 
managers disclose the optimal level of information from the social welfare perspective.  
 Agency costs. Several papers argue that the reduction of information asymmetry 
via improved disclosures reduces agency costs (Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002). This is so 
because higher quality and level of information facilitates better contracts and easier 
monitoring of agents (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Holmström, 1979, Armstrong et 
al., 2010). However, the agency costs do not necessarily reduce welfare at the aggregate 
level in society because from the society’s point of view, non-optimal decisions by 
managers mean wealth transfer, but not a loss for society as a whole. Moreover, the 
competitors will take advantage of the firm’s lost investment opportunities and hence 
society’s utility does not decrease. Consequently, if we want to justify disclosure 
regulation through reduced agency costs, we have to make the assumption that 
regulators can demand information that principals cannot and that mitigated agency 
problems increase wealth in society (Beyer et al., 2010, 316).14  
 Economies of scale. Regulation can increase the efficiency of the dissemination 
of information in society for example by reducing investors’ need to separately seek the 
same information, and by increasing the comparability of firms’ disclosures. This 
improves the accuracy of firm valuation and may also provide cost savings and 
                                                 
14 Regulation can influence an agent’s disclosure motives more effectively than private contracting 
because regulators can penalize firms in a way that is not possible in private contracting (Beyer et al., 
2010, 316).    
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efficiency gains in society at the aggregate level (Mahoney, 1995; Dye & Sunder, 2001; 
Dye & Sridhar, 2008).  
 Beyer et al. (2010, 316) point out that the above-mentioned justifications for 
disclosure regulation are still insufficient arguments on behalf of regulation for the 
following reasons. First, standards do not take into account the individual differences 
between the firms (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2000). Second, increased transparency does not 
always lead to positive consequences. Obligatory disclosures may have a negative effect 
on risk-sharing (Hirshleifer, 1971; Diamond, 1985) and they may also generate 
unnecessary costs to the society (Verrecchia, 1983). Reduced overall informativeness of 
stock prices (Fischer & Stocken, 2010; Guttman, 2010) and reduced cooperation 
between the agent and the principal (e.g., Christensen & Feltham, 2000; Allen et al., 
2006) are other potential negative effects of improved disclosures.  
 Scott (2009, 470) adds to the justifications described above by emphasizing that 
the direct and indirect costs of disclosures may sometimes be larger than the benefits of 
disclosure.15 Direct costs include the enforcement costs of the regulator and the 
compliance costs of the firms. Indirect costs refer to the costs to society that arise 
because the regulator demands too much information. However, considering standard-
setting purely from the perspective of economic theory would be an overly limited 
approach. Also, the political tensions behind regulators’ decisions should be taken into 
account. As the economic theory perspective rests on the public interest theory, 
regulation will probably be needed because of public demand for correction of market 
failures. Decisions on the right amount of information are very difficult from this 
viewpoint because information is such a complex commodity (Scott, 2009, 484). 
Consequently, some scholars consider this view superficial and naïve (Stigler, 1971; 
Posner, 1974; Peltzman, 1976). 
 The interest group theory is another theoretical standpoint on regulation. It 
suggests that regulators have to cooperate with several interest groups that have 
conflicting objectives and aspirations. In addition to those interest groups to whom the 
                                                 
15 For example, Bushee & Leuz (2005) examine the economic consequences of SEC disclosure regulation 
and provide evidence on both the costs and benefits of increased mandatory disclosure requirements. They 
depend on the characteristics of the firms. For instance, for smaller firms the new requirements are too 
costly, which forces them to delist from the OTCBB. 
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(disclosure) requirements are primarily targeted, the political authority is also an interest 
group and wants to retain its power. Regulators are the object of considerable lobbying 
and try to balance the conflicting incentives of the interest groups. The interest group 
theory suggests that in their decision-making regulators are likely to follow those 
interest groups that are most convincing about the importance of their preferences. The 
recognition of conflicting interest groups underlines that this theoretical view may 
predict standard-setting better than the public interest theory (Scott, 2009; 485-486). 
Furthermore, Scott (2009, 485) brings into discussion an important issue which has not 
received much attention in the existing accounting literature: the moral hazard problem 
of the regulator. It is often impossible for a legislature to monitor the work of regulators. 
This increases the likelihood that they will act on their own behalf or not make the full 
effort in doing their work. 
 Accounting theories and empirical accounting research can at best help standard 
setters in their inferences. Positivistic accounting research describes how things are but 
cannot say what the regulator should do. Interpretivist accounting research digs deeper 
into the observed phenomena but is also incapable of providing direct guidance to 
regulators. May & Sundem’s (1976, 748) description of the differences between 
accounting theory and accounting policy is still valid (italics added):  
 
“Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of policy decisions, it is necessary to 
distinguish between accounting theories and accounting policy [Ijiri, 1975. pp. 9–
11]. An accounting theory is a descriptive or predictive model whose validity is 
independent of the acceptance of any goal structure. Though assumed goals may 
be part of such a model, research relating to a theory or model of accounting does 
not require acceptance of the assumed goals as necessarily desirable or 
undesirable. On the other hand, accounting policy requires a commitment to 
goals and, therefore, requires a policy maker to make value judgments (emphasis 
added). Policy decisions presumably are based on both an understanding of 
accounting theories and acceptance of a set of goals. Research relating to 
accounting policy decisions must recognize and discern the aspect of the policy-
making process at issue.” 
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 Consequently, political issues are often so complex and subject to the influence 
of so many conflicting incentives that it would be naïve to examine issues only from the 
economic theory perspective. For example, there are conflicting assertions on whether 
the value relevance literature can help in standard setting. Barth et al. (2001) suggest that 
this part of the literature is useful for regulators whereas Holthausen & Watts (2001) 
take a more critical view. However, it can be concluded that academic research provides 
important evidence to regulators which can be used in planning effective and efficient 
standards. Much more knowledge on the benefits and costs of financial reporting will be 
needed before making any decisions on the optimal amount of disclosure regulation 
(Scott, 2009, 466). Recent empirical evidence on the economic consequences of 
disclosure regulation is mixed (Bushee & Leuz, 2005; Beyer et al., 2010, 319-321). 
 Scott (2009, 493-495) states four criteria that standard setters are expected to 
consider in their decision making. First, a new standard should be decision-useful, in 
other words it should provide relevant information to investors and other stakeholders. 
Second, it should also reduce information asymmetry in capital and managerial labor 
markets. Third, the overall costs of the new standards should not exceed the benefits. For 
example, in addition to the direct enforcement and compliance costs of the new 
standards, it should be borne in mind that increased regulation decreases the ability of 
managers to signal through voluntary disclosures. Moreover, the results of the cost-
benefit analysis may vary significantly because of firm and industry differences. Fourth, 
high quality due processes are important in securing that all interest groups commit to 
compliance with the new standards. 
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2.3.4 Evidence on Firms’ Compliance with Laws and Recommendations 
 
Firms have several reasons to comply with disclosure laws and recommendations. First, 
because disclosure laws are mandatory, firms are obligated to follow them. Non-
compliance with standards may cause significant costs to firms such as penalties from 
the regulator, increased political costs, and/or a bad reputation with the public. Empirical 
research on compliance with laws and recommendations has not been as common as 
voluntary disclosure research although some evidence can be documented. In addition, it 
should be taken into account that in several voluntary disclosure papers the researchers 
have been unable to exclude mandatory disclosures from the analysis (Beyer et al., 
2010).  
 Larger firms are expected to suffer more from political costs (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978), which may increase their responsiveness to new disclosure 
standards. Although there is some evidence on the positive size effect (e.g., Wallace & 
Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997), the association is ambiguous (e.g., Glaum & Street 2003). 
The positive impact of the global accounting firm on compliance is demonstrated in 
several mandatory disclosure studies (e.g., Wallace & Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; 
Gray & Street, 2002).  
 Gray & Street (2002) examine globally firms’ compliance with the International 
Accounting Standards and found significant non-compliance with IAS disclosure 
requirements. On the one hand, there is significant positive association between 
compliance and being domiciled in China or Switzerland. On the other hand, there is 
significant negative association between compliance and being domiciled in Africa, 
France, or Germany. In addition to the country differences, IAS-required disclosure is 
significantly greater for firms that are in the transportation, communication and 
electronics industry, or have an international listing.  
 Furthermore, there is also evidence on the interplay between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures. Inchausti (1997) demonstrates that regulatory pressures impact on 
mandatory disclosures but voluntary disclosures are immune to them. Also, Kanto & 
Schadewitz (1997) provide evidence on the differences between these two disclosure 
categories. Al-Razeen & Karbhari (2004) study the interaction between mandatory 
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disclosures, voluntary disclosures that relate closely to mandatory disclosures, and 
purely voluntary disclosures. The results reveal that there is a significant positive 
correlation between mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure that relates to 
mandatory disclosure. However, purely voluntary disclosure does not correlate with 
other disclosure categories. The authors conclude that no clear pattern exists between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Thus, investors are advised not to assume that 
firms that are better in mandatory disclosures also report more voluntarily. The authors 
suggest that one reason for the independence of voluntary and mandatory disclosures 
may be low coordination between the board of directors and the management in the 
preparation of the annual reports.  
 Moreover, Pope (2003) argues that two primary dimensions of accounting 
systems impact earnings predictability: the degree of disclosure and the accruals 
measurement rules. The earlier theoretical models do not predict any interaction between 
accounting policy choice and voluntary disclosure (e.g., Dye & Verrecchia, 1995; Gigler 
& Hemmer, 1998). On the contrary, Gietzmann & Trombetta (2003) demonstrate in their 
theoretical model that cost of capital is jointly determined by accounting policy choice 
and voluntary disclosure. Gietzmann & Ireland (2005), Espinosa & Trombetta (2007), 
and Dargenidou et al. (2011) find empirical support for this prediction by documenting 
that accounting policy choice influences the relationship between cost of capital and 
disclosure. In addition, the motives of managers for voluntarily increasing the 
informativeness of earnings via voluntary disclosures are empirically documented. Some 
of these studies have demonstrated that earnings quality and voluntary disclosure are 
positively associated (Lennox & Park, 2006; Francis et al., 2008); others have provided 
evidence of a negative relationship (Chen et al., 2002; Lougee & Marquard, 2004). 
These findings suggest that the disclosure choices are endogenously determined by 
earnings quality. Hence, the association between earnings quality and market 
consequences should not be examined without considering the endogenously determined 
availability of qualitative accounting information (see, Dechow et al., 2010). 
  Finally, Mangena & Tauringana (2007) examine compliance with recommended 
disclosures by analyzing the ASB Statements on interim reports among firms listed on 
the London Stock Exchange. They demonstrate that full compliance is not achieved 
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through the voluntary best practice guidance. However, their results suggest that firms 
react to disclosure recommendations, and give reason to presume that there are 
differences between purely voluntary disclosure and recommended disclosure. However, 
much more research will be needed before we can understand the interconnections 
between different forms of corporate disclosures (Beyer et al., 2010).  
   
2.3.5  Financial Reporting Quality and its Measurement 
 
Accounting literature lacks a sensible economic definition of disclosure quality and 
direct derivation of measures from that definition (see, Beyer et al., 2010, 311). Botosan, 
(2004, 290) states that the IASB and FASB conceptual frameworks provide good 
guidance regarding generally accepted views of information quality.16 However, it is 
very difficult to apply these requirements in the analyses of corporate disclosures 
without any subjective decision-making by the researcher. Beretta & Bozzolan (2008, 
341) point out that a valid definition for financial reporting quality requires consensus on 
the significant information items and how they are disclosed. However, such consensus 
is difficult to achieve because multiple stakeholders with conflicting interests use 
financial reports. Therefore, it is almost impossible to measure disclosure quality 
objectively. In this dissertation, we examine quality of corporate risk and transition 
disclosures in the IFRS era and hence investors’ role as end-users of information is 
emphasized in the analysis of quality.  
 The high-quality of corporate disclosures is an important issue for transparent 
and well-functioning capital markets. Previous studies report various disclosure-
measurement frameworks as an attempt to best capture differences in the quality of 
corporate disclosures (see, Marston & Shrives, 1991; Bushee, 2004). First, quantitative 
indices (e.g., CIFAR scores, Standard & Poor’s T&D scores) which are given by 
external organizations can be used to explicitly measure the quantity of disclosure (e.g., 
                                                 
16 For example, the fundamental qualitative characteristics of financial reporting information provided in 
the IASB conceptual framework (see, IASB, 2008) for financial reporting are relevance and faithful 
presentation. Enhancing qualitative characteristics are comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and 
understandability. They are complementary to the fundamental qualitative characteristics, and distinguish 
more useful information from less useful information. 
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Hope, 2003b; Khanna et al., 2004; Bushman et al., 2004). Second, survey rankings (e.g., 
analysts’ AIMR rankings) which contain both quantitative and qualitative examination 
of corporate disclosures have been utilized in previous studies (e.g., Lang & Lundholm, 
1993; Healy et al, 1999). Third, different content analysis techniques (e.g., simple 
calculation of disclosure words and self-constructed one-dimensional or multi-
dimensional disclosures indices) are widely used (e.g., Cerf, 1961; Singhvi & Desai, 
1971; Cooke, 1989; Botosan, 1997; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Francis et al., 2008; 
Shalev, 2009; Beck et al., 2010; Cheung et al., 2010; Miihkinen, 2012). They make it 
possible for scholars to develop their own detailed and accurate measures of firm 
disclosures for specific settings. Fourth, studies applying the natural language processing 
techniques have been conducted increasingly in recent years (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; 
Tetlock, 2008; Kothari et al., 2009; Demers & Vega, 2010). These methods enable 
larger sample sizes but may also result in less detailed proxies of disclosure. Finally, 
different earnings quality measures can also be used if the analysis of the quality of 
reporting is more focused on the recognition of net income and accruals in the financial 
statements of the firms (see, Dechow et al., 2010).  
 Furthermore, prior literature suggests that the quality of (risk) disclosure should 
be analyzed along several dimensions. New empirical measures for corporate disclosures 
have been constructed to reflect various dimensions of financial reporting quality (e.g., 
Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Bozzolan et 
al., 2009). Beattie et al. (2004) suggest that one quality dimension is the concentration of 
corporate disclosures across different topics and that a balanced description of these 
topics implicates higher quality. Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) argue that the semantic 
properties of corporate disclosure define its quality. They highlight that the focus should 
not be on the quantity of firms’ disclosures but on the content. Their indicators measure 
how much qualitative and quantitative information is provided by managers about the 
expected economic impact of the identified risk on future performance and how much 
they report on actions taken or programs planned to face corporate risks.  Bozzolan et al. 
(2009) hypothesize that verifiable disclosures are more useful than unverifiable 
disclosures to analysts and provide empirical support for their prediction. Moreover, 
although the extant literature has tried to distinguish between the quantity and quality of 
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corporate disclosures, Botosan (2004) argues that all of the new disclosure frameworks 
implicitly maintain the hypothesis that quantity and quality are positively related. 
Botosan’s (2004) arguments demonstrate that there is some dissonance between scholars 
on the right way to measure information quality.  
 This doctoral dissertation suggests that discussion between quantity and quality 
is partly rhetorical. We should not use the inherent conceptual difficulties of measuring 
disclosure quality in a complete, valid, and reliable manner as an excuse not to develop 
new avenues for measuring different aspects of corporate disclosure quality. New 
measures may provide useful approximations of some important aspects of quality and 
help further research to develop even better indicators of quality. Recent accounting 
literature has discussed at least the coverage and semantic properties of disclosure as 
alternative measurement approaches (e.g., Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 
2004; Miihkinen, 2012). Self-constructed disclosure indices have been criticized because 
they demand hand-collected information from corporate financial reports and are thus 
very labor-intensive. This also makes it more difficult to replicate and generalize the 
findings. However, self-constructed disclosure indices also facilitate very detailed 
analyses of specific research problems.  
 Another common problem in corporate disclosure research is the impossibility of 
controlling the entire corporate information environment. If we apply the full disclosure 
principle (Beaver, 1973) and assume that sophisticated investors can find the relevant 
and disclosed information everywhere, all this other information should be controlled. 
This is usually impossible. Both Core (2001) and Beyer et al. (2010) consider natural 
language processing techniques the most promising way to examine disclosure in future 
studies and some empirical papers already apply these techniques (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; 
Tetlock, 2008; Kothari et al., 2009; Demers & Vega, 2010). On the one hand, this 
approach enables larger sample sizes and more objective approach to data collection. On 
the other hand, at the moment the information collected with computerized methods is a 
relatively coarse measure of the quality of corporate disclosures. Hence, it does not 
allow the detailed and focused analyses often provided by hand-collected data. 
   
  
52 
 
2.4 Theoretical Framework of the Dissertation: 
 The Dissemination and Use of Information in the IFRS Era 
 
Figure 2 provides the theoretical framework of the doctoral dissertation. It describes the 
role of the main actors of the corporate information environment in the IFRS era. It 
builds on the assumption that markets are imperfect (e.g., there are information 
asymmetry and externalities in the market as described in section 2.3.3) and hence there 
is justification for regulation to ensure that the utility will be maximized at the aggregate 
level in society.  
 There are three main actors in the framework: regulatory body, reporting entity, 
and investors. The regulator releases new reporting initiatives (disclosure laws, 
standards, guidance, and recommendations).17 The process of formulating and issuing a 
law usually takes a long time. Similarly, the issuance of new standards by independent 
standard-setters is time consuming because of due processes which ensure that all 
interest groups will be heard before the final version. Disclosure laws and standards may 
be effective but lack efficiency in cases in which fast and/or transitory disclosure 
improvements are needed (e.g., transition disclosure). Sometimes the standard-setter 
may also clarify the disclosure requirements of the existing law by issuing a guideline on 
its application. This may be an efficient way to increase the impact of the law because 
the guideline does not require any long lasting due processes (cf., the risk disclosure 
guidance of the Finnish Accounting Practice Board).  
 This dissertation suggests that the quality of the process of formulating new 
reporting initiatives may suffer from the adverse effect of several contradictory political 
views and the aspects of different interest groups. Moreover, if nobody is responsible for 
                                                 
17 The relation between laws and standards depends on the institutional setting. In the US the SEC has 
mandated the FASB to issue standards. The FASB is a private national standard-setting body. However, 
the SEC may also issue its own standards. In the US, the Congress could in principle issue disclosure laws 
but this is unusual. With regard to IFRS the IASB is a private international standard-setting body which 
issues standards. On the European level, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament 
may decide on new disclosure directives or regulations proposed by the Commission. For example, 
Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and Council stipulated adoption of IFRS from 
2005 (European Parliament and Council, 2002). In Finland, the Parliament issues disclosure laws on the 
basis of drafts proposed by ministerial expert task force. The Finnish Accounting Practice Board works 
under the Ministry of Labor and Economy. It can clarify and interpret the Finnish Accounting Act 
(released by the Parliament) by issuing its own guidance on application of the law. 
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the process itself, poor coordination of the project leads to ineffective and inefficiently 
implemented standards, which may decrease the overall wellbeing of society.  
 We argue that the implementation phase of the new reporting initiatives is very 
important. The moral hazard problem may also exist on the regulators’ side, as described 
earlier in the literature review. If regulators are lax and do not ensure that managers 
interpret the new mandatory disclosure requirements correctly, the standard will 
probably have an effect on most managers’ behavior but the quality of disclosures may 
remain low, especially that of narrative disclosures in corporate financial reports. 
Similarly, disclosure recommendations may not be effective if the enforcement body is 
not active and does not encourage managers to follow them. ‘Regulation Enforcement’ 
and ‘Communication’ arrows illustrate this in figure 2. Communication between the 
regulatory body and the reporting entity reduces information asymmetry in relation to 
regulation enforcement (Information asymmetry A).  
 Moreover, it is important to control the impact of the new reporting initiatives on 
managers’ behavior and make adjustments if needed. A good example is the corrective 
action taken by the Finnish Accounting Practice Board (examined in essay 1) after they 
noticed that the general risk disclosure requirements of the Finnish Accounting Act were 
ineffective in improving firms’ risk disclosures. Finally, in the IFRS era it is essential to 
find the right form of cooperation between the local and global regulatory bodies and 
authorities. A good example is the cooperation between the CESR and the FIN-FSA 
regarding the IFRS transition disclosure (examined in essay 3). 
 Managers of reporting entities interpret the reporting initiatives issued by the 
regulator. They also make a decision on the degree and form of compliance with the 
initiative based on their threshold level of disclosure (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983). Because of 
the mandatory nature of laws and standards, all firms are obligated to follow them. 
Otherwise they may be penalized by the regulator, suffer from increased political costs, 
and/or obtain a bad reputation with the public (regulatory determinants).  
 The significance of the non-regulatory determinants of disclosure behind 
managers’ reporting decisions cannot be underestimated. For example, larger firms may 
be willing to decrease agency costs and political costs by increasing disclosures, or 
leveraged firms may want to conceal their financial condition and the increased threat of 
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covenant violations by reducing disclosure. Managers’ disclosure incentives and 
corporate governance factors (non-regulatory determinants) affect their disclosure 
decisions in both mandatory and recommend disclosures. For example, regarding 
disclosure on narrative issues such as risks, there is substantial room for variation in 
firms’ disclosure practices. A manager may choose a strategy to comply superficially 
with the risk disclosure standards by providing information on a very general level and 
repeating the same information year after year. In this case, full disclosure of the 
required information will not be the disclosure equilibrium. 
 Investors interpret the information provided by firms. Based on the content of the 
information they make new assessments of predicted future cash flows. They also 
consider whether the information risk of the firms has increased or decreased 
(Information asymmetry B).18 The level of information risk has a direct impact on firm 
value. If it increases, it also raises the discount factor that will be used in valuation of the 
firm. Consequently, the market value of the firm decreases (cf., Akerlof, 1970). The 
lower the information risk of the firm, the narrower is the gap between its market value 
and intrinsic value. 
 In addition to the main actors of the model, there are other factors which 
influence interpretation by managers and investors of the information provided. The 
auditor and the internal control functions of the firm help the manager to interpret what 
the regulatory body wants them to disclose and hence, have a role in reducing 
information asymmetry A. Auditors supervise reporting but also help firms to 
understand the content of the reporting requirements, which may improve the quality of 
disclosure. The internal control function supervises the quality and integrity of corporate 
reporting internally, and also increase the pressure for corrective actions in cases of low 
disclosure quality. Moreover, analysts may be beneficial in the reduction of information 
asymmetry B if they help investors to interpret the manager’s disclosures correctly. 
Analysts make their own interpretations of the information provided by firms. Although 
                                                 
18 It is also worth mentioning that sometimes firms also obtain new information from investors (as 
described earlier in the literature review). 
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this may simplify interpretation by investors, additional opinions may also increase 
confusion on the future prospects of the firms (cf., Healy & Palepu, 2001).19    
 The theoretical framework of the dissertation adds to the existing literature by 
seeing the role of information asymmetry in the capital markets from a wider 
perspective. Previous literature has focused more on information asymmetry B whereas 
we also include information asymmetry A in the analyses. It is important to understand 
that communication problems may exist at all levels in the corporate information 
environment. Sometimes the coercive effect of disclosure standards or recommendations 
may not have an optimal impact on managers’ reporting choices if the reporting 
requirements are poorly formulated and/or ineffectively implemented. 
                                                 
19 The framework of the dissertation assumes that information risk cannot be diversified because in 
imperfect markets all firms have information risk and its effect on firm value is always negative. In this 
sense the model differs from the recent theoretical models of perfect market settings which argue that 
information risk is not priced because it is diversifiable when the number of traders becomes large (e.g., 
Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2007). 
56
57 
 
3  RISK AND TRANSITION 
 DISCLOSURES: EVIDENCE AND 
 IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
Both risk and transition disclosures are new research areas in corporate disclosure 
literature. Literature on corporate risk disclosures has evolved in the last ten years. In 
addition, there is only meager direct evidence on transition disclosures. This section 
provides a detailed review of studies examining corporate risk disclosures, and also 
some prior evidence on transition disclosures. The characteristics and unique features of 
the Finnish risk disclosure environment are also discussed. Lastly, we summarize 
sections two and three and present the research gap in the literature that is relevant from 
the perspective of this doctoral dissertation.  
 
 
3.1 Risk Disclosure Regulation and Quality of Risk Disclosure 
 
Risk management is critical for the maximization of shareholder wealth because its 
purpose is to maximize profitability and minimize the probability of financial failure at 
the same time (Solomon et al., 2000). Therefore, investors need high-quality risk 
information. Moreover, employees, customers and other stakeholders may follow 
managers’ risk disclosures. Financial reporting has often been criticized for not 
providing a detailed description of risks and uncertainties (e.g., ICAEW, 1997). 
Academics, practitioners, and standard-setters have observed this problem and discussed 
whether regulatory bodies should plan more specific risk disclosure standards (cf., 
Schipper, 2003).  
 Although accounting researchers have become increasingly interested in risk 
disclosure in recent years (e.g., Elmy et al., 1998; Roulstone, 1999; Solomon et al., 
58 
 
2000; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & Zéghal 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; 
Abraham & Cox, 2007; Dobler, 2008; Dobler et al., 2011, Miihkinen, 2012), it is still 
one of the most ambiguous and unexplored areas of disclosure research. In particular, 
there is only meager evidence on risk disclosure quality. The importance of high-quality 
risk reporting has been also emphasized in several surveys, guidance, and standards of 
professional and regulatory bodies in the recent two decades (e.g., AICPA, 1994a, 
AICPA, 1994b; FASB, 2001; IASB, 2010; ICAEW, 1997, 1999a; 2006; 2011a, 2011b; 
IFAC, 2002; CICA, 2008, 2009, 2010; KPMG, 2008; SEC, 1997, 2005; FSA, 2005, 
2006; EFRAG, 2010; BCBS, 1998, 2013). These documents provide several frameworks 
and approaches for risk reporting. The unifying theme is the objective of enhancing the 
quality of corporate risk reports as the following examples demonstrate.  
 First, risk information is defined to be one content element of a decision-useful 
management commentary in IFRS Practice Statement on Management Commentary 
(IASB, 2010). One objective of the statement is to harmonize risk reporting, which is a 
challenging task, taking into account the variety of institutional corporate disclosure 
environments (cf., Hope, 2003a; Haller et al., 2009; Adelopo, 2011). Second, the SEC 
requires overall risk reviews in annual and quarterly reports from 2005 onwards (SEC, 
2005). Third, the ICAEW (2011a) provides a timely and extensive survey on the current 
stage and future challenges of risk reporting. Fourth, the BCBS’s (2013) brand new 
guidance presents principles to improve banks’ risk reporting practices. Furthermore, 
professional and regulatory bodies have also widely discussed the importance of first-
class corporate governance practices in recent years (ICAEW, 1999b; SEC, 2002; FRC, 
2004, 2005, 2011; COSO, 2004; IIA, 2008). Effective risk management and internal 
control are at the core of corporate governance and they are closely related to risk 
reporting. This is so because the identification and management of risks normally 
precedes their disclosures to stakeholders. 
 Risk information asymmetry may cause several problems in capital markets such 
as high transaction costs, thin markets, low liquidity, lower gains from trade, and 
unprofitable investments for defenseless minority investors (Lev, 1988). Considering the 
valuation and stewardship role of accounting information (see, Beyer et al., 2010), risk 
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disclosure provides useful information for both purposes. It facilitates more accurate 
valuation but can also be used as a coarse proxy for management’s sense of direction.  
 Previous literature demonstrates that managers react to new disclosure 
requirements and recommendations (Inchausti, 1997; Roulstone, 1999; Miihkinen, 
2008). Roulstone (1999) documents that FRR No. 48 is effective in improving the 
market-risk disclosures of US listed firms.20 However, prior literature has not provided 
evidence about the effectiveness of regulation in improving the overall quality of risk 
disclosure within a single country. For this reason, Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) suggest 
that future research should examine whether the quality of risk disclosure can be 
influenced through regulation. 
 The lack of evidence about the impact of risk disclosures in stock markets is one 
reason for delay in the development of risk standards and guidance (Schrand & Elliot, 
1998). Nowadays we have some evidence that risk disclosures provide decision-useful 
information to analysts and investors (Rajgopal, 1999, Jorion, 2002; Thornton & 
Welker, 2004; Huang, 2011; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2013). However, 
behavioral accounting studies demonstrate that risk reporting seldom helps investors to 
form risk judgments (Koonce et al., 2005a, 2005b). The deficiencies of managers’ risk 
disclosures are supported by several prior studies (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & 
Zéghal, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Linsley & Lawrence, 2007, and Dobler et al., 
2011).  
 Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) demonstrate that although Italian firms disclose some 
risk information voluntarily, the quality of risk reports is low. In the Canadian 
institutional setting, Lajili & Zéghal (2005) find that firms’ risk disclosures lack 
uniformity, clarity, and quantification, which reduces their decision-usefulness. Linsley 
& Shrives (2006) examine risk reporting in the UK and document that managers are 
reluctant to make many quantitative risk disclosures. Moreover, there is a lack of 
coherence in risk narratives, which is evidence of the existing risk information gap. This 
                                                 
20 FRR No. 48 was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1997 to improve market-
risk disclosures that were encouraged, but not required, under SFAS No. 119. One of the guiding 
principles followed by the SEC in planning the standard was that it should be flexible enough to take into 
account different types of registrants, different degrees of market-risk exposure, and alternative ways of 
measuring market risk (Linsmeier & Pearson, 1997). Consequently, the standard was principles-based and 
allowed managers considerable latitude in market risk disclosures.  
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hampers stakeholders’ assessment of corporate risk profiles. Linsley & Lawrence (2007) 
continue their analyses in the UK setting and show that corporate risk disclosures lack 
readability. Finally, Dobler et al. (2011) examine the international attributes of corporate 
risk disclosures. They demonstrate that risk disclosures are most common in 
management reports, concentrate on financial risk categories, and include little 
quantitative and forward-looking disclosure across sample countries (US, Canada, UK, 
Germany). They conclude that domestic regulation can only partly explain cross-country 
variation in the determinants of disclosure, which suggests that disclosure incentives 
play an important role in risk reporting. 
 
 
3.2 Risk Disclosure, Managers’ Disclosure Incentives and 
 Firms’ Corporate Governance Structures 
 
Managers’ disclosure motives influence corporate risk-reporting even under mandatory 
risk-disclosure requirements (Dye, 1990; Marshall & Weetman, 2007; Dobler, 2008; 
Dobler et al., 2011). Marshall & Weetman (2007) document that managers know much 
more about their foreign exchange risk management than they report to investors 
mandatorily. Their disclosure choices, and thereby their risk disclosures as well, are 
likely to be influenced by several motives and factors examined in section two of this 
literature review. For example, managers are motivated to reduce the adverse selection 
problems and agency costs via improved disclosures (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In addition, many factors demonstrated in voluntary disclosure 
literature are probable indicators of high-quality risk disclosure. These include for 
instance firm size (Cooke, 1989; Robb et al., 2001; Eng & Mak, 2003; Cahan et al., 
2005; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006), profitability (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Leuz, 2000; 
Prencipe, 2004), prospects for growth (Kanto & Schadewitz, 1997; Miihkinen, 2008), 
the need for external financing (Lang & Lundholm, 1993), and listing status (Cooke, 
1989; Hossain et al., 1995; Saudagaran & Meek, 1997; Robb et al., 2001).  
 Moreover, the type of financial system (bank versus market orientation) may also 
influence managers’ incentives to disclose risks in corporate financial statements and 
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annual reports (cf., La Porta et al., 1997; Ongena & Smith, 2000). On the one hand, in 
bank-oriented financial systems (e.g., Germany, Italy, and Spain) direct communication 
with banks is important which may reduce incentives for public disclosures of relevant 
information. On the other hand, in market-oriented financial systems the pressures for 
high-quality investor communication are high. Traditionally, Finland has been a bank-
oriented country but in the recent decades the pressures for transparency in risk reporting 
have increased because of the liberalization and internationalization of the capital market 
(see section 3.5 for a more detailed description of the evolvement of the Finnish risk 
disclosure environment).  
 Furthermore, some firms may have more potential risk information to disclose to 
the investors because of their higher exposure to risks (Lin et al., 2010). Firm with high 
leverage have increased bankruptcy risk, which makes them more vulnerable to risks 
(cf., Dobler et al., 2011). Also, business risk (e.g., volatility of the yearly cash-flows and 
globalization) may influence managers’ risk disclosure behavior (Jorgensen & 
Kirschenheiter, 2003; Cahan et al., 2005). Moreover, high sensitivity to systematic risk 
in the capital markets may motivate managers to improve risk disclosures (Linsley & 
Shrives, 2006).  
 Finally, corporate governance structures may also influence their risk-reporting 
(Abraham & Cox, 2007). High ownership concentration probably decreases willingness 
to provide detailed risk information. In addition, the ratio of foreign owners to domestic 
owners may impact managers’ risk disclosure choices. 
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3.3 Evidence on the Economic Consequences of Risk Disclosure 
 
We discussed the mixed views on the relationship between corporate disclosure and cost 
of capital in recent years in section two (e.g., Easley & O’Hara, 2004; Hughes et al., 
2007; Lambert et al., 2007; Beyer et al., 2010). Jorgensen & Kirschenheiter (2003) 
model managerial equilibrium strategies for voluntarily disclosing information about 
firm risks and show that a disclosing firm has a lower risk premium and beta ex post 
than a non-disclosing firm. 
   Starting with Amir & Lev (1996), many scholars have begun to explore 
empirically whether soft accounting information provides incremental information to 
investors (e.g., Abrahamson & Amir, 1996; Kothari et al., 2009; Demers & Vega, 2010). 
The findings of these studies have demonstrated that soft accounting information is 
indeed useful to investors. However, the accounting literature provides only meager 
empirical evidence on the economic consequences of narrative risk disclosures.  
 The existing evidence is mainly limited to the analyses of the value relevance of 
risk disclosures provided in line with the Securities and Exchange Commission's 
requirement FRR No.48. It requires firms to provide quantitative and qualitative 
disclosures about exposure to market risk and to disclose how they account for 
derivatives (see, Rajgopal, 1999; Linsmeier, 2002; Jorion, 2002; Liu et al., 2004; Lim & 
Tan, 2007; Pérignon & Smith, 2010). Rajgopal (1999) demonstrates that market-risk 
disclosures by oil and gas producers affect their stock return sensitivities to oil and gas 
price movements. Lim & Tan (2007) document that a higher quantitative value-at-risk 
estimate is associated with a weaker return-earnings relation and a higher future stock-
return volatility.  
 Recently, concurrent studies on mandatory corporate overall risk reviews in the 
US have provided evidence that these disclosures are informative to investors despite the 
reporting deficiencies (Huang, 2011; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2013). 
Campbell et al. (2013) demonstrate that risk disclosures associate negatively with 
information asymmetry. Kravet & Muslu (2013) analyze 10-K filings and show that 
increases in qualitative risk factors in corporate annual reports are correlated with 
increases in stock-return volatility and trading volume around and after the filings. 
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3.4 Transition Disclosure on the Impact of the Adoption of 
 IFRS 
 
All firms listed in a stock exchange of any Member State of the European Union have 
been required to follow IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) in their 
consolidated financial statements since 2005. For this reason, at the end of 2003, the 
CESR (Committee of European Securities Regulators) published a Recommendation for 
Additional Guidance Regarding the Transition to IFRS, which provided guidance on 
how managers should disclose the transition effects of the adoption of IFRS.  
 All transitions from one financial accounting system to another are always 
unique and may influence decision-making by investors if they do not know what is 
behind the reported numbers. Hence transition disclosure is closely linked to risk 
disclosure. The adoption of IFRS had a significant influence on financial reporting by 
listed firms. Without appropriate transition disclosure, it would have been more difficult 
to investors to assess corporate risk profiles. Consequently, high-quality transition 
disclosure also enabled more accurate valuation of the firms. 
 Excluding the third essay of this dissertation (Miihkinen, 2008), only Kent and 
Stewart (2008) provide evidence on the determinants of transition disclosure to IFRS in 
the existing literature. They examine the association between the level of disclosure and 
corporate governance quality. They document that the quantity of disclosure is 
positively associated with some aspects of superior corporate governance, such as the 
frequency of board and audit committee meetings and the choice of auditor. 
 The non-scientific studies of the Finnish Financial Supervision Authority (FIN-
FSA) provide insights into the Finnish listed firms’ transition disclosure on the adoption 
of IFRS standards in 2004 and 2005. FIN-FSA demonstrates that in 2004 transition 
disclosures were insufficient although 70 percent of the firms gave some IFRS 
disclosure (FIN-FSA, 2004). However, less than half of the firms had a moderate or 
good level of disclosure. The results demonstrate that eight percent of the firms did not 
mention IFRS in their financial statements, 24 percent mentioned only the transition 
date, 45 percent described the transition process, and 54 percent described differences in 
the preparation of financial statements between the Finnish Accounting Act and IFRS.  
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 As regards disclosures in 2005, FIN-FSA states that about 80 per cent of 125 
listed firms had disclosed on the transition to IFRS at the latest in conjuncture with the 
first interim report (FIN-FSA, 2005). FIN-FSA notes that the Finnish listed firms 
disclosed more actively with regard to the IFRS transition than the firms of other EU 
Member States. The quality of transition disclosure was on average good, although big 
differences also existed. The study suggests that bigger firms disclosed better on 
average. However, FIN-FSA states that transition disclosures were partly difficult to 
understand. 30 per cent of the firms informed that the impact of IFRS on shareholder’s 
equity was minor. For other firms, the effect seemed to be moderate or significant. The 
greatest adjustments derived from the recognition of subordinated loans, the company’s 
own shares, minority interest, financial instruments, and tax liabilities. 60 per cent of the 
firms reported that IFRS increased their net income. The biggest changes were due to 
recognition of goodwill, real estates, pensions, and matching between earnings and 
expenses. Most firms also reported increases in assets mainly because of the new fair 
value-based recognition principles and the recognition of finance leases in the balance 
sheet. FIN-FSA concluded that the adoption of IFRS had significant influence on 
financial reporting by Finnish listed firms and, it was thus challenging to investors to 
understand the changes. FIN-FSA recommended that Finnish listed firms complement 
and clarify their forthcoming disclosures and continue their efforts to provide high-
quality IFRS-reports. 
 
 
3.5 The Finnish Risk Disclosure Environment 
 
The Finnish stock market has evolved considerably over the last few decades. The 
general internationalization and deregulation of the financial markets started in the early 
1980s - a few years later than in the other Nordic countries. The process proceeded 
gradually from the liberalization of the money market to the abolishment of all 
restrictions on capital movements to and from Finland. Finally, the restrictions on 
foreign ownership of Finnish stocks were removed in 1993. For international investors 
small markets are interesting because they may provide considerable diversification 
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benefits although the co-movements between Finnish and global market may have 
increased in recent years (see, Kallunki et al., 1997). 
 The trading of shares in Finland is concentrated in the largest companies (e.g., 
Nokia Plc, Stora Enso Plc, Nordea Plc). Markets are thin, which increases volatility and 
reduces liquidity especially among the smaller firms. The low number of trades also 
typically results in larger spread between the two quotes. Despite the low trading 
volume, the Finnish stock market research suggests that there are several fundamentals, 
such as earnings, macroeconomic factors, and financial leverage that are important 
determinants of stock prices in Finland (see, Kallunki et al., 1997). 
 The existing corporate disclosure literature provides some evidence from 
Finland. Ikäheimo’s (1996) dissertation is an extensive analysis of the factors behind 
communication in stock markets. Kanto & Schadewitz (1997) provide important insight 
into the differences between the determinants of mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
The need for this type of research was also highlighted in Beyer et al.’s (2010) review 
article. They demonstrate that both disclosure categories can be explained by a capital 
structure and growth-related factors, although firm size impacts only managers’ 
voluntary disclosures. Moreover, the economic significance of the capital structure and 
growth-related factors is much higher in the voluntary disclosure model.21  
 Voluntary disclosure theory suggests that managers who intend to raise external 
financing have an incentive to reduce the firm’s cost of capital through voluntary 
disclosure. In his dissertation, Seppänen (1999) examines whether external financing 
arrangements are associated with managers’ discretionary disclosures in the Finnish 
institutional setting. The results provide some evidence that disclosure frequency of 
forward-looking information and timely disclosure of material information increase with 
security offering frequency. Seppänen also demonstrates that private long-term debt 
financing is negatively associated with the timeliness of annual earnings announcements. 
 Finnish disclosure literature provides also evidence on the usefulness of 
voluntary reconciliation statements to investors. Niskanen et al. (2000) examine the 
value relevance of earnings recognized under the Finnish Accounting Act and their 
                                                 
21 Schadewitz (1997) provides additional evidence on the determinants of managers’ interim report 
disclosures in his dissertation.  
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voluntarily disclosed reconciliations to the International Accounting Standards. They 
suggest that local earnings have significant value relevance to both domestic and foreign 
investors. However, the aggregate reconciliation of local earnings to IAS earnings does 
not provide significant value relevance to domestic or foreign investors. The results for 
the value relevance of individual reconciling items suggest that adjustments relating to 
differences in untaxed reserves and consolidations have significant value relevance to 
both investor groups. 
 
 
3.6 Summary and Research Gaps 
  
The corporate information environment is very complex in nature and influenced by 
several often contradicting forces. In this setting financial accounting should be able to 
perform its valuation and stewardship roles. The unraveling result theory will not hold in 
imperfect market settings for several reasons, which increases the likelihood of 
managerial discretion. Prior literature documents several incentives for voluntary 
disclosure such as achievement of positive capital market consequences, reduction of 
agency costs and avoidance of proprietary costs. However, regulation can be justified for 
several reasons such as the reduction of the adverse effects of externalities and agency 
costs and increased economies of scale in society. Via regulation we can improve the 
optimal allocation of scarce capital resources in society and hence increase the welfare 
of society at the aggregate level. However, it is often difficult to decide on what is the 
right amount of regulation. Moreover, standard-setting demands careful cooperation 
with different interest groups.  
 Prior empirical literature provides more evidence on voluntary disclosure than on 
mandatory disclosure. More research will be needed on the interconnections between 
these two categories. Moreover, although we have found new ways to measure corporate 
disclosure quality in recent years, we are still in the beginning of that process.  
 The theoretical framework of this doctoral dissertation describes the 
dissemination and use of information in the IFRS era. It illustrates interaction between 
the regulatory body, reporting entity, and investors, and shows the importance of high-
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quality communication from the perspective of all actors. Especially, it contributes to 
prior literature by taking into account the role of effective communication in regulation 
enforcement. The existing literature has focused more on disclosure between the firm 
and investors, whereas we also underline the significance of effective communication 
between the regulatory body and the manager of the firm. It is essential to understand 
that communication problems may exist at both levels. For example, the regulatory body 
may be lax or there may be some other explanation for high information asymmetry 
between the manager and the regulatory body. Thus, the coercive effect of disclosure 
laws, standards, guidance, and recommendations cannot always influence optimally if 
the reporting requirements are poorly formulated and/or implemented. 
 Risk disclosures are important to investors because they provide evidence on the 
uncertainties relating to firms’ future prospects. Prior literature provides only meager 
evidence on the impact of regulation on risk disclosure quality, or on the association 
between managers’ disclosure motives and corporate governance structures with high-
quality risk disclosures. Moreover, evidence on the economic consequences of risk 
disclosures is mainly limited to market-risk disclosures, and hence we do not know how 
decision-useful the overall risk reviews made by managers are to investors. Lastly, 
taking into account the importance of effective transition between different accounting 
policies, there is surprisingly little evidence on the regulatory and non-regulatory 
determinants of corporate transition disclosures.  
 To summarize, the existing literature provides only meager evidence of the 
impact of regulation on the quality of risk disclosure or the impact of authoritative 
disclosure recommendations on corporate reporting. Furthermore, we need more 
evidence of the consequences of risk disclosure on stock markets in a highly regulated 
setting. Also, the non-regulatory determinants of risk and transition disclosures need 
additional research. Finally, although the existing accounting literature documents some 
methods for examining the quality of disclosure, we are only beginning to understand 
these issues more deeply. 
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4 RESULTS 
 
 
 
4.1 Research Question 1 Results 
 
The first essay (Miihkinen, 2012) answers the research question 1: Can a detailed 
national risk disclosure standard improve the quality of firms’ overall risk reviews 
under IFRS.  
 The results of a regression analysis point to the following main findings. First, 
the risk disclosure standard increases the quality of corporate risk disclosure on several 
dimensions. After the release of the standard, the risk reviews of the firms are more 
extensive and also provide more evenly distributed information across risk topics. 
Moreover, firms give more detailed qualitative descriptions of the economic impact of 
the identified risk on future performance and provide more information on actions taken 
and programs planned to face their risks. The first essay also documents an increase in 
willingness on the part of firms to provide quantitative risk information although the 
effect of the standard is weaker compared with other quality dimensions. 
 Second, the study finds that the coercive effect of the standard drives increases in 
the overall quality of risk disclosure. In addition, some evidence is also found that the 
impact of the standard on quality is more pronounced among less profitable firms, which 
may suggest that the coercive effect of the standard forces these firms to reconsider their 
threshold level of disclosure. Third, the results demonstrate that the risk disclosure 
standard has a strong impact on the location of the risk information provided. After the 
release of the standard, 81.9 percent of risk disclosure is provided in the operating and 
financial reviews. In the previous year the comparable number was 57.5 percent. An 
additional finding is that the quality improvements are permanent in the subsequent 
years. 
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4.2 Research Questions 2 Results 
 
The second essay answers the research question 2: Does the quality of risk disclosure 
provided by firms in their annual reports affect information asymmetry between the 
management and investors?  
 The results demonstrate that quality of risk disclosure associates negatively with 
information asymmetry. Firms that provide high-quality risk information also have 
lower levels of information asymmetry. The results are robust with respect to the 
alternative measures of information asymmetry used in the previous literature. 
 
 
4.3 Research Question 3 Results 
 
The second essay also answers research question 3: Do certain contingency factors such 
as firm riskiness, investor interest, and market condition affect the usefulness of annual 
risk disclosures to investors? 
 It is documented that firm riskiness influences the usefulness of risk disclosures. 
The results show that risk disclosure is more useful to investors if it is provided by small 
firms and high tech firms. Furthermore, this study demonstrates that investor interest 
also has an effect on the results. High-quality risk information is more useful to investors 
when it is provided by firms with low analyst coverage. Last but not least, the third 
essay shows that risk disclosure is useful to investors under all market conditions. 
However, it was also found that it is even more useful in falling and recovering stock 
markets than during rising stock markets.  
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4.4 Research Question 4 Results   
 
The third essay (Miihkinen, 2008) answers research question 4: In relation to the 
transition disclosure recommendation of the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR), is the behavior of firms more similar to voluntary or to mandatory 
disclosure? 
 The results indicate that recommended disclosure has more mandatory 
characteristics than voluntary disclosure. First, the mean is higher for recommended 
disclosure than for voluntary disclosure. This suggests that recommended disclosure has 
been on average better than voluntary disclosure. Second, the overall impact of control 
factors, disclosure incentives, and corporate governance factors is smaller on 
recommended disclosure than on voluntary disclosure. The finding implies that the 
mandatory characteristics of the authoritative disclosure recommendation decrease 
variation in firms’ recommended disclosures and hence the explanatory power of the 
recommended disclosure model is lower.  
 In addition, the empirical results demonstrate that firm size has a smaller impact 
on recommended disclosure than on voluntary disclosure. The existing literature is 
almost unanimous that firm size is a significant determinant of voluntary corporate 
disclosures (e.g., Cooke, 1989; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006). 
Hence, the finding is consistent with the view that the mandatory characteristics of the 
CESR transition disclosure recommendation decrease the impact of size on disclosure. 
The results provide evidence that recommended and voluntary transition disclosures can 
be placed in different disclosure categories. Although some firm characteristics 
influence firms’ responses to a change in disclosure regulation (the issuance of the 
CESR transition disclosure recommendation), they do not impact recommended 
disclosures as strongly as voluntary disclosures.  
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4.5 Research Question 5 Results 
 
The first and third essays answer research question 5: What are the non-regulatory 
determinants of risk and transition disclosures? 
 The first essay demonstrates that in addition to the impact of the detailed national 
risk disclosure standard, other important drivers of quality are firm size, profitability, 
and listing on the NYSE. Larger firms have higher disclosure quality. Also, listing on 
the NYSE has a positive effect on quality. On the contrary, it is documented that more 
profitable firms report lower quality risk information. It was also found that a less 
profitable firm discloses more on its risks if it has a high business risk. Moreover, we 
found evidence of the impact of growth prospects and financial leverage on risk 
disclosure levels. Finally, this essay demonstrates that larger firms and firms reporting 
under the requirements of the SEC disclose more quantitative risk information.  
 The third essay demonstrates three significant disclosure incentives for transition 
disclosure: firm size, financial leverage, and growth prospects. After controlling for 
other relevant factors, firm size associates positively with transition disclosure and 
financial leverage negatively. It is also documented that the growth prospects of firms 
are a significant positive determinant of transition disclosure. 
 The third essay also demonstrates a significant corporate governance factor that 
associates with the quality of transition disclosure. The proportion of independent board 
members on corporate boards relates positively to disclosure of the effects of the IFRS 
adoption. Interestingly, the impact of a global accounting firm on transition disclosure 
remains insignificant. 
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4.6 Results over and above the Individual Essays  
 
This research examines the determinants of corporate disclosure in essays 1 and 3. The 
overall results of the doctoral dissertation provide evidence that both common and 
disclosure-item-specific determinants of disclosure exist. Firm size is demonstrated to be 
a significant determinant of both risk and transition disclosures. There is also evidence 
on the positive impact of growth prospects and the negative effect of financial leverage 
on disclosure. The impact of profitability on disclosure remains ambiguous. One 
interesting finding combining the studies of this dissertation is that the disclosure 
improvements in risk and transition disclosures also continue after the initial 
introduction of the guidance and recommendation. 
 
 
4.7 Results summary 
 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine risk and transition disclosures by Finnish 
listed firms in the IFRS era. The following research questions are examined: 
  
1. Can a detailed national risk disclosure standard improve the quality of firms’ 
overall risk reviews under IFRS? 
 
2. Does the quality of risk disclosure provided by firms in their annual reports affect 
information asymmetry between the management and investors?  
 
3.  Do certain contingency factors such as firm riskiness, investor interest, and 
market condition affect the usefulness of annual risk disclosures to investors? 
 
4.  In relation to the transition disclosure recommendation of the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR), is the behavior of firms more similar to 
voluntary or to mandatory disclosure? 
 
5.  What are the non-regulatory determinants of risk and transition disclosures?  
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 The research demonstrates that the regulatory attempts to influence risk and 
transition disclosures have been successful (RQ 1 and RQ 4). In addition, it is 
documented that the quality of risk disclosure associates negatively with information 
asymmetry in the stock markets (RQ 2), and that the usefulness of risk disclosure to 
investors depend on firm riskiness, investor interest, and market condition (RQ 3). 
Finally, this research reports several significant non-regulatory determinants of risk and 
transition disclosures (RQ 5). The relations of the research questions, essays, research 
methods, and main results are summarized in table 1. 
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Table 1. Summary of the Research Questions, Essays, Research Methods, and Main 
Results 
 
 
 
  
Research question Essay 1 Essay 2 Essay 3 Research method Main results
1. Can a detailed 
national risk 
disclosure standard 
improve the quality 
of firms' overall risk 
reviews under IFRS?
X
Firms' risk disclosure before and after the 
detailed standard (2005 and 2006 annual 
reports). Matched paired sample design. 
The standard mean test and the multivariate 
regression analysis are the main test 
methods. STANDARD is an indicator 
variable for the reporting year. 
STANDARD is positively associated with the 
quality of risk disclosure. 
2. Does the quality of 
risk disclosure 
provided by firms in 
their annual reports 
affect information 
asymmetry between 
the management and 
investors? 
X
Four-year panel data (years 2006-2009). 
The multivariate regression analysis is the 
main test method. SPREAD and VOLUME 
are empirical measures for information 
asymmetry. RDISC is an empirical measure 
of disclosure quality.
RDISC is negatively associated with 
SPREAD. RDISC is positively associated 
with VOLUME.
3. Do certain 
contingency factors 
such as firm riskiness, 
investor interest, and 
market condition 
affect the usefulness 
of annual risk 
disclosures to 
investors?
X
Interaction variables between RDISC and 
the contingency factors. MCAP and 
HTECH (firm riskiness), ANALYSTS 
(investors interest), and 
FALLING/RECOVERING/RISING 
(market condition) are proxies for the 
contingency factors.
In the SPREAD model, the regression 
coefficient of RDISC*MCAP positive and 
significant, RDISC*HTECH negative and 
significant, RDISC*ANALYSTS positive and 
significant, and 
RDISC*FALLING/RECOVERING negative 
and significant.
4. In relation to the 
transition disclosure 
recommendation of 
the Committee of 
European Securities 
Regulators (CESR), 
is the behavior of 
firms more similar to 
voluntary or to 
mandatory 
disclosure?
X
Firms' transition disclosure in 2004 and 
2005. Separate disclosure indices for 
recommended (Index 1) and voluntary 
disclosure (Index 2). The standard mean 
test and the multivariate regression analysis 
are the main test methods.
Index 1 has a significantly higher mean value 
than Index 2. The adjusted R-square of the 
recommended disclosure model is about 18 
percentage points lower than that of the 
voluntary disclosure model. Firm size has a 
smaller impact on recommended disclosure 
than on voluntary disclosure.
5. What are the non-
regulatory 
determinants of risk 
and transition 
disclosures? 
X X
Several proxies for the non-regulatory 
determinants of risk and transition 
disclosure. The multivariate regression 
analysis is the main test method.
Firm size is positively associated with both 
risk and transition disclosure. Listing on the 
NYSE (profitability) is positively (negatively) 
associated with risk disclosure. Growth 
prospects and the proportion of independent 
board members in corporate boards is 
positively associated with transition 
disclosure. Financial leverage is negatively 
associated with transition disclosure.
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5  DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
5.1   Contribution of the Study 
 
This doctoral dissertation contributes to the existing corporate disclosure literature in 
several ways. First, it examines the impact of regulation on the quality of risk disclosure, 
and the influence of authoritative disclosure recommendations on reporting by firms. 
Second, it analyzes the consequences of risk disclosure on the stock market in a highly 
regulated setting. Third, this dissertation sheds light on the non-regulatory determinants 
of risk and transition disclosures. Fourth, it provides new insights on measurement of the 
quality of risk disclosure. In addition, the theoretical framework of the dissertation 
illustrates the importance of communication and disclosure in the corporate information 
environment. These issues are elaborated next in more detail. 
 As discussed in the literature review, the unraveling result theorem holds in a 
perfect corporate information environment and managers will voluntarily release all 
their private information (e.g., Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981). However, 
interventions by regulators can be justified on the basis of several imperfections in the 
market such as informational externalities (e.g., Beyer et al., 2010) and also by some 
direct empirical evidence on the role of regulation in reducing information asymmetry 
(e.g., Bushee & Leuz, 2005; McLaughlin & Safieddine, 2008). However, more research 
will be needed if we want to understand these issues more deeply and also someday get 
closer to a unifying theory of mandatory disclosure (Dye, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). This 
dissertation provides evidence on two types of attempts to regulate corporate reporting: 
disclosure guidance which specifies the risk disclosure requirements of the Finnish 
Accounting Act, and the CESR transition disclosure recommendation which specifies 
how firms should give information on their IFRS transition.  
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 Earlier research (see, Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004) points out that to date, there is 
little if any, research evidence concerning the impact of risk disclosure regulation on 
quality. The extant research documents the importance of reporting incentives as a 
determinant of accounting quality (e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Leuz, 2003; Ball & 
Shivakumar, 2005; Dobler, 2008; Dobler et al., 2011) but provides only meager 
evidence on whether the regulatory body can increase the overall quality of risk 
disclosure within a single country. Our findings contribute to the accounting literature by 
demonstrating that detailed risk disclosure guidance can be used to improve the overall 
quality of risk disclosure. However, although we document an increase in managers’ 
willingness to provide quantitative risk information, the effect of the guidance on that 
quality dimension is weaker compared with other quality dimensions. Managers’ 
reluctance to provide quantitative assessments of firm risks is consistent with the 
findings of Beretta & Bozzolan (2004), Linsley & Shrives (2006), and Dobler et al. 
(2011). Moreover, we find some evidence that the effect of the standard on quality is 
more pronounced among less profitable firms, which may suggest that the coercive 
effect of the standard forces the managers of these firms to reconsider their threshold 
level of disclosure. This finding provides new evidence on the possible interplay 
between disclosure regulation and managers’ disclosure incentives (cf., Dobler, 2008). 
 This research also contributes to the discussion on the relation between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure. Previously, many studies have concentrated on 
voluntary disclosure (e.g., Cooke, 1989; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Cahan et al., 2005). 
Others have examined compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements (e.g., 
Inchausti, 1997; Gray & Street, 2002). In the light of prior consolidated evidence on 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure, and on their differences (e.g., Kanto & Schadewitz, 
1997; Al-Razeen & Karbahari, 2004), it is obvious that the quality of mandatory 
disclosure associates with the level of reporting and disclosure requirements whereas 
voluntary disclosure is driven by managers’ disclosure incentives such as the reduction 
of agency costs and asymmetric information and the avoidance of proprietary costs 
(Beyer et al., 2010). This research contributes to that discussion by demonstrating the 
mandatory characteristics of recommended disclosure. Managers apparently consider 
that the costs of compliance with the recommendation are lower than those of non-
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compliance. However, their freedom and will to choose is more evident when it comes 
to voluntary transition disclosures such as those which relate to corporate segment 
reporting. Segment reporting may reveal something valuable to competitors and hence, 
managers may have an incentive to withhold that information. Beyer et al. (2010) 
emphasize that we need more evidence on the interconnections between mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure. This dissertation shows that managers probably treat recommended 
and voluntary disclosures as separate disclosure categories. 
 The analysis of recommended disclosures is useful to the existing literature 
because only a few prior studies provide evidence on compliance by managers with 
disclosure recommendations. Basically, compliance with recommended disclosures is 
voluntary for firms but can also be expected to exhibit characteristics of mandatory 
disclosure because disclosure recommendations are usually published by influential 
organizations. Prior literature focuses on compliance with voluntary disclosure 
recommendations but does not analyze the mandatory characteristics of those 
recommendations. Also, the existing research does not examine the effectiveness and 
efficiency of disclosure recommendations in those situations in which regulators have an 
urgent need to achieve fast changes in corporate disclosure practices (cf., Mangena & 
Tauringana, 2007). Consequently, by demonstrating the mandatory characteristics of the 
CESR transition disclosure recommendation, we show how disclosure recommendations 
issued by authoritative supervisory bodies can be used to reduce information asymmetry 
between management and stakeholders. Moreover, we show that recommended 
disclosures may be particularly applicable in cases in which the regulator pursues fast 
disclosure enhancements. 
 Previous literature provides evidence that managers react to new disclosure 
requirements and recommendations (e.g., Inchausti, 1997; Roulstone, 1999) which is in 
line with our findings in risk and transition disclosure context. One unique feature of this 
doctoral dissertation is that it provides evidence on the role of effective communication 
in regulation enforcement, an issue which is also emphasized in the theoretical 
framework of the dissertation, but seldom referred to in the extant literature. The Finnish 
Accounting Practice Board (FAPB) has been active and sought to clarify to managers 
what is meant by high-quality risk disclosure. Similarly, the Finnish Financial 
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Supervision Authority (FIN-FSA) actively promoted the CESR disclosure 
recommendation and insistently urged Finnish managers to make transition disclosure 
improvements accordant with it after its publication. Consequently, the FAPB and the 
FIN-FSA aimed at boosting the impact of the regulator’s attempt to influence managers’ 
disclosures. Their role can be seen as that of an intermediary which ‘translates’ the will 
of the regulator to more understandable form and underlines the importance of the 
specific disclosure item. It is impossible to state the exact influence of the efforts of 
these national regulatory bodies on corporate disclosure improvements. We can only 
demonstrate that Finnish listed firms have improved their risk and transition disclosures 
under the existing regulatory pressures.  
 It is also important to obtain evidence on the usefulness of different disclosure 
items to investors because disclosure regulation may also generate significant costs for 
some firms (e.g., Bushee & Leuz, 2005; Beyer et al., 2010) and hence it is unreasonable 
to require firms to provide information on irrelevant items. Prior evidence on the impact 
of the quality of mandatory overall risk reviews on stock markets is very scarce and 
limited to recent studies in the US institutional setting (Huang, 2011; Kravet & Muslu, 
2013; Campbell et al., 2013). Hence, there is not much evidence on whether mandatory 
risk disclosures lower information asymmetry in a highly regulated risk disclosure 
environment. This is so because recent academic work has mostly focused on examining 
the regulatory and non-regulatory determinants of risk disclosure (e.g., Roulstone, 1999; 
Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006, Dobler et al., 2011) or the value 
relevance of market risk disclosures (e.g., Rajgopal, 1999; Linsmeier, 2002; Jorion, 
2002; Lim & Tan, 2007).  This dissertation contributes to that discussion by examining 
the usefulness of corporate overall risk reviews in Finland, which is a highly regulated 
risk disclosure environment. Finnish risk disclosure requirements are advanced in terms 
of the clarity, specificity, and versatility of the guidance. We demonstrate that the 
quality of risk disclosure associates negatively with information asymmetry, which 
suggests that annual report risk disclosures are informative to investors. Consequently, 
our results are in line with those of the recent studies (Huang, 2011; Kravet & Muslu, 
2013; Campbell et al., 2013) and provide reinforcing evidence on the relevance of 
mandatory risk disclosures to investors.  
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  Furthermore, this research contributes to prior literature by including several 
relevant contingency factors such as firm riskiness, investor interest, and market 
condition into the analyses of the usefulness of risk disclosures. We demonstrate that 
risk disclosures are more useful to investors if they are provided by small firms and high 
tech firms, which may imply that investors require more risk information from risky 
firms (cf., Fama & French, 1992; Easley & O’Hara, 2004; Lin et al., 2010). We also 
show that the risk disclosures of firms that are followed less extensively are more useful 
to investors. The finding suggests that the risk profiles of the less extensively followed 
firms are vague to investors, which increases the reactions of investors to their risk 
disclosures. The result is also consistent with the view that the information environment 
of the more extensively followed firms differs from that of other firms. The result is in 
line with those of Botosan (1997) and Hope (2003b). Botosan (1997) documents that 
high-quality annual report disclosure reduces the cost of equity capital among firms with 
low analyst coverage. Hope (2003b) demonstrates that the level of annual report 
disclosure is more important to the following analysts when the analyst coverage of the 
firm is low. Finally, it was found that risk disclosures are most useful during difficult 
economic conditions (cf., Bowen et al., 1989). This finding is consistent with the view 
that during an economic downturn investors become more cautious, which increases 
their risk information needs.  
 In addition, this research adds to prior literature by providing evidence on the 
importance of several non-regulatory determinants in explaining managers’ mandatory 
risk disclosures and recommended transition disclosures. Hence the research extends the 
existing risk disclosure literature (e.g., Roulstone, 1999; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 
Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Dobler, 2008; Dobler et al., 2011) and provides totally new 
evidence on the (dis)similarities between the determinants of recommended and purely 
voluntary transition disclosure (cf., Kent & Stewart, 2008).  
 Firm size was demonstrated to be an important driver of managers’ risk and 
transition disclosures, which is in line with the existing corporate disclosure literature in 
general (e.g., Cooke, 1989; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Cahan et al., 2005) and the risk 
disclosure literature in particular (e.g., Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Dobler et al., 2011). 
Moreover, Kent & Stewart (2008) document that larger firms provide more transition 
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disclosure on the adoption of IFRS in the Australian setting. However, the result 
contradicts with some of the earlier mandatory disclosure studies (Kanto & Schadewitz, 
1997; Glaum & Street, 2003), which do not find the size effect. There are several 
reasons for the documented size effect: they include higher agency costs (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), lower proprietary costs (e.g., Prencipe, 2004), and lower unit costs of 
disclosure (e.g., Lang & Lundholm, 1993). Larger firms are also expected to suffer more 
from political and litigation costs and intensive pressure from analysts, which may 
increase their responsiveness to disclosure guidance and recommendations (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978; Cooke, 1989; Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Inchausti, 1997).  
 Poorly performing firms are documented to outperform more profitable firms in 
risk disclosure. Previous literature provides contradictory interpretations for the impact 
of profitability on corporate disclosure (e.g., Leuz, 2000; Prencipe, 2004; Troberg et al., 
2010). This research is the first to provide evidence on this relationship in a risk 
disclosure context. The result may imply that managers of firms with low profitability 
want to convince investors by increasing the quality of their risk disclosures because 
otherwise investors might think that the future prospects of the firm are even worse. 
 Listing on the NYSE has a strong positive impact on corporate risk disclosure 
quality. For instance Cooke (1989) and Hossain et al. (1995) have shown that listing 
status influences corporate disclosure levels. Our findings suggest that firms listed on the 
NYSE outperform firms listed on the Finnish stock exchange with regard to the 
substance of the information provided. This could be explained by higher capital market 
pressures for high quality disclosures by firms that have been forced to provide 
disclosures under the reporting requirements of the SEC. 
 Financial leverage relates negatively to managers’ risk and transition disclosure 
levels, which is in line with prior corporate disclosure literature (e.g., Meek et al., 1995; 
Eng & Mak, 2003). It may imply that debt financing is used to avoid succumbing to 
pressure to disclose proprietary information (Verrecchia, 1983; Healy & Palepu, 1993) 
or to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow and thus the need for disclosure (Jensen, 
1986). We also document that corporate growth prospects associate positively with risk 
and transition disclosures, which is consistent with the suggestions and findings of the 
existing literature (e.g., Gibbins et al., 1992; Kanto & Schadewitz, 1997; Lev & 
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Sougiannis, 1999). The finding supports the argument that the managers of growth firms 
have an incentive to reduce information asymmetry and thereby prevent adverse 
selection (e.g., Akerlof, 1970).  
 Finally, the proportion of independent board members in corporate boards relates 
positively to managers’ recommended transition disclosures. The finding is consistent 
with the argument that an independent board member increases the monitoring power of 
the board (Fama & Jensen, 1983), thereby improving disclosure quality. Similar 
empirical results have also been documented previously (e.g., Ajinkya, 2005; Patelli & 
Prencipe, 2007; García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). Interestingly, use of the 
services of a global accounting firm does not increase managers’ recommended 
transition disclosures. Prior literature has shown that this variable has a positive effect 
on mandatory disclosure (e.g., Wallace & Naser, 1995; Glaum & Street, 2003) but an 
insignificant effect on voluntary disclosure (e.g., Hossain et al., 1995; Eng & Mak, 
2003). 
 Regarding the similarities and differences between the determinants of managers’ 
risk and transition disclosures, this doctoral dissertation contributes to prior literature by 
demonstrating how certain disclosure incentives are important drivers of disclosure 
regardless of the topic. This finding suggests that both disclosure items are relevant to 
managers and hence are also taken into account in decision-making concerning the 
disclosure policies of their firms. Interestingly, attempts by the regulator to influence 
managers’ disclosures on risks and the effects of transition also impact reporting after 
initial introduction of the guidance and recommendation. This may imply that 
compliance with the new regulatory attempts is a learning process for managers. In some 
dimensions, quality improvements in risk disclosures also continue in the subsequent 
years. Also, transition disclosures were more extensive in 2005 than in 2004, which can 
be partly explained by the imminent adoption of IFRS, but also by increasing 
understanding of the regulators’ will.   
 Lastly, this dissertation contributes to the accounting literature by testing new 
measures for corporate disclosure quality. The previous literature recognizes the inherent 
conceptual difficulties of measuring disclosure quality in a complete, valid, and reliable 
manner (e.g., Botosan, 2004). However, certain quality indicators developed in the 
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existing related literature may provide useful approximations of some important aspects 
of risk disclosure quality (see, Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). Earlier 
research has not applied all these measures at the same time in a single study and 
compared the determinants of different quality dimensions in a highly regulated risk 
disclosure environment. This dissertation partly fills this research gap and provides new 
insights for continuing work on developing better ways to measure disclosure quality. 
Table 2 summarizes the contribution of this doctoral dissertation. 
 
Table 2. Description of the Contribution of the Doctoral Dissertation 
 
 
Research gap Contribution Contributing essay
The impact of regulation on the quality of 
risk disclosure?
The quality of risk disclosure can be improved by 
specifying the risk disclosure requirements of the 
law via guidance.
Essay 1
The impact of authoritative disclosure 
recommendations on firms' reporting?
Authoritative disclosure recommendations are an 
efficient way to improve firms' transition disclosure. 
Recommended disclosure has more mandatory 
characteristics than voluntary disclosure.
Essay 3
The role of communication in regulation 
enforcement?
The theoretical framework of the dissertation 
suggests that the effective communication in 
regulation enforcement may reduce information 
asymmetry between the regulatory body and the 
reporting entity. Essays 1 and 3 provide evidence 
on situations in which the regulator has taken an 
active role to ensure disclosure improvements.
Essay 1, Essay 3
The consequences of risk disclosure in 
the stock market in a highly regulated 
setting?
High-quality risk disclosure reduces information 
asymmetry in the stock market. The usefulness of 
risk disclosure depends on several contingency 
factors.
Essay 2
The non-regulatory determinants of risk 
and transition disclosure?
Both disclosure items (risks and IFRS transition) 
are significantly associated with several non-
regulatory determinants of disclosure.
Essay 1, Essay 3
The measurement of the quality of risk 
disclosure?
It extends prior literature by empirically applying 
and combining several disclosure quality indicators 
provided in the recent accounting literature.
Essay 1, Essay 2
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5.2   Practical Implications 
 
This doctoral dissertation also has several practical implications. First, the results benefit 
standard-setters such as the IASB, and the FASB, the SEC, and other national regulatory 
bodies by demonstrating how risk reporting under IFRS can be influenced through a 
detailed national disclosure standard which provides guidance on application of the law. 
This research provides an example of how the Finnish regulator has been able to 
improve the quality of risk reporting within a single country. In particular, the findings 
suggest that one clause of the law may not be effective enough to guarantee transparent 
disclosure about abstract issues such as risks. Many managers might need detailed 
descriptions of the required disclosures with illustrative examples. In addition to the 
coercive effect of detailed risk disclosure standards, they may also have the effect of 
guidance on corporate reporting. The greatest challenge is to motivate managers to 
report quantitative risk information. This is interesting because many firms report that 
they have in fact internally evaluated the impact of the risks and their probabilities.  
 This research also demonstrates that the CESR transition disclosure 
recommendation reduces information asymmetry by improving corporate disclosures. 
Although disclosure recommendations are voluntary, managers interpret them to have 
mandatory characteristics. This increases the average level of disclosure and therefore 
also makes disclosure recommendations useful for the purposes of regulatory bodies. In 
some cases, authoritative disclosure recommendations may be a faster and more cost-
efficient way to achieve disclosure enhancements than regulation. This is valuable 
information for the regulatory bodies. Especially when there is an urgent need for 
improvements in disclosure, recommendations may be an efficient way to reduce 
information asymmetry between firms and their stakeholders. If the regulatory body 
wants to increase the impact of a disclosure recommendation, it is important to actively 
communicate its content to managers in the implementation phase, and hence increase 
pressure for compliance. A good example is the actions that the Finnish Financial 
Supervision Authority (FIN-FSA) took in the implementation phase of the CESR 
transition disclosure recommendation.  
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 This research provides evidence on two various ways to improve reporting: 
detailed guidance which specifies the law and authoritative disclosure recommendations. 
The findings suggest that disclosure laws provided on a very general level may be 
inadequate to motivate managers to report on risks or other disclosure items that are 
given mainly in a narrative form. Consequently, if the regulatory bodies want to improve 
disclosures on these issues it is important to provide some guidance on the expected 
disclosure level. Otherwise, many firms are prone to report on the required items on a 
very general level year after year. Such ‘boilerplate’ disclosures may not be useful to 
investors because they seldom give a good picture of firms’ risk profiles and hence do 
not help investors in valuing them. The use of illustrative disclosure examples is one 
possible strategy for regulatory bodies to demonstrate the expected quality of reporting 
to managers. Furthermore, this research shows that in some cases authoritative 
disclosure recommendations may be a fast and cost-efficient way to ensure reporting of 
the needed information. 
  The findings regarding the usefulness of risk disclosures have implications for 
regulators, managers, investors, and analysts. First, it is important for regulators to note 
that the usefulness of risk reporting to investors has been documented in an institutional 
setting where risk reporting is regulated through a detailed risk disclosure guidance 
augmented with illustrative examples. A similar approach can also provide a promising 
solution for increasing the relevance of risk disclosures to investors in other countries. 
Our results demonstrate that the differences between the Finnish and US institutional 
settings do not alter the conjecture that high-quality overall risk reviews are useful to 
investors (cf., Huang, 2011; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell et al., 2013). We do not 
argue that financial reporting should shift towards the rules-based accounting tradition. 
Instead, we argue that reporting on certain important (narrative) items such as risks may 
be ambiguously guided under both reporting approaches and hence improved guidance 
may serve the needs of investors and other stakeholders under both regimes. Second, 
managers can utilize the results by improving their risk disclosure quality to reduce the 
information asymmetry component of the cost of capital. Finally, investors and analysts 
benefit from the findings through an increased awareness of the association between 
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information asymmetry and risk disclosure. Thus, the results may help investors to 
develop more effective trading strategies and analysts to issue better recommendations. 
 The findings regarding the non-regulatory determinants of risk and transition 
disclosures demonstrate that smaller firms tend to report less than larger firms. The 
result suggests that from the regulatory perspective it might be useful to make special 
efforts to increase the awareness of managers of smaller firms of required disclosures 
and their willingness to follow them. This suggestion relates to Beyer et al.’s (2010, 319) 
argument in which they state that uniform disclosure standards do not take into account 
firm diversity, which makes it difficult to plan optimal disclosure regulation. In this 
dissertation we include several firm characteristics in the analyses of the effect of 
disclosure regulation and thus, provide evidence for the regulatory bodies on the 
interconnections between firm diversity and compliance with disclosure requirements. 
Because it is difficult to plan different standards for different firms, we propose that firm 
diversity could be taken into account in the enforcement phase of the standard. Targeted 
communication to some special groups of firms and marketing of the laws, standards, 
guidance or recommendations in general might be a good starting point for designing 
and implementing optimal disclosure regulation. 
 To summarize, the dissertation considers at least the following practical 
viewpoints for the purposes of regulatory bodies, managers, investors, and analysts:  
 
Regulator: - Disclosure laws provided on a very general level may not be 
 adequate to ensure high-quality reporting on narrative items such as 
 risks. More detailed guidance on the expected disclosures may be 
 needed. 
 
 - Disclosure recommendations may be a fast and efficient way to 
 influence reporting by managers. It is important to actively promote 
 the recommendation in the implementation phase. 
 
 - Be aware of the impact of firm diversity on disclosure. For example, 
 the reporting of smaller firms is on average lower-quality than that 
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 of larger firms. The managers of these firms may require more 
 promotion of the laws, standards, guidance, or recommendations. 
 
Manager:  - Investors consider overall risk disclosures to be useful. Increasing 
 the quality of the firm’s risk disclosures may decrease the 
 information risk of the firm and hence reduce the information 
 asymmetry component of the cost of capital. Reduced information 
 risk narrows the gap between the market value and fundamental 
 value of the firm. 
 
 - Risk disclosures may be particularly useful if they are provided by 
 small firms, high tech firms, firms with low investor interest, and 
 during difficult economic conditions. 
 
 - If your firm is small, it is at higher risk of disclosing inadequately to 
 investors.  
 
Investor/ 
Analyst:  - Be aware of and alert to the risk disclosure differences between 
 firms. 
 
 - Small firms that report low-quality risk disclosures and are not 
 extensively followed by investors may have a higher information risk. 
 In this case the return expectations are higher, which should 
 associate with higher realized returns. Take this into account  when 
 you are balancing your stock portfolio or releasing new 
 buy/hold/sell recommendations. 
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5.3   Reliability and Validity 
 
The results obtained in the study are internally valid if they are true. In this dissertation 
the potential validity threats relate to the validity and reliability of the variables. One 
possible validity threat is that the choice of the disclosure topics of the examined 
disclosure items is subjective. An attempt was made to prevent this by deriving the 
disclosure topics from the detailed risk disclosure standard and the CESR transition 
disclosure recommendation. In addition, because the risk disclosure standard does not 
give an exhaustive description of all subtopics in the risk categories, the risk disclosure 
framework applied in this research has been made more comprehensive by adopting 
some of the risk disclosure subtopics found in the existing literature. Finally, a 
subsample of financial publications has been pre-tested in order to identify missing 
subtopics from the examined risk categories, and also to decide on the disclosure items 
that should be included in the transition disclosure score sheet over and above the 
recommended disclosures. 
 Another possible validity threat is the subjective composition of the disclosure 
indices and the subjective weighting of the disclosure items of the indices. In this 
dissertation the applied disclosure indices have been derived from the guidance and 
recommendation. We have also avoided weighting disclosure items; this means that the 
sample firms could earn a maximum of one point from each disclosure item. 
Furthermore, the separation of recommended and purely voluntary disclosure may have 
been difficult for some firms.22 However, because the CESR transition disclosure 
recommendation defines the recommended disclosure items very clearly, the managers 
should have been able to assess whether they were complying with the recommendation 
or providing purely voluntary disclosure. Selection of the empirical measures for the 
other examined variables may also cause a validity threat. However, in this research the 
empirical measures of firm and industry fundamentals, disclosure incentives, and 
corporate governance factors should be valid because they are derived from the existing 
                                                 
22 Also, Beyer et al. (2010) point out that it is challenging to separate mandatory and voluntary disclosures 
effectively.  
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literature. To summarize, based on the arguments above, the applied variables should not 
pose a threat to the internal validity of the results. 
 The reliability threat of the dissertation relates to the stability of the empirical 
measures. The scoring of corporate risk and transition disclosures should be stable 
across firm observations because the same criteria are used consistently throughout the 
evaluation. However, the transition disclosures are coded by one coder, which may 
increase the random error of the coding. Random error weakens associations in 
statistical tests and hence makes it more difficult to find significant results. The several 
significant associations demonstrated in the examination of the recommended and 
voluntary transition disclosures provide indirect evidence on the reliability of the coding. 
In the analyses of corporate risk disclosures two coders were used, which is expected to 
decrease the random error of coding. Two measures of inter-coder reliability are 
calculated: the first is the simple coefficient of agreement and the second the alpha 
coefficient of agreement proposed by Krippendorf (1980). Taken together the coding of 
the subsamples, the simple coefficient of agreement is 0.90, and the alpha coefficient of 
agreement is 0.87. The extant literature suggests a threshold level of 0.75 for the alpha 
coefficient of agreement (Milne & Adler, 1999). Consequently, the inter-coder reliability 
should be high enough.  
 Most of the variables of the regression models were collected from the Thomson 
One Banker Financial, IBES, and Worldscope databases. Several double checks were 
made to control for that the values of the databases were consistent with the values 
announced in the financial publications. The board composition, accounting firm, and 
institutional ownership data were collected manually from the firms’ annual reports and 
the foreign ownership data from the register of Euroclear Finland Oy. Some of the 
manually collected items were checked occasionally to minimize the risk of mistakes in 
the coding phase. Accordingly, the reliability threat of the variables should be 
minimized, which should increase the internal validity of the results. 
 The external validity threat relates to the generalizability of the results. The 
results are based on observations in Finland, which has a rules-based accounting 
tradition. Hence the results should be generalizable to other countries with similar legal 
roots. However, because the extant literature reports high compliance and disclosure 
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ratios for Finnish firms (King, 1999; Dargenidou et al., 2006), the results may not be 
generalizable to countries with low compliance and disclosure ratios. Moreover, Finland 
is part of the Scandinavian institutional setting, where investor protection is lower than 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g., US and UK) but higher than in southern Europe 
(e.g., Greece and Italy) (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 2000). Differences in 
the level of investor protection may also have some influence on the generalizability of 
the results to other settings. 
 
 
5.4   Recommendations for Further Research 
 
This doctoral dissertation shows that a detailed national risk disclosure standard can 
improve the quality of overall risk reviews under IFRS. However, it also found that the 
guidance of the standard does not impact as strongly as the willingness of managers to 
report quantitative risk disclosures. The reluctance of managers to disclose quantitative 
assessments of risks is consistent with the findings of prior literature (e.g., Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Dobler et al., 2011). Some determinants of 
quantitative risk disclosures are demonstrated in this research. However, this issue could 
be elaborated further in the upcoming studies. Moreover, additional research evidence 
on the interplay between reporting standards and managers’ disclosure incentives would 
be very welcome.   
 One challenge relating to narrative disclosures in annual reports is that it is 
difficult to document their usefulness to investors. This dissertation has examined the 
impact of high-quality annual report risk disclosures on information asymmetry in stock 
markets. However, future research could try to examine more comprehensively the 
economic consequences of risk information from the perspective of equity and debt 
investors. For example, the association between the quality of risk disclosure and returns 
could be examined. This type of research would provide evidence of whether investors 
pay less for firms which do not provide adequate risk reports. 
 In addition, the results of the dissertation suggest that investors need transparent 
risk information in a country of semi-strong investor protection (cf., La Porta et al., 
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1997; La Porta et al., 2000). The information needs of investors may be even higher in 
countries of low investor protection and hence replicating this study in those countries is 
a promising avenue for future research. 
 One part of this doctoral dissertation concentrated on the transition disclosures of 
Finnish listed firms relating to first-time adoption of IFRS. Prior research has indicated 
that region may have an impact on disclosures (e.g., Troberg et al., 2010). Potential 
explanations for that phenomenon are differences in the legal origin and national culture 
(cf., La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 2000; Hope, 2003a; Rahman et al., 2010). 
Future research could potentially widen the transition disclosure sample to include firms 
from other countries and to examine whether the same explanatory variables as in 
Finland also explain transition disclosures in those countries.  
  Finally, this research provides evidence on the efficiency of the CESR transition 
disclosure recommendation in improving firms’ disclosures. The concept of 
‘recommended disclosure’ should be taken more precisely into account in corporate 
disclosure research. There are a number of avenues for future research to increase the 
understanding of the differences between mandatory disclosure, recommended 
disclosure, and purely voluntary disclosure. Further information on the common and 
dissimilar features of these disclosure categories and their determinants would be useful 
to the academy which tries to find more comprehensive theory of mandatory disclosure 
(see, Beyer et al., 2010, 315). Also, the regulatory bodies might consider that kind of 
information beneficial in their efforts to design optimal disclosure regulation. Starting 
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, many countries have experienced an 
unprecedented amount of governmental and institutional intervention and are now in the 
process of restructuring their current laws, regulations, and enforcement capabilities 
within the framework of the best corporate governance practices (Aksu & Kosedag, 
2006).  
 To conclude, by providing evidence on corporate risk and transition disclosures 
in the IFRS era, this dissertation opens various new avenues for additional studies. We 
also encourage scholars to deepen our knowledge on these intriguing research topics in 
the future. 
 
  
91 
 
References for Part I 
 
 
 
Aboody, D., & Kasznik, R. (2000). CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of 
 Voluntary Disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29 (1), 73–100. 
 
Aboody, D., Hughes, J., & Liu, J. (2005). Earnings Quality, Insider Trading, and Cost of 
 Capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 43 (5), 651–673. 
 
Abraham, S., & Cox, P. (2007). Analysing the Determinants of Narrative Risk 
 Information in UK FTSE 100 Annual Reports. The British Accounting Review, 39 
 (3), 227–248.  
 
Abrahamson, E., & Amir, E. (1996). The Information Content of the President’s Letter 
 to Shareholders. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 23 (8), 1157–1182. 
 
Acharya, V.V., DeMarzo, P.M., & Kremer, I. (2011). Endogenous Information Flows 
 and the Clustering of Announcements. Working Paper (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 
 DP8680). Electronic Copy Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1976022  
 Accessed 03.02.2013. 
 
Adelopo, I. (2011). Voluntary Disclosure Practices amongst Listed Companies in 
 Nigeria. Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International 
 Accounting, 27 (2), 338–345. 
 
Admati, A., & Pfleiderer, P. (2000). Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure 
 Regulation and Externalities. Review of Financial Studies, 13 (3), 479–519. 
 
AICPA. (1994a). Improving Business Reporting – A Customer Focus: Meeting the 
 Information Needs of Investors and Creditors. New York, NY: American Institute of 
 Certified Public Accountants (Comprehensive Report of the Special Committee on 
 Financial Reporting: The Jenkins Report). 
 Electronic Copy Available at 
 http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/frc/accountingfinancialreporting/ 
 downloadabledocuments/jenkins%20committee%20report.pdf. Accessed 27.01.2013. 
 
92 
 
 AICPA. (1994b). Disclosure of Certain Significant Risks and Uncertainties. New York, 
 NY: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (Accounting Standards 
 Executive Committee’s  Statement of Position (SOP) 94-6). 
 Electronic Copy Available at 
 http://clio.lib.olemiss.edu/cdm/ref/collection/aicpa/id/1828. Accessed 27.01.2013. 
 
Ajinkya, B., Bhojraj, S., & Sengupta, P. (2005). The Association between Outside 
 Directors,  Institutional Investors and the Properties of Management Earnings 
 Forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research, 43 (3), 343–376. 
 
Akerlof, G. (1970). The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
 Mechanism. Quarterly  Journal of Economics, 84 (3), 488–500. 
 
Aksu, M., & Kosedag, A. (2006). Transparency and Disclosure Scores and their 
 Determinants in the Istanbul Stock Exchange. Corporate Governance: An 
 International Review, 14 (4), 277–296. 
 
Allen, F., Morris, S., & Shin, H.S. (2006). Beauty Contests and Iterated Expectations in 
 Asset Markets. The Review of Financial Studies, 19 (3), 719–752. 
 
Al-Razeen, A., & Karbhari, Y. (2004). Interaction between Compulsory and Voluntary 
 Disclosure in Saudi Arabian Corporate Annual Reports. Managerial Auditing 
 Journal, 19 (3), 351–360. 
 
Amihud, Y., & Mendelson, H. (1986). The Effects of Beta, Bid-Ask Spread, Residual 
 Risk and Size on Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance, 44 (2), 479–486. 
 
Amir, E., & Lev, B. (1996). Value-Relevance of Nonfinancial Information: The 
 Wireless Communications Industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22 (1-3), 
 3–30. 
 
Armstrong, C.S., Guay, W.R., & Weber, J.P. (2010). The Role of Information and 
 Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting. Journal of 
 Accounting and Economics, 50 (2-3), 179–234. 
 
Artiach, T.C., & Clarkson, P.M. (2011). Disclosure, Conservatism and the Cost of 
 Equity Capital: A Review of the Foundation Literature. Accounting and Finance, 51 
 (1), 2–49. 
 
Arya, A., Frimor, H., & Mittendorf, B. (2010). Discretionary Disclosure of Proprietary 
 Information in a Multisegment Firm. Management Science, 56 (4), 645–658. 
93 
 
Baginski, S.P., Hassell, J.M., & Kimbrough, M.D. (2002). The Effect of Legal 
 Environment on Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Management Earnings 
 Forecasts Issued in U.S. and Canadian Markets. The Accounting Review, 77 (1), 25–
 50. 
 
Ball, R., Robin, A., & Wu, J.S. (2003). Incentives versus Standards: Properties of 
 Accounting Income in Four East Asian Countries. Journal of Accounting and 
 Economics, 36 (1-3), 235–270. 
 
Ball, R., & Shivakumar, L. (2005). Earnings Quality in UK Private Firms: Comparative 
 Loss Recognition Timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39 (1), 83–128. 
 
Bamber, L.S., & Cheon, Y.S. (1998). Discretionary Management Earnings Forecast 
 Disclosures: Antecedents and Outcomes Associated with Forecast Venue and 
 Forecast Specificity Choices. Journal of Accounting Research, 36 (2), 167–190. 
 
Barry, C., & Brown, S. (1985). Differential Information and Security Market 
 Equilibrium. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20 (4), 407–422. 
 
Barry, C., & Brown, S. (1986). Limited Information as a Source of Risk. The Journal of 
 Portfolio  Management, 12 (2), 66–72. 
 
Barth, M.E., Beaver, W.H., & Landsman, W.R. (2001). The Relevance of the Value 
 Relevance Literature for Financial Accounting Standard Setting: Another View. 
 Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31 (1-3), 77–104. 
 
Barth, M.E., Landsman, W.R., & Lang, M.H. (2008). International Accounting 
 Standards and Accounting Quality. Journal of Accounting Research, 46 (3), 467–498. 
 
Bassen, A., Basse Mama, H., and Ramaj, H. (2010) Investor Relations: A 
 Comprehensive Overview. Journal für Betriebswirtschaft, 60 (1), 49–79. 
 
Beattie, V., McInnes, B., & Fearnley, S. (2004). A Methodology for Analysing and 
 Evaluating Narratives in Annual Reports: A Comprehensive Descriptive Profile and 
 Metrics for Disclosure Quality Attributes. Accounting Forum, 28 (3), 205–236. 
 
Beaver, W.H. (1973). What Should be the FASB’s Objectives. The Journal of 
 Accountancy, 136 (2), 49–56. 
 
94 
 
Beck, A.C., Campbell, D., & Shrives, P.J. (2010). Content Analysis in Environmental 
 Reporting Research: Enrichment and Rehearsal of the Method in a British-German 
 context. The British Accounting Review, 42 (3), 207–222. 
 
Bens, D.A. (2002). The Determinants of the Amount of Information Disclosed About 
 Corporate Restructurings. Journal of Accounting Research, 40 (1), 1–20. 
 
Beretta, S., & Bozzolan, S. (2004). A Framework for the Analysis of Firm Risk 
 Communication. The International Journal of Accounting, 39 (3), 265–288. 
 
Beretta, S., & Bozzolan, S. (2008). Quality versus Quantity: The Case of Forward-
 Looking Disclosure. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 23 (3), 333–375. 
 
Berger, P., & Hann, R. (2007). Segment Profitability and the Proprietary and Agency 
 Costs of Disclosure. The Accounting Review, 82 (4), 869–906. 
 
Bertomeu, J., Beyer, A., & Dye, R.A. (2011). Capital Structure, Cost of Capital, and 
 Voluntary Disclosures. The Accounting Review, 86 (3), 857–886. 
 
Beyer, A., Cohen, D.A., Lys, T.Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010). The Financial Reporting 
 Environment: Review of the Recent Literature. Journal of Accounting and 
 Economics, 50 (2-3), 296–343.  
 
Beyer, A., & Guttman, I. (2012). Voluntary Disclosure, Manipulation and Real Effects. 
 Journal of Accounting Research, 50 (5), 1141–1177.  
 
Botosan, C.A. (1997). Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital. The Accounting 
 Review, 72 (3), 323–350. 
 
Botosan, C.A., & Plumlee, M.A. (2002). A Re-Examination of Disclosure Level and the 
 Expected Cost of Equity Capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 40 (1), 21–40. 
 
Botosan, C.A. (2004). Discussion of a Framework for the Analysis of Firm Risk 
 Communication. The International Journal of Accounting, 39 (3), 289–295. 
 
Botosan, C.A., & Stanford, M. (2005). Managers’ Motives to Withhold Segment 
 Disclosures and the Effect of SFAS No. 131 on Analysts’ Information Environment. 
 The Accounting Review, 80 (3), 751–771. 
 
Botosan, C.A. (2006). Disclosure and the Cost of Capital: What Do We Know? 
 Accounting and Business Research, 36 (Special Issue), 31–40. 
95 
 
 
Bowen, R., Johnson, M., & Shevlin, T. (1989). Informational Efficiency and the 
 Information Content of Earnings during the Market Crash of October 1987. Journal 
 of Accounting and Economics, 11 (2-3), 225–254. 
 
Bozzolan, S., Trombetta, M., & Beretta, S. (2009). Forward-Looking Disclosures, 
 Financial  Verifiability and Analysts' Forecasts: A Study of Cross-Listed European 
 Firms. European Accounting Review, 18 (3), 435–473.  
 
Brammer, S., & Pavelin S. (2006). Voluntary Environmental Disclosures by Large UK 
 Companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33 (7-8), 1168–1188. 
 
BCBS. (1998). Enhancing Bank Transparency. Public Disclosure and Supervisory 
 Information that Promote Safety and Soundness in Banking Systems. The Basel 
 Committee on Banking Supervision. Electronic Copy Available at 
 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs41.pdf. Accessed 27.01.2013. 
 
BCBS. (2013). Principles for Effective Risk Data Aggregation and Risk Reporting. The 
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Electronic Copy Available at 
 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs239.pdf. Accessed 27.01.2013. 
 
Bushee, B.J. (2004). Discussion of Disclosure Practices of Foreign Companies 
 Interacting with U.S. Markets. Journal of Accounting Research, 42 (2), 509–525. 
 
Bushee, B.J., & Leuz, C. (2005). Economic Consequences of SEC Disclosure 
 Regulation: Evidence  from the OTC Bulletin Board. Journal of Accounting and 
 Economics, 39 (2), 233–264. 
 
Bushman, R.M., Piotroski, J.D., & Smith, A.J. (2004). What Determines Corporate 
 Transparency? Journal of Accounting Research, 42 (2), 207–252. 
 
Buzby, S.L. 1975. Company Size, Listed versus Unlisted Stocks, and the Extent of 
 Financial Disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 13 (1), 16–37. 
 
Cahan, S.F., Rahman, A., & Perera, H. (2005). Global Diversification and Corporate 
 Disclosure. Journal of International Accounting Research, 4 (1), 73–93. 
 
Campbell, J.L., Chen, H, Dhaliwal, D.S., Lu, H., & Steele, L.B. (2013). The Information 
 Content of Mandatory Risk Factor Disclosures in Corporate Filings. Forthcoming in 
 Review of Accounting Studies. Electronic Copy Available at 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1694279. Accessed 08.02.2013. 
96 
 
CESR. (2003). European Regulation on the Application of IFRS in 2005. 
 Recommendation for Additional Guidance Regarding the Transition to IFRS 
 (CESR/03-323e). Electronic Copy Available at 
 http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/03_323e.pdf. Accessed  18.07.2012. 
 
Cerbioni, F., & Parbonetti, A. (2007). Exploring the Effects of Corporate Governance on 
 Intellectual Capital Disclosure: An Analysis of European Biotechnology Companies. 
 European Accounting Review, 16 (4), 791–826. 
 
Cerf, A.R. (1961). Corporate Reporting and Investment Decisions. University of 
 California, Berkley. 
 
Chen, S., DeFond, M., & Park, C. (2002). Voluntary Disclosure of Balance Sheet 
 Information in Quarterly Earnings Announcements. Journal of Accounting and 
 Economics, 33 (2), 229–251. 
 
Cheung, Y-L., Jiang, P., & Tan, W. (2010). A Transparency Disclosure Index Measuring 
 Disclosures: Chinese Listed Companies. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 29 
 (3), 259–280.  
 
Chow, C.W., & Wong-Boren, A. (1987). Voluntary Financial Disclosure by Mexican 
 Corporations. The Accounting Review, 62 (3), 533–541. 
 
Christensen, P.O., & Feltham, G.A. (2000). Market Performance Measures and 
 Disclosure of Private Management Information in Capital Markets. Review of 
 Accounting Studies, 5 (4), 301–329. 
 
Christensen, P.O., De La Rosa, L.E., & Feltham G.A. (2010). Information and the Cost 
 of Capital: An Ex Ante Perspective. The Accounting Review, 85 (3), 817–848. 
 
CICA. (2008). Building a Better MD&A: Risk Disclosure. Toronto: The Canadian 
 Institute of Chartered Accountants (A Publication of the Canadian Performance 
 Reporting Board). 
 Electronic Copy Available at   
 http://www.cica.ca/focus-on-practice-areas/reporting-and-capital-
 markets/performance-reporting-resource-centre/item12822.pdf. Accessed 27.01.2013. 
 
  
97 
 
CICA. (2009). Management’s Discussion and Analysis: Guidance on Preparation and 
 Disclosure. Comprehensive Revision. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Chartered 
 Accountants (A Publication of the Canadian Performance Reporting Board). 
 Electronic Copy Available at   
 http://www.cica.ca/publications/list-of-publications/manual/item29637.pdf  
 Accessed 27.01.2013. 
 
CICA. (2010). Guidance on Improved Strategy and Outlook Disclosures. A Review of 
 Advanced  Practices in 2009 Annual Reports. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of 
 Chartered Accountants (A Publication of the Canadian Performance 
 Reporting Board). Electronic Copy Available at   
 http://www.cica.ca/publications/list-of-publications/manual/item43909.pdf 
 Accessed 27.01.2013. 
 
Cohen, D. (2008). Does Information Risk Really Matter? An Analysis of the 
 Determinants and Economics Consequences of Financial Reporting Quality. Asia-
 Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics, 15 (2), 69–90. 
 
Cooke, T.E. (1989). Voluntary Corporate Disclosure by Swedish Firms. Journal of 
 International Financial Management and Accounting, 1 (2), 171–195. 
 
Copeland, T., & Galai, D. (1983). Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread. The 
 Journal of Finance, 38 (5), 1457–1469. 
 
Core, J.E. (2001). A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature: Discussion. Journal 
 of Accounting and Economics, 31 (1-3), 441–456. 
 
Crawford, V., & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic Information Transformation. Econometrica, 
 50 (6), 1431–1451. 
 
COSO. (2004). Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework. The Committee 
 of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. 
 
Darrough, M.N. (1993). Disclosure Policy and Competition: Cournot vs. Bertrand. The 
 Accounting Review, 68 (3), 534–561. 
 
Dargenidou, C., McLeay, S., & Raonic, I. (2006). Expected Earnings Growth and the 
 Cost of Capital: An Analysis of Accounting Regime Change in the European 
 Financial Market. Abacus, 42 (3-4), 388–414. 
98 
 
Dargenidou, C., McLeay, S., & Raonic, I. (2011). Accruals, Disclosure and the Pricing 
 of Future Earnings in the European Market. Journal of Business Finance & 
 Accounting, 38 (5-6), 473–504. 
 
Datar, S.M., Feltham, G.A., & Hughes, J.S. (1991). The Role of Audits and Audit 
 Quality in Valuing New Issue. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14 (1), 3–49. 
 
Dechow, P., Ge, W., & Schrand, C. (2010). Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review 
 of the Proxies, their Determinants and their Consequences. Journal of Accounting 
 and Economics, 50 (2-3), 344–401. 
 
DeGennaro, R., & Robotti, C. (2007). Financial Market Frictions. Economic Review 
 (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta), 92 (3), 1–16. 
 
Demers, E.A., & Vega, C. (2010). Soft Information in Earnings Announcements: News 
 or Noise? Faculty & Research Working Paper at INSEAD. Electronic Copy 
 Available  at http://www.insead.fr/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=44292 
 Accessed 03.08.2012. 
 
Detemple, J. (2002). Asset Pricing in an Intertemporal Partially-Revealing Rational 
 Expectations Equilibrium. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 38 (1-2), 219–248. 
 
Diamond, D. (1985). Optimal Release of Information by Firms. The Journal of Finance, 
 40 (4), 1071–1094. 
 
Diamond, D.W., & Verrecchia, R.E. (1991). Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of 
 Capital. The Journal of Finance, 46 (4), 1325–1359. 
 
Dobler, M. (2008). Incentives for Risk Reporting – A Discretionary Disclosure and 
 Cheap Talk Approach. The International Journal of Accounting, 43(2), 184–206. 
 
Dobler, M., Lajili, K., & Zéghal, D. (2011). Attributes of Corporate Risk Disclosure: An 
 International Investigation in the Manufacturing Sector. Journal of International 
 Accounting Research, 10 (2), 1–22. 
 
Dye, R.A. (1985). Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 23 (1), 123–145. 
 
Dye, R.A. (1986). Proprietary and Nonproprietary Disclosures. Journal of Business, 59 
(2), 331–366. 
 
99 
 
Dye, R.A. (1990). Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosures: The Cases of Financial and 
 Real Externalities. The Accounting Review, 65 (1), 1–24. 
 
Dye, R.A., & Sridhar, S.S. (1995). Industry-Wide Disclosure Dynamics. Journal of 
 Accounting Research, 33 (1), 157–174. 
 
Dye, R.A., & Verrecchia, R.E. (1995). Discretion vs. Uniformity: Choices among 
 GAAP. The Accounting Review, 70 (3), 389–415. 
 
Dye, R.A. (2001). An Evaluation of ‘‘Essays on Disclosure’’ and the Disclosure 
 Literature in Accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32 (1-3), 181–235. 
 
Dye, R.A., & Sunder, S.S. (2001). Why Not Allow FASB and IASB Standards to 
 Compete in the U.S.? Accounting Horizons, 15 (3), 257–271. 
 
Dye, R.A., & Sridhar, S.S. (2002). Resource Allocation Effects of the Price Reactions to 
 Disclosures. Contemporary Accounting Research, 19 (3), 385–410. 
 
Dye, R.A., & Sridhar, S.S. (2008). A Positive Theory of Flexibility in Accounting 
 Standards. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46 (2-3), 312–333. 
 
Easley, D., & O’Hara, M. (2004). Information and the Cost of Capital. The Journal of 
 Finance, 59 (4), 1553–1583. 
 
Easterbrook, F.H., & Fischel, D.R. (1991). The Economic Structure of Corporate Law. 
 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Easton, P.D., & Monahan, S.J. (2005). An Evaluation of Accounting-Based Measures of 
 Expected Returns. The Accounting Review, 80 (2), 501–538. 
 
Easton, P.D., & Sommers, G.A. (2007). Effects of Analysts’ Optimism on Estimates of 
 the Expected Rate of Return Implied by Earnings Forecasts. Journal of Accounting 
 Research, 45 (5), 983–1015. 
 
EFRAG. (2010). Endorsement of the Amendments to IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: 
 Disclosures – Transfers of Financial Assets. Introduction, Background and 
 Conclusions.  
 Brussels: European Financial Reporting Advisory Group. Electronic Copy Available 
 at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/ifrs/20110316-effect-
 study_en.pdf. Accessed 28.01.2013. 
 
100 
 
Einhorn, E. (2007). Voluntary Disclosure under Uncertainty about the Reporting 
 Objective. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43 (2-3), 245–274. 
 
Einhorn, E., & Ziv, A. (2008). Intertemporal Dynamics of Corporate Voluntary 
 Disclosures. Journal of  Accounting Research, 46 (3), 567–589. 
 
Einhorn, E., & Ziv, A. (2012). Biased Voluntary Disclosure. Review of Accounting 
 Studies, 17 (2), 420-442.   
 
Elliott, K., & Jacobson, P. (1994). Costs and Benefits of Business Information 
 Disclosure. Accounting  Horizons, 8 (4), 80–96. 
 
Elmy, F.J., LeGuyader, L.P., & Linsmeier, T.J. (1998). A Review of Initial Filings 
 Under the  SEC’s New Market Risk Disclosure Rules. Journal of Corporate 
 Accounting and Finance, 9 (4), 33–45. 
 
Eng, L., & Mak, Y. (2003). Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure. Journal of 
 Accounting and Public Policy, 22 (4), 325–345. 
 
Espinosa, M., & Trombetta, M. (2007). Disclosure Interactions and the Cost of Equity 
 Capital: Evidence from the Spanish Continuous Market. Journal of Business Finance 
 & Accounting, 34 (9-10), 1371–1392. 
 
European Parliament and Council. (2002). Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the 
 European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the Application of 
 International Accounting Standards. Official Journal of the European Communities. 
 Electronic Copy Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. 
 do?uri=OJ:L:2002:243:0001:0004:EN:PDF. Accessed 20.08.2012. 
 
FAPB. (2006). Yleisohje toimintakertomuksen laatimisesta (Kirjanpitolautakunta). 
 Translation: Guidance on the Preparation of Operating and Financial Review. 
 Electronic Copy Available at 
 http://ktm.elinar.fi/ktm/fin/kirjanpi.nsf/all/F656564842BC1755C22571ED0047A0B1
 Accessed 03.08.2012. 
 
  
101 
 
FASB. (2001). Improving Business Reporting: Insights into Enhancing Voluntary 
 Disclosures. Norwalk, CT: The Financial Accounting Standards Board (Steering 
 Committee Report, Business Reporting Research Project).  
 Electronic Copy Available at 
 http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175819611134&blobh
 eader=application%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs  
 Accessed  27.01.2013.   
 
Fama, E.F. (1970). Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work. 
 Journal of Finance, 25 (2), 383–417. 
 
Fama, E.F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political 
 Economy, 88 (2), 288–307. 
 
Fama, E.F., & Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of 
 Law and Economics, 26 (2), 301–325. 
 
Fama, E.F., & French, K.R. (1992). The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns. The 
 Journal of Finance, 47 (2), 427–465. 
 
Fan, J.P., & Wong, T.J. (2002). Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness 
 of Accounting Earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33 (3), 
 401–425. 
 
Field, L., Lowry, M., & Shu, S. (2005). Does Disclosure Deter or Trigger Litigation? 
 Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39 (3), 487–507. 
 
FIN-FSA. (2004). Electronic Publishing of FIN-FSA 5/2004. Electronic Copy Available 
 at http://www.finanssivalvonta.fi/fi/Tiedotteet/Arkisto/Rata_tiedottaa/ 
 Documents/5_04_kooste.pdf. Accessed 14.08.2012. 
 
FIN-FSA. (2005). Electronic Publishing of FIN-FSA 3/2005. Electronic Copy Available 
 at http://www.finanssivalvonta.fi/fi/Tiedotteet/Arkisto/Rata_tiedottaa/ 
 Documents/Rata_tiedottaa_032005.pdf. Accessed 03.08.2012. 
 
Fischer, P.E., & Stocken, P.C. (2001). Imperfect Information and Credible 
 Communication. Journal of Accounting Research, 39 (1), 119–134. 
 
Fischer, P.E., & Verrecchia, R.E. (2004). Disclosure Bias. Journal of Accounting and 
 Economics, 38 (Conference Issue), 223–250. 
 
102 
 
Fischer, P.E., & Stocken, P.C. (2010). Analyst Information Acquisition and 
Communication. The Accounting Review, 85 (6), 1985–2009. 
 
Fishman, M.J., & Hagerty, K.M. (2003). Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in 
 Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers. The Journal of Law, Economics, 
 and Organization, 19 (1), 45–63. 
 
Florence, D., & Thomas, J. (2012). Determinants of Quantitative Information 
 Withholding in Annual  Reports. European Accounting Review, 21 (1), 115–151. 
 
Foster, G. (1981). Intra-Industry Information Transfers Associated with Earnings 
 Releases. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3 (3), 201–232. 
 
Francis, J., Philbrick, D., & Schipper, K. (1994). Shareholder Litigation and Corporate 
 Disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 32 (2), 137–164. 
 
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., & Schipper, K. (2005). The Market Pricing of 
 Accruals Quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39 (2), 295–327. 
 
Francis, J., Nanda, D., & Olsson, P. (2008). Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Quality, and 
 Cost of Capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 46 (1), 53–99. 
 
FRC. (2004). The Turnbull Guidance as an Evaluation Framework for the Purposes of 
 Section 404(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. London: Financial Reporting Council. 
 Electronic Copy Available at http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/9e3ea3c6-6fa0-
 45e5-aae5-db4f1be84300/Guide-on-use-of-Turnbull-for-section-404.aspx  
 Accessed 28.01.2013. 
 
FRC. (2005). Internal Control: Revised Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code. 
 London: Financial Reporting Council (The Updated Turnbull Guidance). Electronic 
 Copy Available at http://frc.org.uk/getattachment/5e4d12e4-a94f-4186-9d6f-
 19e17aeb5351/Turnbull-guidance-October-2005.aspx. Accessed 28.01.2013. 
 
FRC. (2011). Boards and Risk. A Summary of Discussions with Companies, Investors, 
 and Advisers. London: Financial Reporting Council. Electronic Copy Available at 
 http://frc.org.uk/getattachment/0aa7cd16-8d37-4c27-999c-63cc09268c43/Boards-
 and-Risk-A-Summary-of-Discussions-with-Companies,-Investors-and-Advisers.aspx 
 Accessed 28.01.2013.  
 
  
103 
 
FSA. (2005). Strengthening Capital Standards (Including Feedback on CP189).  
 London: The Financial Services Authority. Electronic Copy Available at  
 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp05_03.pdf. Accessed 27.01.2013. 
 
FSA. (2006). Strengthening Capital Standards 2.  
 London: The Financial Services Authority. Electronic Copy Available at  
 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp06_03.pdf. Accessed 27.01.2013. 
 
García-Meca, E., & Sánchez-Ballesta, J.P. (2010). The Association of Board 
 Independence and Ownership Concentration with Voluntary Disclosure: A Meta-
 Analysis. European Accounting Review, 19 (3), 603–627. 
 
Gibbins, M., Richardson, A., & Waterhouse, J. (1990). The Management of Corporate 
 Financial  Disclosure: Opportunism, Ritualism, Policies, and Processes. Journal of 
 Accounting Research, 28 (1), 121–143. 
 
Gibbins, M., Richardson, A., & Waterhouse, J. (1992). The Management of Financial 
 Disclosure: Theory and Perspectives. Research Monograph (No.20). The Canadian 
 Certified General Accountants’ Research Foundation. 
 
Gietzmann, M.B., & Trombetta, M. (2003). Disclosure Interactions: Accounting Policy 
Choice and Voluntary Disclosure Effects on the Cost of Raising Outside Capital. 
Accounting and Business Research, 33 (3), 187–205. 
 
Gietzmann, M., & Ireland, J. (2005). Cost of Capital, Strategic Disclosures and 
 Accounting Choice, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32 (3-4), 599–634. 
 
Gigler, F.B. (1994). Self-Enforcing Voluntary Disclosures. Journal of Accounting 
 Research, 32 (2), 224–240. 
 
Gigler, F., & Hemmer, T. (1998). On the Frequency, Quality, and Information Role of 
 Mandatory Financial Reports. Journal of Accounting Research, 36 (3), 117–147. 
 
Gjesdal, F. (1981). Accounting for Stewardship. Journal of Accounting Research, 19 (1), 
 208–231. 
 
Glaum, M., & Street, D.L. (2003). Compliance with the Disclosure Requirements of 
 Germany’s New Market: IAS versus US GAAP. Journal of International Financial 
 Management and Accounting, 14 (1), 64–100. 
 
104 
 
Glosten, L., & Milgrom, P. (1985). Bid, Ask, and Transaction Prices in a Specialist 
 Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 14 
 (1), 71–100. 
 
Gray, S.J., & Street, D.L. (2002). Factors Influencing the Extent of Corporate 
 Compliance with International Accounting Standards: Summary of Research 
 Monograph. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation, 11 (1), 51–
 76. 
 
Grossman, S.J., & Hart, O. (1980). Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids. The Journal of 
 Finance, 35 (2), 323–334. 
 
Grossman, S.J. (1981). The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure 
 about Product Quality. Journal of Law and Economics, 24 (3), 461–483. 
 
Guttman, I. (2010). The Timing of Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts. The Accounting 
 Review, 85 (2), 513–545. 
 
Haller, A., Ernstberger, J., & Froschhammer, M. (2009). Implications of the Mandatory 
 Transition from National GAAP to IFRS – Empirical Evidence from Germany. 
 Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting, 25 (2), 
 226–236. 
 
Hayes, R., & Lundholm, R. (1996). Segment Reporting to the Capital Market in the 
 Presence of a Competitor. Journal of Accounting Research, 34 (2), 261–279. 
 
Healy, P.M., & Palepu, K.G. (1993). The Effect of Firm’s Financial Disclosure 
 Strategies on Stock Prices. Accounting Horizons, 7 (1), 1–11. 
 
Healey, P.M., & Palepu, K.G. (1995). The Challenges of Investor Communication. The 
 Case of CUC Internationl, Inc. Journal of Financial Economics, 38 (2), 111–140. 
 
Healy, P., Hutton, A., & Palepu, K. (1999). Stock Performance and Intermediation 
 Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in Disclosure. Contemporary Accounting 
 Research, 16 (3), 485–520. 
 
Healy, P.M., & Palepu, K.G. (2001). Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, 
 and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature. Journal of 
 Accounting and Economics, 31 (1-3), 405–440. 
 
105 
 
Hirshleifer, J. (1971). The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to 
 Inventive  Activity. The American Economic Review, 61 (4), 561–574. 
 
Holmström, B. (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. The Bell Journal of Economics, 
 10 (1), 74–91. 
 
Holthausen, R.W., & Watts, R.L. (2001). The Relevance of the Value-Relevance 
 Literature for Financial Accounting Standard Setting. Journal of Accounting and 
 Economics, 31 (1-3), 3–75. 
 
Hope, O-K. (2003a). Firm-Level Disclosures and the Relative Roles of Culture and 
 Legal Origin. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, 14 
 (3), 218–248. 
 
Hope, O-K. (2003b). Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards, and 
 Analysts’  Forecast Accuracy: An International Study. Journal of Accounting 
 Research, 41 (2), 235–272. 
 
Hope, O-K., & Thomas, W.B. (2008). Managerial Empire Building and Firm Disclosure. 
 Journal of Accounting Research, 46 (3), 591–626. 
 
Hossain, M., Perera, M.H.B., & Rahman, A.R. (1995). Voluntary Disclosure in the 
 Annual Reports of New Zealand Firms. Journal of International Financial 
 Management and Accounting, 6 (1), 69–87. 
 
Hou, K., & Robinson, D.T. (2006). Industry Concentration and Average Stock Returns. 
 The Journal of Finance, 61 (4), 1927–1956. 
 
Huang, K. (2011). Exploring the Information Contents of Risk Factors in SEC Form 10-
 K: a Multi-Label Text Classification Application. Working Paper. Electronic Copy 
 Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1784527  
 Accessed 16.09.2012. 
 
Hughes, P.J. (1986). Signalling by Direct Disclosure under Asymmetric Information. 
 Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8 (2), 119–142. 
 
Hughes, J.S., Kao, J.L., & Williams, M. (2002). Public Disclosure of Forward Contracts 
 and Revelation of Proprietary Information. Review of Accounting Studies, 7 (4), 459–
 478. 
 
106 
 
Hughes, J.S., Liu, J., & Liu, J. (2007). Information Asymmetry, Diversification, and 
 Cost of Capital. The Accounting Review, 82 (3), 705–729. 
 
IASB. (2008). Exposure Draft of an Improved Conceptual Framework for Financial 
 Reporting. London: The International Accounting Standards Board. Electronic Copy 
 Available at http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Conceptual-
 Framework/EDMay08/ Documents/conceptual_framework_exposure_draft.pdf 
 Accessed 03.08.2012. 
 
IASB. (2010). Management Commentary – A Framework for Presentation.  
 London: The International Accounting Standards Board (IFRS Practice Statement).  
 Electronic Copy Available at  
 http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Management-Commentary/ 
 IFRS-Practice-Statement/Documents/Managementcommentarypracticestatement8 
 December.pdf. Accessed 16.09.2012. 
 
ICAEW. (1997). Financial Reporting of Risk – Proposals for a Statement of Business 
 Risk. London: The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
 (Financial Reporting Committee: Steering Group). 
 
ICAEW. (1999a). No Surprises: The Case for Better Risk Reporting. London: The 
 Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (Financial Reporting 
 Committee: Steering Group). 
 
ICAEW. (1999b). Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code. 
 London:  The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (The 
 Turnbull Guidance). Electronic Copy Available  
 at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/turnbul.pdf. Accessed 28.01.2013. 
 
ICAEW. (2006). No Surprises: Working for Better Risk Reporting. London: The 
 Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (Center for Business 
 Performance). 
 
ICAEW. (2011a). Reporting Business Risks: Meeting Expectations. Information for 
 Better Markets Initiative. London: The Institute of  Chartered Accountants in England 
 and Wales. Electronic Copy Available  
 at http://www.icaew.com/~/media/Files/Technical/Financial-reporting/Information 
 %20for%20better%20markets/IFBM/ rbr-final.pdf. Accessed 27.01.2013. 
 
ICAEW. (2011b). Risk Reporting: The Story so Far. London: The Institute of 
 Chartered  Accountants in England and Wales (P. Linsley). 
107 
 
IFAC. (2002). Managing Risk to Enhance Stakeholder Value. New York, NY: 
International Federation of Accountants (The Financial Management Accounting 
Committee). Electronic Copy Available  
 at http://www.cimaglobal.com/Documents/ImportedDocuments/ 
 mgrisk_techguide_2002.pdf. Accessed 27.01.2013. 
 
IIA. (2008). Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: A Guide for Management by Internal Controls 
Practitioners. Altamonte Springs, FL: The Institute of Internal Auditors. Electronic 
Copy Available at http://www.sox-expert.com/uploads/files/Sarbanes-Oxley%20 
 Section%20404%20-%20A%20Guide%20for%20Management%202nd_edition% 
 201_08.pdf. Accessed 28.01.2013. 
 
Ijiri, Y. (1975). Theory of Accounting Measurement. Sarasota, FL: American 
Accounting Association. 
 
Ikäheimo, S. (1996). Communication in the Share Markets. Doctoral Dissertation. Turku 
 School of  Economics and Business Administration. 
 
Inchausti, B.G. (1997). The Influence of Company Characteristics and Accounting 
 Regulation on Information Disclosed by Spanish Firms. European Accounting 
 Review, 6 (1), 45–68. 
 
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
 Costs and  Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4), 305–360. 
 
Jensen, M. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. 
 American  Economic Review, 76 (2), 323–329. 
 
Jorgensen, B.N., & Kirschenheiter, M.T. (2003). Discretionary Risk Disclosures. The 
 Accounting Review, 78 (2), 449–469. 
 
Jorion, P. (2002). How Informative are Value-at-Risk Disclosures. The Accounting 
 Review. 77 (4), 911–931. 
 
Jovanovic, B. (1982). Truthful Disclosure of Information. The Bell Journal of 
 Economics, 13 (1), 36– 44. 
 
Jung, W.O., & Kwon, Y.K. (1988). Disclosure When the Market is Unsure of 
 Information Endowment of Managers. Journal of Accounting Research, 26 (1), 146–
 153. 
 
108 
 
Kajüter, P. (2001). Risikoberichterstattung: Empirische Befunde und der Entwurf des 
 DRS 5. Der Betrieb, 54 (3), 105–111. Translation: Risk Reporting: Empirical 
 Findings and Draft of DRS 5. 
 
Kakkuri-Knuuttila, M-L., & Heinlahti, K. (2006). Mitä on tutkimus? Argumentaatio ja 
 tieteenfilosofia. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. Translation: What is Research? 
 Argumentation and Philosophy of Science. 
 
Kallunki, J., Martikainen, M., Martikainen, T., & Yli-Olli, P. (1997). The Finnish Stock 
 Market: A Survey of Some Empirical Evidence and Its Practical Relevance. The 
 Finnish Journal of Business Economics, 1 (4), 474–495. 
 
Kanodia, C., Mukherji, A., Sapra, H., & Venugopalan, R. (2000). Hedge Disclosures, 
 Future Prices and Production Distortions. Journal of Accounting Research, 38 (3), 
 53–82. 
 
Kanto, A., & Schadewitz, H. J. (1997). A Multidimensional Model for the Disclosure 
 Policy of a Firm. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 13 (3), 229–249. 
 
Kent, P., & Stewart, J. (2008). Corporate Governance and Disclosures on the Transition 
 to International Financial Reporting Standards. Accounting and Finance, 48 (4), 649–
 671. 
 
Khanna, T., Palepu, K.G., & Srinivasan, S. (2004). Disclosure Practices of Foreign 
 Companies Interacting with U.S. Markets. Journal of Accounting Research, 42 (2), 
 475–508. 
 
Kim, O., & Verrecchia, R. (1994). Market Liquidity and Volume around Earnings 
 Announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17 (1-2), 41–67. 
 
King, C.G. (1999). The Measurements of Harmonization in the Form and Content of the 
 Auditor’s Report in the European Union. Journal of International Accounting, 
 Auditing and Taxation, 8 (1), 23–42. 
 
Koonce, L., McAnally, M.L., & Mercer, M. (2005a). How Do Investors Judge the Risk 
 of Financial Items. The Accounting Review, 80 (1), 221–241. 
 
Koonce, L.,  Lipe, M.G., & McAnally, M.L. (2005b). Judging the Risk of Financial 
 Instruments: Problems and Potential Remedies. The Accounting Review, 80 (3), 871–
 895. 
 
109 
 
Korn, E. (2004). Voluntary Disclosure of Partially Verifiable Information. 
 Schmalenbach Business Review, 56 (2), 139–163. 
 
Kothari, S.P., Li, X., & Short, J.E. (2009). The Effect of Disclosures by Management, 
 Analysts, and Business Press on Cost of Capital, Return Volatility, and Analyst 
 Forecasts: A Study Using Content Analysis. The Accounting Review, 84 (5), 1639–
 1670. 
 
KPMG. (2008). Disclosure of Significant Risks and Uncertainties in the Current 
 Economic Environment. A Reminder of Existing Requirements. 
 Electronic copy available at 
 http://us.kpmg.com/microsite/attachments/us_accounting_bulletin_2008/07_ 
 DisclosureofSignificantRisksandUncertaintiesintheCurrentMarketEnvironment.pdf 
 Accessed 28.01.2013. 
 
Kravet, T., & Muslu, V. (2013). Textual Risk Disclosures and Investors’ Risk 
 Perceptions. Forthcoming in Review of Accounting Studies. Electronic copy  
 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1736228  
 Accessed  06.01.2013. 
 
Krippendorf, K. (1980). Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology. Beverly 
 Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Lajili, K., & Zéghal, D. (2005). A Content Analysis of Risk Management Disclosures in 
 Canadian  Annual Reports. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 22 (2), 
 125–142. 
 
Lambert, R. (2001). Contracting Theory and Accounting. Journal of Accounting and 
 Economics, 32 (1-3), 3–87. 
 
Lambert, R.A., Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R.E. (2007). Accounting Information, 
 Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 45 (2), 385–
 420. 
 
Lambert, R.A., Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R.E. (2012). Information Asymmetry, 
 Information Precision, and the Cost of Capital. Review of Finance, 16 (1), 1–29. 
 
Lanen, W.N., & Verrecchia, R.E. (1987). Operating Decisions and the Disclosure of 
 Management Accounting Information. Journal of Accounting Research, 25 (3), 165–
 189. 
 
110 
 
Lang, M.H., & Lundholm, R.J. (1993). Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings 
 of Corporate Disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 31 (2), 246–271. 
 
Lang, M.H., & Lundholm, R.J. (1996). Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst 
 Behavior. The Accounting Review, 71 (4), 467–492. 
 
Lang, M.H., & Lundholm, R.J. (2000). Voluntary Disclosure and Equity Offerings: 
 Reducing  Information Asymmetry or Hyping the Stock? Contemporary Accounting 
 Research, 17 (4), 623–662. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). Legal 
 Determinants of External Finance, The Journal of Finance, 52 (3), 1131–1150. 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor 
 Protection and Corporate Governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58 (1-2), 3–
 27. 
 
Leland, H.E., & Pyle, D.H. (1977). Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and 
 Financial  Intermediation. The Journal of Finance, 32 (2), 371–387. 
 
Lennox, C., & Park, C. (2006). The Informativeness of Earnings and Management’s 
 Issuance of Earnings Forecasts. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42 (3), 439–
 458. 
 
Leone, A., Rock, S., & Willenborg, M. (2007). Disclosure of Intended Use of Proceeds 
 and Underpricing in Initial Public Offerings. Journal of Accounting Research, 45 (1), 
 111–153. 
 
Leuz, C. (2000). The Development of the Voluntary Cash Flow Statements in Germany 
 and the Influence of International Reporting Standards. Schmalenbach Business 
 Review, 52 (2), 182–207. 
 
Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R.E. (2000). The Economic Consequences of Increased 
 Disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 38 (3), 91–124. 
 
Leuz, C. (2003). IAS versus U.S. GAAP: Information Asymmetry-Based Evidence from 
 Germany’s New Market. Journal of Accounting Research, 41 (3), 445–472. 
 
Lev, B. (1988). Towards a Theory of Equitable and Efficient Accounting Policy. The 
 Accounting Review, 63 (1), 1–22. 
 
111 
 
Lev, B. (1992). Information Disclosure Strategy. California Management Review, 34 
 (4), 9–32. 
 
Lev, B., & Sougiannis, T. (1999). Penetrating the Book-to-Market Black Box: The R&D 
 Effect. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 26 (3), 419–449. 
 
Lim, C. Y., & Tan, P. M. (2007). Value Relevance of Value-at-Risk Disclosure. Review 
 of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 29 (4), 353–370.  
 
Lin, C., Owens, W. L., & Owers, J. E. (2010). The Association between –Market Risk 
 Disclosure Reporting and Firm Risk: The Impact of SEC FRR No. 48. Journal of 
 Applied Business Research, 26 (4), 35–46.  
 
Linsley, P.M., & Shrives, P.J. (2006). Risk Reporting: A Study of Risk Disclosures in 
 the Annual Reports of UK Companies. The British Accounting Review, 38 (4), 387–
 404. 
 
Linsley, P.M., & Lawrence, M.J. (2007). Risk Reporting by the Largest UK Companies: 
 Readability and Lack of Obfuscation. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
 Journal, 20 (4), 620–627. 
 
Linsmeier, T.J., & Pearson, N.D. (1997). Quantitative Disclosures of Market Risk in the 
 SEC Release. Accounting Horizons, 11 (1), 107–135. 
 
Linsmeier, T. J., Thornton, D. B., Venkatachalam, M., & Welker, M. (2002). The Effect 
 of Mandated Market Risk Disclosures on Trading Volume Sensitivity to Interest 
 Rate, Exchange Rate, and Commodity Price Movements. The Accounting Review, 77 
 (2), 343–377.  
 
Liu, C., Ryan, S. G., & Tan, H. (2004). How Banks' Value-at-Risk Disclosures Predict 
 their Total and Priced Risk: Effects of Bank Technical Sophistication and Learning 
 over Time. Review of Accounting Studies, 9 (2-3), 265–294. 
 
Lougee, B., & Marquardt, C. (2004). Earnings Informativeness and Strategic Disclosure: 
 An Empirical Examination of “Pro Forma” Earnings. The Accounting Review, 79 (3), 
 769–795. 
 
Lowry, M. (2009). Discussion of ‘Shareholder Litigation and Changes in Disclosure 
 Behavior’. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 47 (1-2), 157–159. 
 
112 
 
Mahoney, P.G. (1995). Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems. The 
 University of Chicago Law Review, 62 (3), 1047–1112. 
 
Mangena, M., & Tauringana, V. (2007). Corporate Compliance with Non-Mandatory 
 Statements of Best Practice: The Case of ASB Statement on Interim Reports. 
 European Accounting Review, 16 (2), 399–427. 
 
Marquardt, C., & Wiedman, C. (1998). Voluntary Disclosure, Information Asymmetry, 
 and Insider Selling Through Secondary Equity Offerings. Contemporary Accounting 
 Research, 15 (4), 505–537. 
 
Marshall, A., & Weetman, P. (2007). Modelling Transparency in Disclosure: The Case 
 of Foreign Exchange Risk Management. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
 34 (5-6), 705–739. 
 
Marston, C.L., & Shrives, P.J. (1991). The Use of Disclosure Indices in Accounting 
 Research: A Review Article. The British Accounting Review, 23 (3), 195–210. 
 
May, R.G., & Sundem, G.L. (1976). Research for Accounting Policy: An Overview. The 
 Accounting Review, 51 (4), 747–763. 
 
McLaughlin, R., & Safieddine, A. (2008). Regulation and Information Asymmetry: 
 Evidence from the Performance of Industrial and Utility Firms Issuing Seasoned 
 Equity in the USA. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 16 (1), 59–76. 
 
Meek, G.K., Roberts, C.B., & Gray, S.J. (1995). Factors Influencing Voluntary Annual 
 Report Disclosures by U.S., U.K. and Continental European Multinational 
 Corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 26 (3), 555–572. 
 
Miihkinen, A. (2008). Efficiency of Authoritative Disclosure Recommendations: 
 Evidence from IFRS Transition Disclosure in Finland. Journal of Financial 
 Regulation and Compliance, 16 (4), 384–413. 
 
Miihkinen, A. (2012). What Drives Quality of Firm Risk Disclosure? The Impact of a 
 National Disclosure Standard and Reporting Incentives under IFRS. The 
 International Journal of Accounting,  47 (4), 437–468. 
 
Milgrom, P. (1981). Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and 
 Applications. The Bell Journal of Economics, 12 (2), 380–391. 
 
113 
 
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1986). Relying on the Information of Interested Parties. 
 Rand Journal of Economics, 17 (1), 18–32. 
 
Milne, M., & Adler, R. (1999). Exploring the Reliability of Social and Environmental 
 Disclosures Content Analysis. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 12 
 (2), 237–56. 
 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1990). Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad 
 Acquisitions? The Journal of Finance, 45 (1), 31–48. 
 
Myers, S., & Majluf, N.S. (1984). Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when 
 Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial 
 Economics, 13 (2), 187–221. 
 
Nagar, V., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. (2003). Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-Based 
 Incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 34 (1-3), 283–309. 
 
Niskanen, J., Kinnunen, J., & Kasanen, E. (2000). The Value Relevance of IAS 
 Reconciliation Components: Empirical Evidence from Finland. Journal of 
 Accounting and Public Policy, 19 (2), 119–137. 
 
Noe, C. (1999). Voluntary Disclosures and Insider Transactions. Journal of Accounting 
 and Economics, 27 (3), 305–326. 
 
Ongena, S., & Smith, D.C. (2000). What Determines the Number of Bank 
 Relationships? Cross-Country Evidence. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 9 (1), 
 26-56. 
 
Pae, S. (2000). Information Sharing in the Presence of Preemptive Incentives: Economic 
 Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure. Review of Accounting Studies, 5 (4), 331–
 350. 
 
Pae, S. (2002). Discretionary Disclosure, Efficiency, and Signal Informativeness. 
 Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33 (3), 279–311. 
 
Palepu, K. (1986) Predicting Takeover Targets: A Methodological and Empirical 
 Analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8 (1), 3–35. 
 
Patelli, L., & Prencipe, A. (2007). The Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure and 
 Independent Directors in the Presence of a Dominant Shareholder. European 
 Accounting Review, 16 (1), 5–33. 
114 
 
Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. The Journal of Law 
 and Economics, 19 (2), 211–240. 
 
Penno, M.C. (1997). Information Quality and Voluntary Disclosure. The Accounting 
 Review, 72 (2), 275–284. 
 
Pérignon, C., & Smith, D. R. (2010). The Level and Quality of Value-at-Risk Disclosure 
 by Commercial Banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 34 (2), 362–377. 
 
Pope, P. (2003). Discussion of Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting 
 Standards, and Analysts’ Forecast Accuracy: An International Study. Journal of 
 Accounting Research, 41 (2), 273–283. 
 
Posner, R.A. (1974). Theories of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics 
 and Management Science, 5 (2), 335–358. 
 
Prencipe, A. (2004). Proprietary Costs and Determinants of Voluntary Segment 
 Disclosure: Evidence from Italian Listed Companies. European Accounting 
 Review, 13 (2), 319–340. 
 
Rahman, A., Yammeesri, J., & Perera, H. (2010). Financial Reporting Quality in 
 International Settings:  A Comparative Study of the USA, Japan, Thailand, France, 
 and Germany. The International Journal of Accounting, 45 (1), 1–34. 
 
Rajgopal, S. (1999). Early Evidence on the Informativeness of the SEC’s Market Risk 
 Disclosures: The Case of Commodity Price Risk Exposure of Oil and Gas Producers. 
 The Accounting Review, 74 (3), 251–280. 
 
Robb, S.W.G., Single, L.E., & Zarzeski, M.T. (2001). Nonfinancial Disclosures across 
 Anglo-American Countries. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and 
 Taxation, 10 (1), 71–83. 
 
Rogers, J.L., & Van Buskirk, A. (2009). Shareholder Litigation and Changes in 
 Disclosure Behavior. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 47 (1-2), 136–156. 
 
Roulstone, D.T. (1999). Effect of SEC Financial Reporting Release No.48 on Derivative 
 and Market Risk Disclosure. Accounting Horizons, 13(4), 343–363. 
 
Ruland, W., Tung, S., & George, N.E. (1990). Factors Associated with the Disclosure of 
 Managers’ Forecasts. The Accounting Review, 65 (3), 710–721. 
 
115 
 
Ryan, B., Scapens, R.W., & Theobald, M. (2002). Research Method and Methodology in 
 Finance and Accounting. Second Edition. London: Thomson. 
 
Saudagaran, S.M., & Meek, G.K. (1997). A Review of Research on the Relationship 
 between International Capital Markets and Financial Reporting by Multinational 
 Firms. Journal of Accounting Literature, 16 (1), 127–159. 
 
Schadewitz, H. (1997). Financial and Nonfinancial Information in Interim Reports: 
 Determinants and Implications. Doctoral Dissertation. Helsinki School of 
 Economics. 
 
Schipper, K. (2003). Principles-Based Accounting Standards. Accounting Horizons, 17 
(1), 61–72. 
 
Schrand, C.M., & Elliott, J.A. (1998). Risk and Financial Reporting: A Summary of the 
 Discussion at the 1997 AAA/FASB Conference. Accounting Horizons, 12 (3), 271–
 282. 
 
Scott, W.R. (2009). Financial Accounting Theory. Fifth Edition. Ontario: Prentice Hall 
 (Pearson). 
 
SEC. (1997). Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative Financial Instruments 
 and Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure of Quantitative and 
 Qualitative Information about Market Risk Inherent in Derivative Financial 
 Instruments, Other Financial Instruments, and Derivative Commodity Instruments. 
 Washington, DC: The Securities and Exchange Commission. 
 Electronic Copy Available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7386.txt 
 Accessed  27.01.2013. 
 
SEC. (2002). Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Washington, DC: The Securities and 
 Exchange  Commission. Electronic Copy Available at 
 http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf. Accessed 28.01.2013. 
 
SEC. (2005). Securities and Exchange Commission Final Rule, Release No. 33-8591 
 (FR-75). Washington, DC: The Securities and Exchange Commission. Electronic 
 Copy Available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8591.pdf. Accessed 27.01.2013. 
 
Sengupta, P. (1998). Corporate Disclosure Quality and the Cost of Debt. The Accounting 
 Review, 73 (4), 459–474. 
 
116 
 
Seppänen, H.J. (1999). Discretionary Disclosure and External Financing: Evidence 
 from a Relationship Financing Environment. Doctoral Dissertation. Helsinki School 
 of Economics. 
 
Shalev, R. (2009). The Information Content of Business Combination Disclosure Level. 
 The Accounting Review, 84 (1), 239–270. 
 
Shleifer, A., & Wolfenzon, D. (2002). Investor Protection and Equity Markets. Journal 
 of Financial Economics, 66 (1), 3–27. 
 
Singhvi, S.S., & Desai, H.B. (1971). An Empirical Analysis of the Quality of Corporate 
 Financial  Disclosure. The Accounting Review, 46 (1), 129–138. 
 
Skinner, D. (1994). Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News. Journal of Accounting 
 Research, 32 (1), 38–60. 
 
Skinner, D. (1997). Earnings Disclosures and Stockholder Lawsuits. Journal of 
 Accounting and Economics, 23 (3), 249–282. 
 
Solomon, J.F., Solomon, A., & Norton, S.D. (2000). A Conceptual Framework for 
 Corporate Risk Disclosure Emerging from the Agenda for Corporate Governance 
 Reform. The British Accounting Review, 32 (4), 447–478. 
 
Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 87 (3), 
 355–374. 
 
Stigler, G.J. (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of 
 Economics and Management Science, 2 (1), 3–21.  
 
Stocken, P.C. (2000). Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure. The RAND Journal of 
 Economics, 31 (2), 359–374. 
 
Suijs, J. (2005) Voluntary Disclosure of Bad News. Journal of Business Finance & 
 Accounting, 32 (7-8), 1423–1435. 
 
Suijs, J. (2007). Voluntary Disclosure of Information When Firms are Uncertain of 
 Investor Response. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43 (2-3), 391–410.  
 
Tetlock, P. (2007). Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the 
 Stock Markets. The Journal of Finance, 62 (3), 1139–1168. 
 
117 
 
Tetlock, P. (2008). More than Words: Quantifying Language to Measure Firms’ 
 Fundamentals, The Journal of Finance, 63 (3), 1437–1467. 
 
Thornton, D.B., & Welker, M. (2004). The Effect of Oil and Gas Producers’ FRR No.48 
 Disclosures on Investors’ Risk Assessments. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and 
 Finance, 19 (1), 85–114. 
 
Titman, S., & Trueman, B. (1986). Information Quality and the Valuation of New 
 Issues. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8 (2), 159–172. 
 
Troberg, P., Kinnunen, J., & Seppänen, H.J. (2010). What Drives Cross-Segment 
 Diversity in Returns and Risks? Evidence from Japanese and U.S. Firms. The 
 International Journal of Accounting, 45 (1), 44–76. 
 
Trueman, B. (1986). Why Do Managers Voluntarily Release Earnings Forecasts? 
 Journal of Accounting and Economics 8 (1), 53–71. 
 
Verrecchia, R. (1983). Discretionary Disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
 5 (3), 179–194. 
 
Verrecchia, R. (1990). Information Quality and Discretionary Disclosure. Journal of 
 Accounting and Economics, 12 (4), 365–380. 
 
Verrecchia, R.E. (2001). Essays on Disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
 32 (1-3), 97–180. 
 
Verrecchia, R.E., & Weber, J. (2006). Redacted Disclosure. Journal of Accounting 
 Research, 44 (4), 791–814. 
 
Vives, X. (1984). Duopoly Information Equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand. Journal of 
 Economic Theory, 34 (1), 71–94. 
 
Wagenhofer, J. (1990). Voluntary Disclosure with a Strategic Opponent. Journal of 
 Accounting and Economics, 12 (4), 341–363. 
 
Wallace, R.S., & Naser, K. (1995). Firm-Specific Determinants of the 
 Comprehensiveness of  Mandatory Disclosure in the Corporate Annual Reports of 
 Firms Listed on the Stock exchange of Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public 
 Policy, 14 (4), 311–368. 
 
118 
 
Warner, J., Watts, R., & Wruck, K. (1988). Stock Prices and Top Management Changes. 
 Journal of Financial Economics, 20 (January-March), 461–492. 
 
Watts, R.L., & Zimmerman, J.L. (1978). Towards a Positive Theory of the 
 Determination of Accounting Standards. The Accounting Review, 53 (1), 112–134. 
 
Watts, R.L., & Zimmerman, J.L. (1986). Positive Accounting Theory. New Jersey: 
 Prentice Hall (Englewood Cliffs). 
 
Watts, R.L., & Zimmerman, J.L. (1990). Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year 
 Perspective. The Accounting Review, 65 (1), 131–156. 
 
Weisbach, M. (1988). Outside Directors and CEO Turnover. Journal of Financial 
 Economics, 20 (January-March), 431–460. 
 
Welker, M. (1995). Disclosure Policy, Information Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity 
 Markets. Contemporary Accounting Research, 11 (2), 801–827.  
 
Zeff, S.A. (1978). The Rise of Economic Consequences. The Journal of Accountancy, 
 146 (6), 56–63. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
 
THE ORIGINAL ESSAYS 
  
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESSAY 1 
 
 
 
What Drives Quality of Firm Risk Disclosure? 
 
The Impact of a National Disclosure Standard  
and Reporting Incentives under IFRS  
 
by 
 
Antti Miihkinen 
 
 
 
Article published in The International Journal of Accounting, 2012, 47 (4), 437–468. 
 
This article is © Elsevier and permission has been granted for this version to appear here 
(www.elsevier.com). Elsevier does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed 
or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
 

What Drives Quality of Firm Risk Disclosure?
The Impact of a National Disclosure Standard and
Reporting Incentives under IFRS☆
Antti Miihkinen⁎
Aalto University School of Business, Department of Accounting, P.O. Box 21220, FIN-00076 Aalto, Finland
Received 20 December 2010
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of a detailed national disclosure standard on the quality of ﬁrms'
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and foreign listing status are documented. We also ﬁnd some evidence that the impact of the standard
on quality is more pronounced among less proﬁtable ﬁrms. Additional ﬁndings are that larger ﬁrms
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1. Introduction
High-quality narrative communication in the non-financial statement sections of annual
reports is important to making company reporting more useful to investors. However,
standard-setters face a taxing challenge in deciding on how these sections can most effectively
be regulated. Standard-setting is much concerned with making the best decisions about the
level of detail in the disclosure standards (Schipper, 2003). If standard-setters give overly
directive disclosure requirements, they receive highly comparable information that includes
mostly boilerplate discussion that lacks relevance to investors. In contrast, if standard-setters
do not require disclosure on a specific issue, some firms will not voluntarily disclose anything.
Accounting literature demonstrates that there is a significant risk information gap between
firms and their stakeholders (Kajüter, 2001; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Roulstone, 1999).
However, there is little if any research evidence to date concerning the impact of risk
disclosure regulation on quality (see Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). The literature needs studies
examining this issue. Otherwise, it is difficult to evaluate detailed risk guidance in an
environment where firms have several disclosure motives. The extant research documents the
importance of reporting incentives to determine accounting quality (e.g., Ball, Robin, & Wu,
2003; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005; Dobler, 2008; Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011; Leuz, 2003).
Given this background, this paper examines whether a detailed national risk disclosure
standard can improve the quality of firms' overall risk reviews under IFRS.
In order to examine this question, we exploit the unique regulatory change in Finland. In
2006, the Finnish Accounting Practice Board published a new detailed risk disclosure
standard that described how firms should assess their significant risks in their operating and
financial reviews. It provides a comprehensive view on the expected quality of risk reporting
and also includes illustrative disclosure examples. The standard specifies the risk disclosure
requirements of the Finnish Accounting Act, which are given generally and without
implementation guidance. However, it is still principles-based because it gives firms latitude
in deciding on their risk disclosure policies. Finnish listed firms follow IFRS but are obliged
to publish an operating and financial review according to the Finnish Accounting Act.
Consequently, the new disclosure standard also influences the risk reporting of those Finnish
listed firms that prepare their financial statements according to IFRS. Miihkinen (2011)
documents that the quality of Finnish listed firms' risk disclosure is negatively associated with
information asymmetry around the introduction of the standard.
Roulstone (1999) demonstrates that firms' market risk disclosures improved after the
introduction of FRRNo. 48 in the U.S. The Finnish standard differs fromFRRNo. 48 because
it stipulates the overall risk reviews of firms, i.e. disclosures on strategic risks, operational
risks, financial risks, damage risks, and risk management. The Finnish standard is six pages
long, whereas FRR No. 48 is in excess of 100 pages. Furthermore, FRR No. 48 lacks the
illustrative risk disclosure examples that have an essential role in the Finnish standard.
Starting in December 2005, the SEC requires overall risk reviews in annual and
quarterly reports. However, compared to Finland's standards, this standard is shorter,
vaguer, and lacks disclosure examples. It is not surprising that after the first wave of the
global financial crisis in 2010, the SEC warned companies about overly broad or generic
risk disclosures. SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro said that the commission is working on
revising risk disclosure requirements (CFO.com, 2010). Concurrent working papers on risk
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disclosures in the U.S. have provided evidence that the mandatory risk disclosures are
informative to investors despite the reporting deficiencies (Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu,
& Steele, 2011; Huang, 2011; Kravet & Muslu, 2011).
Another reason that has motivated us to examine how effective Finland's standards are
is that empirical literature finds high compliance and disclosure ratios for Finnish firms
(Dargenidou, McLeay, & Raonic, 2006; King, 1999). Therefore, if we are unable to
document improvements in quality of risk disclosure in this setting, regulatory bodies will
likely encounter similar problems in other countries. This information is relevant for
standard-setters when they consider how to mandate narrative risk reporting in the
non-financial statements of firms' annual reports.
Our empirical indicators of quality of risk disclosure are quantity of disclosure (cf.,
Abraham & Cox, 2007), coverage of disclosure (cf., Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004),
and the semantic properties of disclosure (cf., Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Beretta &
Bozzolan, 2008; Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007). We ensure the overall validity and
reliability of disclosure quality measurement by using factor analysis to summarize the
quality indicators into a composite measure of quality.
The results of a regression analysis point to the following main findings. First, the risk
disclosure standard increases firms' quality of risk disclosure in several dimensions. After
the release of the standard, the risk reviews of the firms become more extensive and also
provide more evenly distributed information across risk topics. Moreover, firms give more
detailed qualitative descriptions of the economic impact of the identified risk on future
performance. Firms also provide more information on the actions they have taken and
programs they have planned to face risks. We also document an increase in firms'
willingness to provide quantitative risk information although the effect of the standard is
weaker compared to other quality dimensions. The reluctance of firms to provide monetary
assessments of risk information is consistent with the findings of Beretta and Bozzolan
(2004), Linsley and Shrives (2006), and Dobler et al. (2011).
Second, we find that the coercive effect of the standard drives increases in the overall
quality of risk disclosure. Other important drivers of quality are firm size, profitability, and
listing on NYSE. We also find some evidence that the impact of the standard on quality is
more pronounced among less profitable firms. This impact suggests that the coercive effect
of the standard forces these firms to reconsider their threshold level of disclosure. It is also
found that a less profitable firm discloses more on its risks if it has a high business risk.
Third, the results demonstrate that the risk disclosure standard has a strong impact on the
location of the risk information provided. After the release of the standard, 81.9% of risk
disclosure is provided in the operating and financial reviews. In the previous year, the
comparable number was 57.5%. Additional findings are that larger firms and firms
reporting under the requirements of the SEC disclose more quantitative risk information,
and that the quality improvements are permanent in the subsequent years.
This study contributes to the accounting literature by demonstrating that detailed risk
disclosure guidance can be used to improve the quality of firms' overall risk reviews. In
addition, we add to prior literature by providing evidence on the importance of several
reporting incentives to determine risk disclosure quality. The results benefit the FASB, the
IASB, the SEC, and national regulatory bodies by demonstrating how a detailed national
disclosure standard can influence risk reporting under IFRS.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the literature
review and development of hypotheses, followed by the research design in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses sample, data, and descriptive statistics, and Section 5 reports empirical
results. Section 6 provides detail of robustness checks and Section 7 provides a summary
and conclusion.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. Risk disclosure regulation and quality of risk disclosure
In recent years, scholars have showed increasing interest in risk disclosure (e.g., Abraham
& Cox, 2007; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Dobler, 2008; Dobler et al., 2011; Lajili & Zéghal,
2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Roulstone, 1999; Solomon, Solomon, & Norton, 2000).
However, risk disclosure is still one of the most ambiguous and unexplored areas of corporate
disclosure. In particular, we know too little about quality of risk disclosure.
Risk management simultaneously maximizes profitability and minimizes the probability
of financial failure, thus it is needed to maximize shareholders' wealth (Solomon et al., 2000).
In addition, employees, customers and other stakeholders benefit from risk disclosure. One
common criticism of financial reporting is that it does not provide a detailed description of
risks and uncertainties. Academics, practitioners, and standard-setters have noticed this
problem and asked whether regulatory bodies should develop specific standards for the
disclosure of risk in annual reports.
Previous literature reports that firms react to new disclosure requirements and
recommendations (Inchausti, 1997; Miihkinen, 2008; Roulstone, 1999). Roulstone (1999)
demonstrates that FRR No. 48 is effective at improving market risk disclosures of U.S. listed
firms.1 However, academic research has provided no evidence about the effectiveness of
regulation in improving the overall quality of risk disclosure within a single country. For this
reason, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) suggest that future research should examine whether the
quality of risk disclosure can be explained by the extent of regulation in the operating
environment of the firms.
One of the problems of developing disclosure standards has been that direct empirical
evidence about the effects of risk disclosures has been nonexistent (Schrand & Elliott,
1998). Nowadays we have some evidence on the information content of risk disclosures to
analysts and investors (Campbell et al., 2011, Huang, 2011; Jorion, 2002; Kravet & Muslu,
2011; Miihkinen, 2011; Rajgopal, 1999; Thornton & Welker, 2004). However, behavioral
accounting studies demonstrate that risk information is often not effective in helping
investors to form risk judgments (Koonce, Lipe, & McAnally, 2005; Koonce, McAnally,
& Mercer, 2005). These arguments are supported by the empirical findings of Beretta and
1 FRR No. 48 was issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1997 to improve market risk
disclosures encouraged, but not required, under SFAS No. 119. One of the guiding principles the SEC followed in
formulating the proposed standard was that disclosure requirements about market risk should be ﬂexible enough
to take into consideration various registrants, different degrees of market risk exposure, and alternative ways of
measuring market risk (Linsmeier & Pearson, 1997). Consequently, the standard was principles-based and
allowed managers considerable latitude in the presentation of disclosure.
440 A. Miihkinen / The International Journal of Accounting 47 (2012) 437–468
Bozzolan (2004), Lajili and Zéghal (2005), Linsley and Shrives (2006), Linsley and
Lawrence (2007), and Dobler et al. (2011).
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) suggest that although Italian firms voluntarily disclose some
risk information, they tend to be oriented towards a policy of ‘formal disclosure but
substantial nondisclosure’ of the anticipated influence of risks on the future of the firms. In the
Canadian institutional setting, Lajili and Zéghal (2005) show that risk disclosures lack
uniformity, clarity, and quantification, which decrease their usefulness to stakeholders.
Linsley and Shrives (2006) examine risk disclosure in the U.K. and report that few firms give
quantitative risk information, and that risk narratives lack coherence. This argument indicates
a gap in risk information; consequently, stakeholders cannot assess accurately the risk profiles
of the firms. Linsley and Lawrence (2007) analyze the writing style of risk disclosures by
U.K. companies and demonstrate that these disclosures lack readability. Finally, Dobler et al.
(2011) examine the attributes of corporate risk disclosures internationally. They document
that managers typically disclose risks in management reports, concentrate on financial risk
categories, and give little quantitative and forward-looking risk information across sample
countries (US, Canada, UK, Germany). The authors conclude that domestic disclosure
regulation only partly explains the cross-country differences in disclosure, which implies that
risk disclosure motives have an essential impact on managers' reporting decisions.
2.2. Managers' disclosure incentives and firms' corporate governance structures
Risk reporting incentives also influence risk disclosure in regulated environments
(Dobler, 2008; Dobler et al., 2011; Dye, 1990; Marshall & Weetman, 2007). Marshall and
Weetman (2007) demonstrate that managers provide significantly less mandatory
information on foreign exchange risk management than they know about the issue. Firm
disclosure decisions, and thereby also firm risk disclosures, are likely to be influenced by a
number of factors that related literatures have examined. These include firm size (Brammer
& Pavelin, 2006; Cahan, Rahman, & Perera, 2005; Cooke, 1989; Eng & Mak, 2003),
profitability (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Leuz, 2000; Prencipe, 2004), prospects for growth
(Kanto & Schadewitz, 1997; Miihkinen, 2008), the need for external financing (Lang &
Lundholm, 1993), and listing status (Cooke, 1989).2
Moreover, some firms have higher exposure to risks and consequently have more
potential risk information to disclose to the capital markets. High leverage increases firms'
bankruptcy risk and makes these firms more vulnerable to risks (cf., Dobler et al., 2011).
Business risk (volatility of the yearly cash-flows and globalization) is another factor that
may influence managers' risk disclosure behavior (Cahan et al., 2005; Jorgensen &
Kirschenheiter, 2003). In addition, high sensitivity to systematic risk in the stock markets
may motivate managers to disclose risks (Linsley & Shrives, 2006).
Finally, the corporate governance structures of firms may also influence their risk
disclosures (Abraham & Cox, 2007). High ownership concentration probably decreases
firms' willingness to provide high quality risk disclosure. In addition, the ratio of foreign
owners to domestic owners may influence managers' risk reporting decisions.
2 Analytical research suggests that the reduction of adverse selection problems and agency costs are the primary
motives for voluntary disclosure (e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Spence, 1973).
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2.3. Hypothesis: the quality impact of the standard
Roulstone (1999) provides evidence on the coercive effect of FRR No. 48 on the
reporting of firms' market risks. FRR No. 48 is extensive, which is typical for the
rules-based accounting tradition in the U.S. Roulstone documents that market risk
disclosures, recommended but not required under FAS No. 119, expanded significantly
under FRR No. 48 but varied greatly in detail and clarity. This finding supports the notion
that the comprehensive standard had a significant coercive effect on firms' reporting.
The Finnish standard has characteristics of FRR No. 48 because it is detailed. In
addition, the Finnish standard is supplemented with illustrative disclosure examples that
should increase its coercive effect. Through these examples, the standard provides a
versatile view of the characteristics of high-quality risk reporting such as the importance of
qualitative and quantitative risk descriptions, and disclosure on all risk topics. The Finnish
Accounting Practice Board emphasizes in the guidance that one of its main objectives is
wide coverage of the provided risk information. From December 2005 onwards, the SEC
requires overall risk reviews in annual and quarterly reports. However, compared to
Finnish standards, this standard is shorter, vaguer, and lacks disclosure examples, which
likely reduces its coercive effect. Unsurprisingly, in 2010, the SEC warned firms about
low-quality overall risk reviews.
We propose that before the publication of the new standard, Finnish firms may have
been unwilling to report their risks in fear of proprietary costs and/or litigation costs
(Verrecchia, 1983). In addition, bad news firms may have been willing to withdraw from
risk disclosures because of the negative impact on valuation (Akerlof, 1970). We argue that
the coercive effect of the standard is strong enough to influence firms' risk disclosure
choices (cf., FRR No. 48), and we test the following hypothesis:
H1. The coercive effect of the risk disclosure standard leads to improved quality of firms'
risk reporting.
3. Research design
3.1. Definition of risk disclosure and risk disclosure framework
We define risk disclosure as all information that firms provide in the risk reviews they
present in their annual reports. Risk disclosure is information that describes firms' major
risks and their expected economic impact on future performance. This includes
forward-looking information that helps external investors build up a point estimate of
future cash flows, information on the sources of uncertainty surrounding forecasts of the
firm's future cash flows, and information on the sources of non-diversifiable risk that
should be included in cost of capital. In addition, historical information about the actions
taken to face risks, and forward-looking information on programs planned to face risks are
taken into account.
The risk disclosure standard of the Finnish Accounting Practice Board forms the basis
of the applied risk disclosure framework. This standard defines the following risk
categories typical of all firms: strategic risks, operational risks, financial risks, damage
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risks, and risk management. Several examples of the risk items belonging to the defined
categories are offered in the standard. In addition, it provides exemplary risk disclosure
formats. Because the standard does not give an exhaustive description of all subtopics in
the risk categories, the risk disclosure framework applied in this study has been made more
comprehensive by adopting some of the risk disclosure subtopics from Linsley & Shrives'
(2006) risk disclosure framework.3 Finally, a subsample of annual reports has been
pre-tested to identify missing subtopics from the examined risk categories. Appendix A
describes the detailed risk disclosure framework.
3.2. Empirical indicators of quality of risk disclosure
Previous literature reports various disclosure-measurement frameworks as an attempt to
best capture differences in the quality of financial reporting. Botosan (2004) contends that
these frameworks imply a positive correlation between quantity and quality. She states that
the IASB's and FASB's conceptual frameworks provide good guidance concerning
generally accepted views of information quality (Botosan, 2004: 290). However, it is
difficult to apply these requirements in the analyses of accounting narratives without
researcher's subjective assessment.
While this study recognizes the inherent conceptual difficulties of measuring disclosure
quality in a complete, valid, and reliable manner, we contend that certain quality indicators
developed in the existing literature may provide useful approximations of important
aspects of quality of risk disclosure (see Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). As
discussed below, these indicators relate to the quantity and coverage of risk disclosure, as
well as to certain semantic properties of the risk information disclosed.4
3.2.1. Risk disclosure quantity
The number of risk disclosure words provided by the firm measures the first proxy for
quality of risk disclosure. Consequently, the empirical indicator of risk disclosure quantity
is as follows:
QUANTITY ¼ In total number of risk disclosure wordsð Þ ð1Þ
3.2.2. Risk disclosure coverage
Investors need a balanced description of the major risks of the firm in order to
understand a firm's value.5 This study applies the disclosure metric described by Beattie
et al. (2004) to measure the coverage of the risk information provided. In this metric, the
3 Linsley and Shrives (2006) use a risk disclosure categorisation that was developed by a professional
accountancy ﬁrm and subsequently used by Kajüter (2001) within a risk disclosure study.
4 The measures presented below are crude proxies for the qualitative characteristics of ﬁnancial reporting
information provided in the IASB conceptual framework (see the IASB exposure draft of an improved conceptual
framework for ﬁnancial reporting, 2008). In this framework, relevance and faithful presentation align with the
fundamental qualitative characteristics of ﬁnancial reporting information. Enhancing qualitative characteristics
(comparability, veriﬁability, timeliness, and understandability) are complementary to the fundamental qualitative
characteristics. They distinguish more useful information from less useful information.
5 This objective was also made explicit in the Finnish risk disclosure standard.
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Herfindahl index is used to measure the concentration of corporate disclosures across risk
topics. The coverage of information is calculated at the main topic level of the risk
disclosure framework. The empirical indicator for risk disclosure coverage is as follows:
COVERAGE ¼ 1=Hð Þ=the number of main risk topics½ ; ð2Þ
where H represents Herfindahl measure of concentration across risk topics calculated as
H=∑ i=1n Pi2, where pi is the proportion of risk disclosure words on topic i. The inverse of
H will be used to make a greater Herfindahl index value reflect more extensive disclosure
coverage. This value has been scaled by dividing it with the number of main risk topics.
3.2.3. The semantic properties of risk disclosure
Recently, scholars have been increasingly interested in the semantic properties of the
information provided in corporate communications (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Beretta &
Bozzolan, 2008; Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007). Analyses of the semantic properties of text
focus on what is disclosed and how it is disclosed. Texts that include semantic quality
properties allow external users to look at firms ‘through the eyes of management’ (Cerbioni
& Parbonetti, 2007). Similar to Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), this study considers the
semantic properties of depth and outlook profile.
Depth concerns the content of information disclosed with regard to the expected
economic impact of identified risks on future performance. The depth dimension consists
of two components that are the qualitative and quantitative description of the economic
impact of the risk. The empirical indicators for these components are as follows:
DEPTH QUALITATIVE ¼ ln
Xkj
j¼1
qualitative ð3Þ
where kj=the number of risk information sentences disclosed by the firm; qualitativej=1 if
the risk information sentence j of the firm contains qualitative information about the expected
economic impact of the identified risk on future performance, otherwise qualitativej=0.
6
DEPTH QUANTITATIVE ¼ ln
Xkj
j¼1
quantitativej ð4Þ
where kj=the number of risk information sentences disclosed by the firm; quantitativej=1 if
the risk information sentence j of the firm contains quantitative information about the
expected economic impact of the identified risk on future performance, otherwise
quantitativej=0.
7,8
6 Observations with zero sentences were awarded 0 points. Consequently, observations with zero or one risk
disclosure sentence have the same disclosure scores on this dimension.
7 This study interprets broadly the sentences that contain quantitative information relating to the expected
economic impact of identiﬁed risk on future performance. Because very few ﬁrms provided any direct values for
risks, all risk disclosure sentences that contained some quantitative information were accepted. A stricter approach
has been applied in the robustness checks section of this study by awarding only sentences that provide sensitivity
analyses about the impact of the identiﬁed risk on net income.
8 For observations with zero sentences, see footnote 6.
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Outlook profile concerns the way management communicates the approach adopted to
face the identified risks (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). The empirical measure for this
dimension is as follows:
OUTLOOK PROFILE ¼ ln
Xkj
j¼1
acpj ð5Þ
where kj= the number of risk information sentences disclosed by the firm; acpj=1 if the
risk information sentence j of the firm contains information about actions taken or
programs planned to face identified risk, otherwise acpj=0.
9
3.2.4. Composite quality of risk disclosure
Factor analysis can be utilized to examine the underlying patterns or relationships of a
number of variables and to determine whether the data can be condensed into a smaller set
of factors or components (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995). The method is used to
summarize the quality indicators considered above and to form a composite measure of
quality of risk disclosure.10 The following composite measure of individual quality
indicators is expected to improve the overall validity and reliability of the measurement of
quality of disclosure:
COMPOSITE ¼ the score of the principal component with the highest eigenvalue:
ð6Þ
Appendix B gives case examples illustrating the use of individual quality indicators in
this study.
3.3. Reliability and validity of the risk disclosure quality indicators
In this study, the reliability of coding is assured by coding a pilot sample in order to
create clear decision rules. At this juncture, discussions with other scholars determine the
most effective and reliable rules for risk disclosure coding. The main data set are coded
after the coding decisions relating to a pilot sample reach an acceptable level of reliability.
Finally, we analyze the inter-rater reliability of coding by dual coding two subsamples, and
demonstrate that the reliability of the coding is sufficiently high.11
9 For observations with zero sentences, see footnote 6.
10 Factor analysis is a generic name given to common factor analysis and principal component analysis. A factor
score is a composite measure created for each observation on each factor extracted in the factor analysis. The
factor weights are used in conjunction with the original variable values to calculate each observation's score. The
factor score can then be used to represent the factor(s) in subsequent analyses (Hair et al., 1995). The analysis
method used in this study is principal component analysis and consequently, all prior communality estimates are
set to one.
11 Two measures of inter-coder reliability are calculated: the ﬁrst is the simple coefﬁcient of agreement, and the
second the alpha coefﬁcient of agreement proposed by Krippendorf (1980). Taken together the coding of the
subsamples, the simple coefﬁcient of agreement is 0.90, and the alpha coefﬁcient of agreement is 0.87. The extant
literature suggests a threshold level of 0.75 for the alpha coefﬁcient of agreement (Milne & Adler, 1999).
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3.4. Independent variables and regression models
The main test variable in the study is an indicator variable for the year 2006, which is an
empirical measure for the risk disclosure standard. Moreover, the impact of the relevant
reporting incentives (e.g., profitability and risk sensitivity), corporate governance
structures (e.g., ownership concentration), and industry are controlled in the regression
models. The main tests in the study involve the estimation of the following multivariate
regressions for different disclosure quality indicators (in Eq. (7), β represent the regression
parameters to be estimated,12 e represents the regression residual, subscripts i and t refer to
the firm and year, respectively):
Quality indicatorit ¼ b0 þ bsRisk disclosure standardit þ∑rbrReporting incentivesit
þ∑gβgCorporate governance structuresit þ∑cβcIndustry controlsit þ eit :
ð7Þ
Table 1 presents a more detailed description of the variable definitions.
4. Sample, data, and descriptive statistics
The target population is comprised of 129 firms listed at the OMX Helsinki during the
research period. The firms follow IFRS but are obliged to publish operating and financial
review according to the Finnish Accounting Act.13 Some firms are excluded from the
analysis. 13 firms that are part of the financial services industry are excluded from the target
population because their accounting practices, financial statements, and related disclosure
requirements differ from the rest of the population. Ten firms that were initially listed or
restructured between 2005 and 2006 are omitted. Three firms are omitted because of their
differing fiscal periods. Finally, four firms are discounted due to the lack of data for some
variables. After these eliminations, the study sample consists of 99 firms. In the empirical
analyses, the observations are pooled across 2005 and 2006, thus there are 198 firm-year
observations in the final sample. The matched paired sample design (i.e., disclosure of the
99 sample firms before and after the new standard) makes it possible to effectively control
that the results are not driven by potentially omitted factors that are not attributable to the
financial reporting system, such as the effects of the economic environment.14 The
approach is similar to that employed by Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008).
12 P-values of parameter estimates are computed from the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at
the ﬁrm level (see Petersen, 2009).
13 The Finnish Accounting Act stipulates that all listed ﬁrms shall incorporate an operating and ﬁnancial review
section (OFR) into their ﬁnancial statements. Conceptually, this is similar to the management discussion and
analysis section (MD&A) regulated by the SEC in the United States, and the management commentary (MC)
section suggested by the IASB. However, the OFR is given by the board of directors whereas the MD&A and MC
are given by the management. Both disclosure standards require ﬁrms to provide a narrative explanation of
company performance, ﬁnancial condition, and future prospects. The intent is to assist investors to interpret the
ﬁrm's ﬁnancial statements (Scott, 2009).
14 The economic environment includes volatility of economic activity and the information environment.
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The risk disclosure data are collated from two sources of 2005 and 2006 annual reports.15
The first source is the operating and financial review sections of the firms (subscript ofr in the
tables). The second is the overall risk reviews of the annual reports that are published in
separate risk sections, the notes to the financial statements, and the corporate governance
sections (subscript other in the tables). Annual report risk disclosure (subscript tot in the
tables) includes risk disclosures collated from both sources. The values for the accounting
variables and stock market data are retrieved from the Thomson One Banker Financial
database.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables for fiscal years 2005 and 2006.
The mean and median statistics of QUANTITY and COVERAGE are fairly close to each
other in both years, which suggest that these variables are distributed symmetrically. The
Table 1
Variable definitions.
Quantity Ln (total number of risk disclosure words)
Coverage The inverse of the Herfindahl index value divided by the number of main risk topics.
Depth_qualitative Ln (number of risk information sentences containing qualitative information about the
expected economic impact of identified risk on future performance)
Depth_quantitative Ln (number of risk information sentences containing quantitative information about the
expected economic impact of identified risk on future performance)
Outlook_profile Ln (number of sentences containing information about actions taken or programs planned to
face identified risk)
Composite It is the score of the principal component with the highest eigenvalue computed from
Quantity, Coverage, Depth_qualitative, Depth _quantitative and Outlook_profile.
Standard Indicator variable=1, if the disclosure index value describes risk disclosure published under
the standard (i.e. in 2006 annual reports), otherwise 0.
Size The natural logarithm of the net sales in million euros.
ROA The return on assets ratio.
P/B The ratio of year-end market capitalization to total common equity.
Exfin The net cash flow from financing deflated by net sales.
F_listing Indicator variable=1, if the firm is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, otherwise 0.
Leverage The financial leverage of the firm computed as follows: 1− (common equity / total assets).
Dev(Cf.) The standard deviation of operating cash flow to assets ratio computed across five years.
Globa The percentage of foreign sales.
Beta The beta of the firm. It is computed from the share and market index returns of the preceding
12 months before the publication of the risk disclosure. MSCI Europe has been used as the
market index.
Clshs The percentage of shares owned by firm insiders.
ForOwn The percentage of foreign owners.
15 The new disclosure standard was published on September 2006. Consequently, its impact on reporting can be
seen ﬁrst time in 2006 annual reports that were published until May 2007.
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distributions of DEPTH_QUALITATIVE and DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE are skewed in
2005, which implies that during the pre-standard period some firms have used several
sentences to describe the expected economic impact of identified risk on future
performance, whereas the median firms have not provided this kind of information at all.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of the variables (n=99).
Mean Median
2005 2006 t-test (sig.) 2005 2006 Wilcoxon (sig.)
Disclosure quality indicators:
Quantity_tot 5.441 6.037 0.000 5.677 6.221 0.000
Quantity_ofr 3.130 4.945 0.000 3.989 5.231 0.000
Quantity_other 4.766 4.787 0.902 5.176 5.088 0.061
Coverage_tot 0.493 0.610 0.000 0.534 0.613 0.000
Coverage_ofr 0.273 0.519 0.000 0.300 0.574 0.000
Coverage_other 0.387 0.375 0.550 0.366 0.331 0.632
Depth_qualitative_tot 0.741 0.995 0.001 0.000 1.099 0.001
Depth_qualitative_ofr 0.218 0.531 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Depth_qualitative_other 0.526 0.482 0.579 0.000 0.000 0.568
Depth_quantitative_tot 0.429 0.547 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.022
Depth_quantitative_ofr 0.106 0.219 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.007
Depth_quantitative_other 0.326 0.362 0.555 0.000 0.000 0.586
Outlook_profile_tot 1.602 2.085 0.000 1.792 2.079 0.000
Outlook_profile_ofr 0.503 1.299 0.000 0.000 1.386 0.000
Outlook_profile_other 1.283 1.199 0.383 1.099 0.000 0.856
Composite_tot 0.785 0.970 0.000 0.654 0.943 0.000
Composite_ofr 0.532 1.059 0.000 0.417 1.059 0.000
Composite_other 0.770 0.753 0.734 0.575 0.495 0.809
Reporting incentives:
Size 5.481 5.585 0.000 5.278 5.397 0.000
ROA 0.082 0.071 0.426 0.081 0.080 0.914
P/B 2.571 2.743 0.235 2.237 2.478 0.008
Exfin 0.155 0.003 0.398 −0.023 −0.015 0.194
F_listing 0.040 0.040 – 0.000 0.000 –
Leverage 0.554 0.538 0.447 0.549 0.537 0.584
Dev(Cf.) 0.069 0.064 0.183 0.050 0.044 0.286
Globa 0.476 0.491 0.262 0.478 0.486 0.098
Beta 1.089 1.193 0.459 1.063 1.077 0.693
Clshs 28.593 28.778 0.836 27.759 26.379 0.005
ForOwn 22.027 23.677 0.009 14.966 15.386 0.002
This table provides the mean, median, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values of the variables.
Moreover, p-values for the t-test and Wilcoxon test for paired samples are reported. Subscript ofr refers to risk
information provided in the operating and ﬁnancial review section of the ﬁrm. Subscript other refers to risk
information provided outside the operating and ﬁnancial review of the ﬁrm. Subscript tot refers to all overall risk
reviews that are provided in the annual report of the ﬁrm. For variable deﬁnitions, see Table 1. Disclosure data is
collected from the 2005 and 2006 annual reports of the ﬁrms. Other variable values are measured at the end of the
ﬁscal year unless otherwise deﬁned. The number of observations is 99 for both years. P-values signiﬁcant at 5% or
better (two-tailed test) are shown in boldface.
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The release of the new standard makes DEPTH_QUALITATIVE more normally
distributed. DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE remains skewed.
Interestingly, the mean values of QUANTITY_ofr (3.130 and 4.945 in 2005 and 2006,
respectively) and QUANTITY_tot (5.441 and 6.037 in 2005 and 2006, respectively)
demonstrate that before the publication of the standard, 57.5% of the risk information was
provided in the operating and financial reviews of the firms. The new standard increases
this ratio to 81.9%.16
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of the variables (n=99).
Std. deviation Min Max
2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006
1.526 1.080 0.000 0.000 7.824 8.137
2.230 1.412 0.000 0.000 7.564 6.966
2.097 2.143 0.000 0.000 7.703 8.039
0.224 0.183 0.000 0.000 0.952 0.976
0.243 0.221 0.000 0.000 0.906 0.929
0.253 0.248 0.000 0.000 0.906 0.972
0.966 0.984 0.000 0.000 3.367 4.159
0.517 0.748 0.000 0.000 2.639 2.996
0.913 0.895 0.000 0.000 3.258 4.111
0.854 0.924 0.000 0.000 3.738 3.761
0.467 0.502 0.000 0.000 3.738 2.079
0.727 0.827 0.000 0.000 2.996 3.761
1.352 1.160 0.000 0.000 4.394 4.543
0.841 0.963 0.000 0.000 3.367 3.555
1.363 1.401 0.000 0.000 4.304 4.489
0.501 0.443 0.000 0.000 1.975 2.242
0.554 0.543 0.000 0.000 3.325 2.411
0.641 0.662 0.000 0.000 2.421 2.796
1.955 1.978 0.205 0.112 10.440 10.624
0.166 0.114 −0.759 −0.387 1.250 0.334
2.007 2.161 −9.901 −9.686 8.727 7.742
1.791 0.115 −0.742 −0.351 17.760 0.576
0.198 0.198 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
0.314 0.198 0.117 0.147 3.193 1.403
0.082 0.061 0.009 0.010 0.709 0.454
0.279 0.283 0.000 0.000 0.991 0.994
0.839 1.150 −1.140 −1.003 3.736 8.396
17.710 18.920 0.024 0.000 71.237 82.237
22.053 23.041 0.026 0.016 90.982 90.785
16 Entwistle (1999) uses content analysis to examine the location of the R&D disclosures contained in 113
Toronto Stock Exchange-listed ﬁrms' annual reports. He documents that 22.7% of total R&D disclosure is located
in the management discussion and analysis section.
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Overall, in line with the hypothesis, we demonstrate that there has been a significant
improvement in firms' disclosure quality indicators in 2006 compared to 2005. 17 The
results consistently show that improvement in the indicators derives from the quality
increases in firms' operating and financial reviews. In contrast, quality has remained
invariable in the other sections of the annual reports.18 The values for every indicator of
risk disclosure quality in firms' operating and financial reviews are higher after the release
of the standard. For example, the mean (median) value of the composite measure of quality
of risk disclosure in the operating and financial reviews of the firms has increased from
0.532 (0.417) to 1.059 (1.059) in 2006 (see COMPOSITE_ofr in Table 2).19
For comparison, we also code the illustrative risk disclosure examples that are
given in the disclosure standard. The index values for QUANTITY, COVERAGE,
DEPTH_QUALITATIVE, DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE, and OUTLOOK_PROFILE are
6.967, 0.676, 2.944, 2.303, and 3.045, respectively. Index values for the best discloser of
the sample after the release of the standard are 6.966, 0.929, 2.996, 2.079, and 3.555,
respectively. Hence, the risk disclosure example ranks high in the quality comparison
against the best risk reports. This finding provides evidence that our indicators of quality
capture those issues that are emphasized in the standard.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Correlation analysis
The correlation coefficients between the quality indicators (computed from all risk
reviews) and STANDARD are provided in Table 3. The results demonstrate that
QUANTITY correlates positively and significantly with the other empirical indicators of
risk disclosure quality. This finding is consistent with the view that quality of risk
disclosure is at least partly a function of risk disclosure quantity. QUANTITY and
COVERAGE are highly correlated, which suggests that firms that provide more risk
17 One should note that while the median values of some variables (e.g., DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE_tot) are
zero for both years 2005 and 2006, the Wilcoxon test between the years nevertheless suggests that the pairwise
differences are not symmetrically distributed. The reason for these apparently contradictory results is that
observations with zero differences between the years are eliminated from the Wilcoxon test.
18 There are altogether four ﬁrms that do not provide any risk information in 2005 annual reports. One of these
does not give any risk information in the 2006 annual report either. More interestingly, there are altogether 30
ﬁrms that do not provide any risk information in their 2005 operating and ﬁnancial reviews (OFR) but 26 of them
begin to report their risks in OFR after the release of the new rule. The (untabulated) results of the logistic
regression analysis (dependent variable: a ﬁrm discloses risks in OFR=1, a ﬁrm does not disclose risks in
OFR=0) demonstrate that the most signiﬁcant driver behind this policy change is STANDARD. P/B, GLOBA,
and BETA also increase the probability of risk disclosure in OFR whereas FOROWN decreases it.
19 The level of the reporting incentives has remained relatively stable during the sample period. However, the
results suggest that the sample ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly larger, more highly valued, and more extensively owned by
foreign owners in 2006.
450 A. Miihkinen / The International Journal of Accounting 47 (2012) 437–468
information also discuss several risk topics. With reference to the semantic properties of
risk disclosure, QUANTITY is most strongly correlated with OUTLOOK_PROFILE. This
implies that a firm disclosing a high level of risk information releases more information on
its actions to reduce the risks than it does on the economic impact that the identified risk
could have on future performance.
COMPOSITE has a high positive correlation with the quality indicators. This is
consistent with the results of the factor analysis, which showed that all disclosure quality
indicators have relatively high positive factor loadings.20 Evidently, if we aim to analyze
quality of risk disclosure comprehensively, we should take all indicators into
consideration. STANDARD correlates positively and significantly with most disclosure
quality indicators. However, DEPTH_QUALITATIVE and DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE
have non-significant positive Pearson correlation coefficients.21
5.2. Impact of the standard on quality of risk disclosure
Table 4 depicts the regression results for the determinants of different quality
dimensions in the annual reports of the firms. In terms of F-values, the overall findings
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Quantity 0.550 ⁎ 0.698 ⁎ 0.548 ⁎ 0.875 ⁎ 0.894 ⁎ 0.219 ⁎
2. Coverage 0.637 ⁎ 0.480 ⁎ 0.289 ⁎ 0.594 ⁎ 0.686 ⁎ 0.264 ⁎
3. Depth_qualitative 0.585 ⁎ 0.448 ⁎ 0.496 ⁎ 0.606 ⁎ 0.829 ⁎ 0.148 ⁎
4. Depth_quantitative 0.475 ⁎ 0.254 ⁎ 0.522 ⁎ 0.564 ⁎ 0.705 ⁎ 0.083
5. Outlook_profile 0.758 ⁎ 0.609 ⁎ 0.595 ⁎ 0.557 ⁎ 0.891 ⁎ 0.177 ⁎
6. Composite 0.800 ⁎ 0.658 ⁎ 0.833 ⁎ 0.775 ⁎ 0.868 ⁎ 0.227 ⁎
7. Standard 0.221 ⁎ 0.276 ⁎ 0.130 0.067 0.189 ⁎ 0.194 ⁎
Correlation coefficients between the disclosure quality indicators and standard (n=198). Quality indicators are
computed from all overall risk reviews which are provided in the annual report of the firm. The Pearson
correlation estimates are presented below the diagonal and the Spearman rank correlation coefficients found above
the diagonal. For variable definitions, see Table 1.
⁎ Denotes correlation coefﬁcients signiﬁcant at 5% or better.
20 The factor loadings for QUANTITY, COVERAGE, OUTLOOK_PROFILE, DEPTH_QUALITATIVE, and
DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE are 0.942, 0.932, 0.958, 0.881, and 0.748, respectively. The ﬁrst factor explains
80.2% of the total variance of the individual disclosure quality indicators.
21 The (untabulated) correlation analysis of the independent variables of the regression equations reveals that the
highest Pearson correlation coefﬁcient is between EXFIN and LEVERAGE (0.734). Although the corresponding
Spearman rank correlation is much lower (0.310), the result suggests a possible multicollinearity problem. Hence,
we conduct a multicollinearity analysis and document the highest variance inﬂation factors (VIF) for
LEVERAGE, DEV(CF.), and EXFIN (3.041, 2.925 and 2.801, respectively). Other variables have clearly lower
VIF-values. Hence, multicollinearity cannot be expected to be a serious problem in the reported regressions.
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indicate that all five regressions are statistically highly significant. The adjusted R-squares
range from 10.8% to 33.1%.22
Consistent with the hypothesis, the results demonstrate that the new risk disclosure
standard has increased firms' quality of disclosure. STANDARD has a positive
and significant regression coefficient in every regression model. However, in the
DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE model, the coefficient is less significant than it is in the
other models. The results provide evidence that firms' risk reviews have been more
extensive and also have provided more evenly distributed information across risk
categories during the post-standard period. Furthermore, firms have disclosed more
qualitative and quantitative information on the economic impact of the identified risk on
future performance. Firms have also provided more information about their actions and the
programs they plan to face risks. The current literature reports that many firms are reluctant
to provide monetary assessments of risk information (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Dobler
et al., 2011; Linsley & Shrives, 2006). We find that the impact of the standard on firms'
disclosure quality is weaker when it comes to the reporting of quantitative information on
risks.
5.3. Managers' reporting incentives and risk disclosure
Dobler (2008) and Dobler et al. (2011) suggest that disclosure motives have a
significant role even in regulated risk disclosure environments. Table 4 shows several
significant reporting incentives for risk disclosure. SIZE is significantly and positively
associated with every disclosure quality dimension. This finding provides evidence that
larger firms not only focus on providing a high level of risk information but also consider
its substance in regard to investors. The positive association between size and disclosure is
consistent with prior corporate disclosure literature in general (e.g., Brammer & Pavelin,
2006; Cooke, 1989; Lang & Lundholm, 1993), and the risk disclosure literature in
particular (Dobler et al., 2011; Linsley & Shrives, 2006).23 Larger firms are expected to
suffer more from political costs (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978), which may increase their
responsiveness to new disclosure standards.
We document that poorly performing firms (ROA) outperform more profitable firms in
risk disclosure. They provide much information on actions taken and programs planned to
face their identified risks (OUTLOOK_PROFILE model). In addition, the coverage of
information is better and risk reports include more information provided in monetary terms
(COVERAGE and DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE models). Previous literature provides
contradictory interpretations for the impact of profitability on corporate disclosure
(e.g., Leuz, 2000; Prencipe, 2004; Troberg, Kinnunen, & Seppänen, 2010). This study is
the first to provide evidence on this relationship in a risk disclosure context.
22 In Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), the adjusted R-square of the quality model is 14.4%. In Abraham and Cox
(2007), the adjusted R-square of the overall risk disclosure model is 42.0%.
23 Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) document a non-signiﬁcant regression coefﬁcient for ﬁrm size in their risk-
disclosure quality study. One explanation for this result may be that the Italian institutional setting differs from the
Finnish one.
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Firms with high growth prospects (P/B) provide a high level of risk information,
which is evenly distributed across different risk categories.24 Our conjecture is that
investors have high future growth expectations for firms with high price-to-book ratios.
This increases pressures to meet these expectations and motivates firms to avoid
adverse selection problems through high quality risk reports (cf., Kanto & Schadewitz,
1997).
Interestingly, listing on the NYSE (F_LISTING) has a strong positive impact on firms'
descriptions of the economic impact of the identified risks on future performance
(DEPTH_QUALITATIVE and DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE). Cooke (1989) has shown
that listing status influences corporate disclosure levels. Our findings suggest that firms
listed on the NYSE outperform domestically listed firms in regard to the substance of the
information they provide. This may be explained by higher capital market pressures for
high quality disclosures by firms that have been forced to provide disclosures under the
reporting requirements of the SEC.
Capital structure (LEVERAGE) relates negatively to risk disclosure quantity. One
interpretation for why highly leveraged firms are reluctant to be risk transparent is that
leverage increases risk of bankruptcy. By providing little risk information to investors and
lenders, the manager of the highly leveraged firm may well be trying to conceal the
vulnerability of the firm to the realization of strategic, operational, financial, or damage
risks. Another explanation is that highly leveraged firms do not want to reveal their
proprietary information. The negative association between corporate disclosure and
financial leverage aligns with the prior literature (e.g., Dobler et al., 2011; Eng & Mak,
2003; Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995; Healy & Palepu, 1993; Troberg et al., 2010;
Verrecchia, 1983).
The positive and significant regression coefficient of BETA in three of the five
models demonstrates that firms with higher systematic risk provide more risk
information. They also transparently disclose the actions they take and the programs
they plan to face their risks. These firms also provide qualitative information on the
impact of these risks.25
24 P/B becomes slightly non-signiﬁcant in the QUANTITY model after we replace the four negative observations
of the variable with 0. In the COVERAGE model the variable remains positive and signiﬁcant.
25 Following Linsley and Shrives (2006), the analysis computes beta from the returns of the preceding 12 months
before the publication of the risk information. The risk-free return has been subtracted from the share return and
market index return. The risk-free return is the monthly return computed from the three month Euribor rate taking
into account the effects of compound interest. The MSCI Europe Index has been used as the market index. Morgan
Stanley Capital International Europe Index is a weighted benchmark index made up of equities from 15 European
countries. We obtain qualitatively similar results when OMXH Cap is used as the market index. OMXH Cap is a
benchmark index made up of equities listed at the OMXH Helsinki in which the highest weight for a share is 10%.
However, the time series applied in the computation of BETA inﬂuences the results. The positive sign of the
variable is no longer signiﬁcant if it is computed starting from the beginning of 2002. The beginning of 2002 has
been selected as the starting point because the stock markets were very volatile in 2000–2001 after the crash of the
information technology bubble. Consequently, the results provide some evidence that ﬁrms react to increases in
their short-term systematic risk. If systematic risk increases, managers may be motivated to pacify their
shareholders by providing additional risk information in the capital markets. The results supplement the ﬁndings
of Linsley and Shrives (2006) who do not ﬁnd any relation between market beta and risk disclosure.
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5.4. Comparison between the standard, managers' reporting incentives, and firms'
corporate governance structures as a determinant of risk disclosure quality
In Table 5, we reduce our disclosure quality indicators to a composite measure that
reflect firms' overall quality of risk disclosure. The adjusted R-square of the model is
27.7%. STANDARD, SIZE, ROA, and F_LISTING are the most significant variables in
this model. The standardized regression coefficients for these variables are 0.173, 0.423,
−0.135, and 0.332, respectively.26 This finding provides evidence that firm size and
listing on NYSE are the most significant determinants of the quality of risk disclosure.27
Interestingly, the results for the (untabulated) yearly samples demonstrate that ROA
becomes highly significant in 2006, which suggests that the impact of the new disclosure
standard on firms' reporting may be partly determined by firms' profitability.28
To obtain further insight on the interaction between the reporting standard, incentives, and
corporate governance factors, we augment our COMPOSITE model with several interaction
variables. The results demonstrate that the regression coefficient of ROA∗STANDARD is
negative and significant. Other interaction variables are non-significant.
Finally, we conduct a subsample analysis to examine in more detail whether the relation
between the quality of risk disclosure and standard varies linearly with profitability.
Table 6 shows regression results for two subsamples: firms with high profitability and with
low profitability.29 The adjusted R-squares of the models are 14.9% and 43.6%,
respectively. STANDARD is positive and significant among both subsamples, which is
consistent with the view that the regressions results concerning the impact of the standard
on quality are robust across firms' profitability. However, the high significance of
STANDARD among the less profitable firms suggests that the impact of the standard on
26 ForOwn has a relatively high negative standardized regression coefﬁcient that is signiﬁcant at the 10%
signiﬁcance level. This ﬁnding may imply that ﬁrms with high percentage of foreign owners prefer having mutual
meetings with their shareholders to providing risk disclosure in annual reports.
27 The (untabulated) results document that SIZE and F_LISTING are also the most important drivers of the
reporting of quantitative risk information as measured by their standardized regression coefﬁcients (see Table 4).
28 The F-value of the Chow test is 0.30 (sig. 0.997). Consequently, there is no structural change in the
relationship between quality of risk disclosure and reporting incentives between the sample years. In 2005, the
unstandardized (standardized) regression coefﬁcient and its signiﬁcance for ROA are −0.160(−0.053) and 0.514,
respectively. In 2006 they are −1.218(−0.315) and 0.002, respectively. The sign and signiﬁcance of the other
variables remains qualitatively similar in both years. SIZE and F_LISTING are the most important drivers of the
overall quality of risk disclosure also in the yearly samples. In addition, we augment our pooled regression with a
continuous variable for percentage change in proﬁtability (ChROA) between 2005 and 2006, and document that
the regression coefﬁcient of the variable is negative and non-signiﬁcant (coef. −0.017, two-tail sig. 0.199). The
main results remain unchanged. The result suggests that the level of proﬁtability (ROA) is a more signiﬁcant
determinant of quality than change in proﬁtability (ChROA).
29 The subsamples are formed based on ﬁrms' proﬁtability at the end of 2005. This makes it possible to use
paired data in the pooled regressions and hence, effectively control the impact of potentially omitted variables.
High(low) proﬁtability subsample consists of 49(50) ﬁrms that have highest(lowest) proﬁtability in 2005. In the
high-proﬁtability subsample, the descriptive statistics for ROA are as follows: mean=0.144, median=0.125,
standard deviation=0.132, minimum=−0.181, maximum=1.250. In the low-proﬁtability subsample, the
descriptive statistics for ROA are as follows: mean=0.011, median=0.048, standard deviation=0.121,
minimum=−0.759, maximum=0.184.
455A. Miihkinen / The International Journal of Accounting 47 (2012) 437–468
quality may be more pronounced among these firms.30 Furthermore, the results suggest
that the negative relation between profitability and the quality of risk disclosure may not be
linear. This can be inferred from the negative and significant (non-significant) regression
Table 5
Regression results for the overall quality of risk disclosure (n=198).
Dependent variable=Composite
Unstand. Stand. Unstand. Stand.
Predicted coeff coeff P-value coeff coeff P-value
Intercept ? 0.245 0.228 0.336 0.115
Regulation:
Standard + 0.166 0.173 0.000 0.282 0.294 0.072
Reporting incentives:
Size + 0.104 0.423 0.001 0.112 0.457 0.002
ROA ? −0.455 −0.135 0.014 −0.183 −0.054 0.416
P/B + 0.030 0.131 0.096 0.034 0.149 0.105
Exfin + −0.009 −0.024 0.776 0.032 0.084 0.212
F_listing + 0.809 0.332 0.001 0.815 0.335 0.003
Leverage − −0.040 −0.022 0.431 −0.218 −0.119 0.224
Dev(Cf.) + 0.586 0.088 0.201 0.683 0.102 0.210
Globa + 0.148 0.086 0.192 0.157 0.092 0.221
Beta + 0.045 0.094 0.086 0.061 0.128 0.143
Clshs − 0.001 0.050 0.494 0.002 0.069 0.432
ForOwn ? −0.004 −0.198 0.098 −0.005 −0.218 0.124
Size∗Standard ? – – −0.011 −0.073 0.688
ROA∗Standard ? – – −0.946 −0.174 0.026
P/B∗Standard ? – – −0.006 −0.027 0.731
Exfin∗Standard ? – – −0.308 −0.052 0.282
F_listing∗Standard ? – – −0.027 −0.008 0.835
Leverage∗Standard ? – – 0.130 0.082 0.605
Dev(Cf.)∗Standard ? – – −0.476 −0.053 0.592
Globa∗Standard ? – – 0.043 0.028 0.778
Beta∗Standard ? – – −0.020 −0.042 0.742
Clshs∗Standard ? – – −0.001 −0.026 0.756
ForOwn∗Standard ? – – 0.001 0.034 0.697
Industry fixed effects Included Included
Model F-value (prob) 5.710 (.000) 3.410 (.000)
Adj.R-square 0.277 0.248
No. of obs 198 198
For variable definitions, see Table 1. Composite is computed from all overall risk reviews, which are provided in
the annual report of the firm. The unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients are reported. Regression
coefficients significant at 10% or better are shown in boldface. One-tailed test is applied if there is a predicted
direction and two-tailed test otherwise. P-values of parameter estimates are computed from the heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level (see Petersen, 2009).
30 We also run the subsample regressions augmented with a continuous variable for percentage change in
proﬁtability (ChROA) between 2005 and 2006. The main results remain unchanged. The unstandardized
regression coefﬁcient of ChROA and its p-value for the high proﬁtability subsample in 2005 are −0.105 and 0.225
(two-tail), respectively. In the low proﬁtability subsample the corresponding values are −0.017 and 0.126 (two-
tail), respectively. The result is consistent with the view that the level of proﬁtability (ROA) is a more signiﬁcant
determinant of quality than change in proﬁtability (ChROA).
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coefficient of ROA in the high (low) profitability subsample. Interestingly, the empirical
measures of business risk (DEV(CF.) and GLOBA) are positively and significantly
associated with the quality of risk disclosure only among the less profitable firms. This
result suggests that high business risk may increase pressures for high-quality risk
reporting, if the profitability of the firm is low (cf., Cahan et al., 2005; Jorgensen &
Kirschenheiter, 2003).31
Table 6
Regression results for the firms with high and low profitability (n=98 and 100, respectively).
Dependent variable=Composite High profitability Low profitability
Unstand. Stand. Unstand. Stand.
Predicted coeff coeff P-value coeff coeff P-value
Intercept ? −0.002 0.993 0.860 0.294
Regulation:
Standard + 0.106 0.117 0.023 0.206 0.205 0.000
Reporting incentives:
Size + 0.143 0.548 0.002 0.114 0.485 0.002
ROA ? −0.530 −0.153 0.006 −0.156 −0.037 0.707
P/B + 0.029 0.100 0.239 0.036 0.148 0.166
Exfin + −0.212 −0.049 0.529 −0.002 −0.009 0.956
F_listing + −0.134 −0.042 0.633 1.063 0.503 0.000
Leverage − 0.269 0.084 0.485 −0.269 −0.168 0.159
Dev(Cf.) + 0.006 0.001 0.498 1.921 0.345 0.015
Globa + 0.038 0.022 0.436 0.422 0.244 0.042
Beta + 0.055 0.102 0.168 0.037 0.083 0.175
Clshs − 0.001 0.034 0.792 0.003 0.104 0.343
ForOwn ? −0.006 −0.281 0.158 −0.003 −0.156 0.224
Industry fixed effects Included Included
Model F-value (prob) 2.060 (.018) 5.780 (.000)
Adj.R-square 0.149 0.436
No. of obs 98 100
For variable definitions, see Table 1. Composite is computed from all overall risk reviews, which are provided in
the annual report of the firm. The unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients are reported. Regression
coefficients significant at 10% or better are shown in boldface. One-tailed test is applied if there is a predicted
direction and two-tailed test otherwise. P-values of parameter estimates are computed from the heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level (see Petersen, 2009). The subsamples are formed based on firms'
profitability at the end of 2005. High(low) profitability subsample consists of 49(50) firms that have
highest(lowest) profitability in 2005.
31 We also conduct a subsample analysis for larger and smaller ﬁrms by using median as the cut-off point. The
(untabulated) results show that the regression coefﬁcient of SIZE is positive and signiﬁcant in both models. In
addition, STANDARD is positively and very signiﬁcantly associated with the quality of risk disclosure in both
subgroups. These ﬁndings are robust to those reported in Tables 4 and 5. The positive relation between ﬁrm size
and the quality of risk disclosure is linear, and the impact of the standard on quality is not dependent on ﬁrm size.
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5.5. Impact of the standard on the location of risk disclosure
To obtain further evidence on the quality impact of the new standard, we compare the
determinants of different quality dimensions in the operating and financial reviews (OFR)
and other sections (OTHER) of the annual reports. After the new standard was released, the
percent of risk information in OFR increased from 57.5 to 81.9 (see Table 2). If we consider
this increase, we can conclude that it became the main medium for risk disclosure. The
(untabulated) results reinforce that STANDARD is a highly significant determinant of the
quality of risk disclosure in every OFR model. In contrast, the variable is non-significant in
all OTHER models. This result suggests that the increase in firms' quality of risk disclosure
is driven by the quality changes in their operating and financial reviews.32
In particular, the new standard has been effective at increasing smaller firms' risk
disclosure in OFR. This can be inferred from the non-significant regression coefficients of
SIZE in the OFR models. SIZE is positive and significant in every OTHER model, which
suggests that the higher overall quality of risk disclosure of larger firms found in this study
derives from the risk information provided outside the firms' operating and financial
reviews. In contrast, smaller firms have disclosed their risks primarily in their operating
and financial reviews.33
To conclude, the results provide evidence that the new disclosure standard improves the
quality of risk disclosure on several dimensions. Previous literature reports that the SEC was
able to improve the quality of firms' market risk disclosures through a detailed and extensive
disclosure standard FRR No. 48 (Roulstone, 1999). On the contrary, the SEC was not
satisfied with firms' willingness to respond to its requirement to give overall risk reviews
from 2005 onwards. We demonstrate that the Finnish Accounting Practice Board succeeded
in influencing the quality of firms' overall risk reviews by releasing a detailed standard
supplemented with illustrative disclosure examples. Our results contribute the extant
accounting literature by providing answers that narrow the research gap documented by
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004): What is the impact of risk disclosure regulation on quality?
6. Robustness checks
After conducting the primary tests reported above, we performed some additional tests.
At the end of 2004, the Finnish Accounting Act was amended to include a requirement to
32 Interestingly, the adjusted R-square of DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE model is higher for disclosures released in
OTHER than in OFR (cf., 14.80 vs. 9.70). This ﬁnding coupled with the signiﬁcant regression coefﬁcients of
SIZE and F_LISTING in the OTHER model imply that larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms reporting under the requirements of
the SEC prefer to provide quantitative risk information outside the operating and ﬁnancial reviews.
33 An interesting case is a Finnish pulp industry company that provides in depth risk information for both years.
In 2005, this information is provided in its operating and ﬁnancial reviews. In 2006, however, after the release of
the standard, the company changed the location of the information to the other sections of its annual report. The
behavior of the ﬁrm is contrary to what would be expected. The reason for this behavior was sought later from
their investor relations manager. She replied that the ﬁrm wanted to increase the readability of its operating and
ﬁnancial review by removing a long risk disclosure section from it. Consequently, the ﬁrm provided different
operating and ﬁnancial review for the investors and authorities. The one sent to authorities included risk
disclosures as required by the Finnish Accounting Act. However, next year, the auditor of the ﬁrm required it to
discontinue this policy.
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give an extensive and balanced description of firms' significant risks in their operating and
financial reviews (OFR). The requirement was one sentence and hence did not provide any
implementation guidance to firms. The new risk disclosure standard (examined in this
paper) gave the needed guidance. It was published on September 2006. Any further version
of the new standard was not released before the actual date and hence, firms were unable to
adopt it early. Some chief financial officers and auditors were aware of its preparation but
they did not know its content.
The amendment of the Accounting Act probably influenced some firms' risk reporting
in 2005 OFR. Hence, we compare risk disclosures in 2004 and 2005 and find that in 2004
(2005) three (69) firms provide some risk information in OFR. The (untabulated) results of
the logistic regression analysis (dependent variable: a firm discloses risks in OFR=1, a
firm does not disclose risks in OFR=0) reinforce the finding that firms have significantly
increased risk disclosures in the 2005 OFR compared to 2004. This finding suggests that
many firms react to the new but ambiguous risk disclosure requirement of the Accounting
Act. Next, we examine whether the quality of OFR risk disclosure of these 69 firms
improves from 2005 to 2006. The (untabulated) results of the regression analysis show that
STANDARD is positively and significantly associated with all quality dimensions
examined in the main tests. This finding provides evidence that the new risk disclosure
requirement of the Accounting Act do not improve the quality of firms' risk reports. On the
contrary, the new risk disclosure standard is effective in increasing reporting quality.
In accordance with the approach applied by Abraham and Cox (2007), we check that
our results are not driven by any sample selectivity biases.34 We compute the Tobit model
by using COMPOSITE as the endogenous variable. The lower bound is set at zero because
altogether five observations obtain zero disclosure points. The results demonstrate that the
positive impact of the standard on risk reporting is significant, as was documented in the
main analyses. In addition, the significance of the other explanatory factors is qualitatively
similar to the main tests.
This study conducts detailed analyses (untabulated) to account for the impact of
possible outlier variables on the results. First, all continuous independent variables are
winsorized at the 1% level at each tail of the distribution. Second, firm-years falling outside
three standard deviations from the mean of any variable are eliminated. In both robustness
models, the economic significance of STANDARD increases from the results reported in
Table 5. ROA becomes slightly non-significant but ROA∗STANDARD is negative and
significant in both cases.
In addition, we examine the robustness of the applied disclosure quality indicators
(untabulated). First, we use absolute values of risk disclosure words and sentences instead
of using the logarithms.35 STANDARD is a positive and significant determinant of risk
34 In the majority of corporate disclosure studies the empirical indicator for corporate disclosure is regressed on
independent variables by applying ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations (e.g., Cooke, 1989; Botosan, 1997;
Prencipe, 2004; Cahan, Rahman, & Perera, 2005; Zechman, 2010). The drawback of the approach is that the
propensity to disclose is a censored variable in the sense that it cannot take a negative value (see Abraham & Cox,
2007, p. 238). In this situation ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations would introduce sample selectivity biases and
therefore the use of a truncated regression technique is necessitated to avoid the biased and inconsistent parameter
estimates that can be associated with OLS estimation. A common solution to the problem is to use a Tobit model.
35 This has been done for QUANTITY, DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE, DEPTH_QUALITATIVE, and
OUTLOOK_PROFILE (see Table 4).
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disclosure in each of the four models. Second, we scale the disclosure scores of the firms
by dividing them with the maximum absolute value of the examined disclosure quality
indicator.36 In this case, STANDARD is positive and significant in all models except the
QUANTITY model.
Third, we examine whether the risk disclosure standard has increased the frequency of
sentences that contain sensitivity analysis about the impact of risks on net income.37 In this
model, STANDARD is positive and weakly significant (coef. 0.023, one-tail sig. 0.072).
Consistent with the results reported in Table 4 for DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE, firm size and
listing on the NYSE are the most important determinants of the number of sensitivity
analyses. These findings support the interpretation that highly relevant risk information for
investors is more likely to be determined by firm size and capital market pressures than the
risk disclosure standard. However, the results of this paper suggest that the standard has had
some role in improving the extent of quantitative risk information provided to investors.
Finally, risk disclosure quantity on strategic risks is used as an additional empirical
indicator of quality of risk disclosure.38 Strategic risks are interesting for investors because
strategic issues largely determine the future potential of the firm. In addition, strategic risks
differ from financial risks because they cannot be hedged. Table 7 reports regression
results for the determinants of disclosure on strategic risks. The results support the previous
findings by showing that the risk disclosure standard has had a positive impact on firms'
disclosure behavior. The standard has increased disclosure on strategic risks in firms'
operating and financial reviews, as can be seen from the significant regression coefficient
of STANDARD in the OFR model. It is likely that in addition to the coercive effect of the
standard, the standard's examples and detailed descriptions of strategic risk disclosures
have helped firms to understand better the nature of this important disclosure topic.
Moreover, F_LISTING is a significant variable in the regressions, which suggests that the
reporting requirements of the SEC (20-F reports) have a positive influence on firms'
reporting on strategic risks. Other significant variables are SIZE, DEV(CF.), and
FOROWN.
Lastly, we examine whether the quality improvements in risk disclosures around the
introduction of the standard are permanent (results untabulated). We analyze risk
disclosures in firms' 2007 and 2008 annual reports, and we compute two empirical
indicators for quality, QUANTITY and COVERAGE. The results of the t-tests for paired
samples demonstrate that increases in the quantity of risk disclosure are significant in 2007
and 2008. On the contrary, the coverage of information is not significantly higher in 2007
and 2008 than it was in 2006.39 We also test whether top 10% of firms in disclosure
36 We have done this for all variables reported in Table 4.
37 Every sentence and row in a table in which a ﬁrm provides some sensitivity analyses about the impact of the
identiﬁed risk on net income is awarded 1 point. The natural logarithm of the number of disclosure points is used
as the dependent variable in the OLS regression tests.
38 Strategic risks are one of the ﬁve main risk topics analyzed in this study. Hence, reporting on strategic risks
also inﬂuences the disclosure indicators examined in the main analyses.
39 The standard deviation of ﬁrms' yearly disclosures decreases from 2005 onwards but clear saturation point can
be observed around 2007 and 2008. Yearly (2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008) values of standard deviation for
QUANTITY are 1.526, 1.080, 1.018, and 1.015, respectively. For COVERAGE, they are 0.224, 0.183, 0.146, and
0.159, respectively.
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change in 2006 (separately for both indicators) remain at the same disclosure level in 2007
and 2008. The results document that these firms continue improvements in QUANTITY
but COVERAGE remains at the same level in the subsequent years. The findings reported
above suggest that compliance with the new standard is a learning process for the firms.
Changes in quality are permanent but in some dimensions quality improvements continue
after the initial introduction of the standard.
7. Summary and conclusions
This study examines whether a detailed national disclosure standard improves the
quality of firms' overall risk reviews under IFRS. We examine quality of risk disclosure
along several dimensions by applying the disclosure quality indicators provided in Beattie
et al. (2004) and Beretta and Bozzolan (2004). Finland offers a unique institutional setting
for the study because in 2006 the Finnish Accounting Practice Board published a new
detailed risk disclosure standard that describes how firms should assess their significant
risks in their operating and financial reviews.
Table 7
Regression results for the determinants of disclosure about strategic risks (n=198).
Strategic ofr Strategic other Strategic total
Predicted Coeff P-value Coeff P-value Coeff P-value
Intercept ? 3.568 0.001 −2.369 0.023 1.698 0.131
Regulation:
Standard ofr/total:+
other:?
1.506 0.000 0.089 0.674 1.165 0.000
Reporting incentives:
Size + 0.009 0.472 0.754 0.000 0.488 0.00
ROA ? −0.180 0.881 −0.552 0.589 −0.334 0.835
P/B + −0.002 0.978 0.067 0.261 0.000 0.999
Exfin + −0.015 0.929 −0.203 0.212 −0.160 0.360
F_listing + 2.366 0.001 1.738 0.076 2.728 0.000
Leverage − −0.862 0.205 0.501 0.642 −0.676 0.292
Dev(Cf.) + 1.463 0.356 5.204 0.077 5.911 0.069
Globa + 0.500 0.241 0.142 0.430 0.435 0.287
Beta + −0.026 0.859 0.113 0.252 0.061 0.338
Clshs − −0.009 0.126 0.005 0.617 −0.007 0.193
ForOwn ? −0.017 0.128 −0.022 0.045 −0.028 0.010
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included
Model F-value (prob) 3.100 (.000) 3.540 (.000) 4.510 (.000)
Adj.R-square 0.146 0.171 0.222
No. of obs 198 198 198
Strategic_ofr is the natural logarithm of the total number of risk disclosure words about strategic risks in the operating
and financial review of the firm. Strategic_other is the natural logarithm of the total number of risk disclosure words
about strategic risks outside the operating and financial review of the firm. Strategic_tot is the natural logarithm of the
total number of risk disclosure words about strategic risks in the annual report of the firm. Other variables are defined in
Table 1. Regression coefficients significant at 10% or better are shown in boldface. One-tailed test is applied if there is a
predicted direction and two-tailed test otherwise. P-values of parameter estimates are computed from the
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the firm level (see Petersen, 2009).
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The empirical results demonstrate that the risk disclosure standard improves Finnish
listed firms' quality of risk disclosure across several dimensions. During the post-standard
period, firms' risk reviews are more extensive and provide more evenly distributed
information across risk categories. Firms also give more detailed qualitative descriptions of
the economic impact of the identified risk on future performance and provide more
information on actions taken and the programs planned to face their risks. Furthermore, the
standard also increases firms' willingness to provide quantitative risk information albeit the
effect is weaker than in the other quality dimensions.
Moreover, we construct a composite model for the overall quality of risk disclosure and
find that the coercive effect of the standard drives the increases in quality. Other important
determinants of quality are firm size, profitability, and listing on NYSE. Interestingly, we
find some evidence that the impact of the standard on quality is more pronounced among
less profitable firms. We also find that business risk significantly determines reporting
quality among these firms. Finally, we demonstrate that the risk disclosure standard has a
strong impact on the location of the risk information provided. After the release of the
standard, 81.9% of risk disclosure is provided in the operating and financial reviews. In the
previous year, the comparable number was 57.5%. Additional findings show that larger
firms and firms reporting under the requirements of the SEC disclose more quantitative risk
information, and that the quality improvements are permanent in the subsequent years.
This study contributes to the accounting literature by demonstrating that detailed risk
disclosure guidance can be used to improve the quality of firms' overall risk reviews. In
addition, we add to prior literature by providing evidence of the importance of several reporting
incentives as a determinant of risk disclosure quality. The results have useful practical
implications for standard-setters such as the FASB and the IASB, the SEC, and national
regulatory bodies. They provide an example how the Finnish regulator has been able to
increase the quality of risk reporting within a single country. In particular, the findings suggest
that one clause of the law may not be effective enough to ensure transparent disclosure about
abstract issues such as risks. Many firms need detailed descriptions of the required disclosures
with illustrative examples. In addition to the coercive effect of detailed risk disclosure
standards, they may also guide firms' reporting. The biggest challenge is to influence firms'
willingness to report quantitative risk information, although many firms explicitly report that
they have internally evaluated the impact of the risks and their probabilities.
The analyses and results reported here are based on observations in Finland, which has a
rules-based accounting tradition. Consequently, the results should be generalizable to other
countries with similar legal roots. However, because existing research reports high
compliance and disclosure ratios for Finnish firms, the results may not be generalizable to
countries with low compliance and disclosure ratios. One challenge for narrative
disclosures in annual reports is that it is difficult to document their usefulness to investors.
However, future research could try to examine more comprehensively the economic
consequences of risk information from equity and debt investors' perspective.
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Appendix A. Risk disclosure framework
This appendix summarizes the main topics and subtopics examined for risk disclosure.
The basis for the classification of every subtopic derives from the Finnish risk disclosure
standard. The risk disclosure framework applied has been made more comprehensive by
adding a number of risk disclosure subtopics from the risk disclosure framework presented
by Linsley and Shrives (2006). Finally, a subsample of annual reports has been pre-tested
to uncover any missing subtopics for the examined risk categories.
1. Strategic risks
a. Market competition
b. Market areas
c. Position in the production chain
d. Dependence on customers
e. Dependence on suppliers
f. Changes in customer preferences
g. Technological development (e.g. threat of competing commodities)
h. Regulatory changes
i. Political changes
j. Economical changes
k. Mergers and acquisitions
l. Pricing
m. Industry specific changes
n. Launch of new products
o. Business portfolio
p. Life cycle (growth and profitability)
q. Management
r. Research and development
2. Operational risks
a. Dependence on the know-how of the personnel
b. Uncommon business fluctuations in demand
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c. Interruptions in the delivery chain
d. Price fluctuations of the factors of production (e.g. raw materials)
e. Patents and other industrial property rights
f. Customer satisfaction
g. Information technology risks
h. Reputation and brand name development
i. Stock obsolescence and shrinkage
j. Product and service failure
k. Environmental
l. Health and safety
m. Project deliveries
n. Quality controls
3. Financial risks
a. Interest rate
b. Exchange rate
c. Liquidity
d. Credit
e. Commodity
4. Damage risks
a. Insurances
b. Significant legal actions
5. Risk management
a. Risk management policy
b. Risk management organization
Appendix B. Risk disclosure examples
This appendix demonstrates the scoring of the risk disclosure quality indicators. More
detailed scoring principles are available from the authors upon request.
1) Quantity= ln (total number of risk disclosure words)
A firm provides 500 words risk information
→ Disclosure score ¼ Quantity ¼ ln 500ð Þ ¼ 6:21:
2) Coverage= [(1 /H) / the number of main risk topics]
The risk information provided by Nokia Corporation in its 2006 operating and financial
review can be divided across risk topics as follows:
Strategic risks: 415 words
Operational risks: 398 words
Financial risks: 51 words
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Damage risks: 68 words
Risk management: 0 words
(Total 932 words)
→ Herfindahl index ¼ H ¼ 415=932ð Þ2 þ 398=932ð Þ2 þ 51=932ð Þ2
þ 68=932ð Þ2þ 0=932ð Þ2 ¼ 0:389
→ Disclosure score ¼ Coverage ¼ 1=0:389ð Þ=5 ¼ 0:51:
3) The semantic properties of risk disclosure
A) DEPTH_QUALITATIVE=ln (number of risk information sentences containing
qualitative information about the expected economic impact of identified risk on
future performance)
B) DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE=ln (number of risk information sentences containing
quantitative information about the expected economic impact of identified risk on
future performance)
C) OUTLOOK_PROFILE= ln (number of sentences containing information about actions
taken or programs planned to face identified risk)
Ponsse Plc provides the following risk information in its 2006 operating and financial
review: “Ponsse faces substantial risks relating to raw materials, components, and supplier
network. To control these risks, the company has begun in 2005 a supplier network
development program.”
The expression “substantial risks” provides qualitative information about the
expected economic impact of risks relating to raw material, components, and
supplier network on future performance. Consequently, the ﬁrm is awarded 1 point
in the scoring of DEPTH_QUALITATIVE indicator.
The expression “supplier network development program” provides information
about actions taken to face identiﬁed risk. Consequently, the ﬁrm is awarded 1 point
in the scoring of OUTLOOK_PROFILE indicator.
Scanfil Plc discloses the following risk information in its 2006 operating and financial
review: “About 80% of the revenues come from the sales to the six biggest customers from
which the share of the biggest customer is significant.”
The expressions “80% of the revenues” and “six biggest customers” provide
quantitative information about the expected economic impact of the risk (high
dependence on customers) on future performance. Consequently, the ﬁrm is awarded
1 point in the scoring of DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE indicator.
The expression “the share of the biggest customer is signiﬁcant” gives qualitative
information on the expected economic impact of the risk on future performance.
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Consequently, the ﬁrm is awarded 1 point in the scoring of DEPTH_
QUANTITATIVE indicator.
Stora Enso Corporation is awarded scores based on the quality of its overall risk reviews
in 2006, as follows:
DEPTH_QUALITATIVE=14 sentences
→ Disclosure score ¼ ln 14ð Þ ¼ 2:64:
DEPTH_QUANTITATIVE=42 sentences
→ Disclosure score ¼ ln 42ð Þ ¼ 3:74
OUTLOOK_PROFILE=29 sentences
→ Disclosure score ¼ ln 29ð Þ ¼ 3:37:
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The Usefulness of Firm Risk Disclosures under Different Firm-
Riskiness, Investor-Interest, and Market Conditions 
  
New Evidence from Finland 
 
 
Abstract 
 
To date, there is only meager research evidence on the usefulness of mandatory 
annual report risk disclosures to investors. Although it has been argued that corporate 
disclosure decreases information asymmetry between management and shareholders, 
we do not know whether investors benefit from high-quality risk reporting in a 
highly regulated risk disclosure environment. In this paper, we performed association 
tests to examine whether the quality of firms’ mandatory risk disclosures relate to 
information asymmetry in the Finnish stock markets. In addition, we analyzed 
whether the usefulness of risk disclosures depends on contingency factors such as 
firm riskiness, investor interest, and market condition. We demonstrate that the 
quality of risk disclosure has a direct negative influence on information asymmetry. 
We also document that risk disclosures are more useful if they are provided by small 
firms, high tech firms, and firms with low analyst coverage. We also found that 
momentum in stock markets affects the relevance of firms’ risk reports.  
 
 
JEL classification: M41, M48 
 
 
Keywords: Risk reporting, Quality of disclosure, Value-relevance, Information asymmetry, 
Regulation, Corporate disclosure  
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Starting with Amir and Lev (1996), many scholars have begun to explore whether 
soft accounting information provides incremental information to investors (e.g., 
Abrahamson & Amir, 1996; Kothari, Li, & Short, 2009; Demers & Vega, 2010). The 
findings of these studies have demonstrated that soft accounting information is 
indeed useful to investors. However, at the moment there is only meager evidence on 
the usefulness of risk disclosures to investors. 
 Prior research has mostly focused on examining the regulatory and non-
regulatory determinants of risk disclosure (e.g., Elmy, LeGuyader, & Linsmeier, 
1998; Roulstone, 1999; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Dobler, 
Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011) or the value relevance of market risk disclosures (e.g., 
Rajgopal, 1999; Linsmeier, 2002; Jorion, 2002; Lim & Tan, 2007). Concurrent 
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studies on firms’ overall risk disclosures1 in the US have provided evidence that 
mandatory risk disclosures are informative to investors despite the reporting 
deficiencies (Huang, 2011; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & 
Steele, 2013). However, the US regulation on firms’ overall risk disclosures leaves 
much room for interpretation. Hence more evidence on the usefulness of overall risk 
reviews in a highly regulated risk disclosure environment will be needed. To fill the 
gap, this paper examines the following questions: 
 
1. Does the quality of risk disclosure provided by firms in their annual 
reports affect information asymmetry between the management and 
investors?  
 
2. Do certain contingency factors such as firm riskiness, investor interest, and 
market condition affect the usefulness of annual risk disclosures to 
investors? 
 
 Finland provides an intriguing institutional setting for the examination of 
these questions because of recent changes in Finnish risk reporting practices 
attributable to the new detailed risk disclosure standard issued by the Finnish 
Accounting Practice Board in 2006. The standard provides an extensive description 
of expected risk reporting and also provides some examples of good risk disclosure. 
Final decisions on the form of disclosure are left to firms. Hence the regulator 
encourages firms to develop the best reporting practices. Since the levels of risk 
disclosure by firms still vary considerably, examination of the research questions is 
feasible. In addition, compared with firms reporting under US reporting standards, 
Finland offers a less rich disclosure environment, and therefore makes any economic 
benefits from increased risk disclosure easier to detect (cf., Leuz & Verrecchia, 
2000).2  
                                                 
1 In this paper the term overall risk disclosures refers to reporting by firms on several risk topics (e.g., 
strategic risks, operations risks, financial risks, damage risks, risk management, and other risks). 
2 In Finland, the disclosure of overall risk reviews is highly regulated and guided. However, firms 
reporting under US reporting standards face stricter disclosure requirements if we consider all 
corporate disclosures. Dissemination of all that information to investors makes it more difficult to 
empirically demonstrate measurable economic benefits for single information items such as risk 
disclosures in the US institutional setting.   
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 The new guidance may have both coercive and advisory effect on firms’ 
overall risk reviews and its impact on quality has been confirmed in earlier research 
(Miihkinen, 2012). Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2009) rank Finland among the 
top countries in the world on the basis of the quality of its governance. This supports 
the notion that Finnish risk disclosure regulation is effective.3 Jorgensen & 
Kirschenheiter’s (2003) seminal theoretical analysis of risk disclosures suggests that 
the expected risk premium of firms is higher under a mandatory risk disclosure 
regime. The advanced Finnish requirements on overall risk reviews compared with 
those of other countries (see, section 2.1.) and the documented effect of the new 
standard justify an examination of the impact of the quality of risk disclosures by 
Finnish listed firms on information asymmetry.   
 We analyze the risk reporting of more than 300 firm-year observations in a 
four year panel covering the fiscal years 2006-2009. The study period encompasses a 
variety of market conditions because annual reports for 2005 and 2006 were 
published under bull market conditions, those for 2007 under bear market conditions, 
and those for 2008 while stock markets were recovering from the crash (see, figure 
2). This allows us to examine whether the usefulness of risk disclosure to investors 
depends on the general trends in the stock markets. In particular, the recent global 
financial crisis makes it possible to analyze whether a shock in investor confidence 
affected the usefulness of provided risk information. 
 The impact of risk disclosure was analyzed along two dimensions, quantity 
and coverage. Principal component analysis was used to construct a measure for the 
composite quality of risk disclosure. Other data were retrieved from the Thomson 
One Banker Financial and IBES databases and from the register of Euroclear 
Finland Oy. Congruent with the existing literature, the bid-ask spread and trading 
volume were used as empirical indicators for information asymmetry (see, Leutz & 
Verrecchia, 2000; Leutz, 2003).  
 We performed several association tests to analyze the research questions. 
First, we examined whether those firms which were ranked higher according to their 
risk disclosure scores exhibited lower levels of information asymmetry than firms 
with lower disclosure scores. Second, we considered what contingency factors 
                                                 
3 For example, in 2007 Finland’s governance scores for regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption were 1.67, 1.89, and 2.58, respectively. For the US the scores were 1.45, 1.56, and 1.40, 
respectively. A higher score means higher governance quality in Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi’s 
ranking (2009).  
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affected the usefulness of annual report risk disclosure to investors. The contingency 
factors examined include measures of firm riskiness, investor interest, and market 
conditions. 
 The study points to the following three main findings. First, firms that 
provide high-quality risk information also have lower levels of information 
asymmetry. The finding suggests that annual report risk disclosure provides useful 
information to investors. 
 Second, it documents that firm riskiness affects results. We show that risk 
disclosure is more useful to investors if it is provided by small firms and high tech 
firms. This result implies that investors require more risk information from risky 
firms. 
 Third, we demonstrate that investor interest also has an effect on results. 
High-quality risk information is more useful to investors when it is provided by firms 
with low analyst coverage. The finding suggests that the risk profiles of less 
extensively followed firms are vague to investors and that this increases investors’ 
reactions to risk disclosures by these firms. This result is in line with the results of 
Botosan (1997) and Hope (2003). Botosan (1997) documents that high-quality 
annual report disclosure reduces the cost of equity capital in firms with low analyst 
coverage.  Hope (2003) demonstrates that the level of annual report disclosure is 
more useful to the following analysts when the analyst coverage of the firm is low. 
 Last but not least, we show that risk disclosure is useful to investors under all 
market conditions. However, we found that it is even more useful in bearish and 
recovering stock markets than in bullish stock markets. This finding is consistent 
with the view that during an economic downturn, investors become more cautious, 
thereby increasing their risk information needs.  
 Our results are congruent with those of the recent studies which demonstrate 
that risk disclosures are informative in the US institutional setting (Huang, 2011; 
Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2013). 
Consequently, the unique features of the Finnish stock market (see, section 2.1) do 
not deteriorate the results. One probable reason for this is the high degree of detail 
required by the Finnish risk disclosure regulation.  
 This study contributes to prior risk disclosure literature by examining the role 
of mandatory risk disclosures in lowering information asymmetry in Finland, which 
is a highly regulated risk disclosure environment. We also add to the concurrent risk 
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disclosure literature in the US setting (Huang, 2011; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; 
Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2013) by including several relevant 
contingency factors in the analyses. Our methodological perspective differs from that 
of current studies on the area (Huang, 2011; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell, Chen, 
Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2013) because we collate our data from annual reports and 
manually code every firm’s disclosure. This makes it possible to categorize risk 
information on the basis of its topics, which should increase the accuracy of our 
disclosure proxy. Moreover, since OMX Helsinki is a small stock exchange, we were 
able to analyze a target sample that covers all Finnish listed firms with the exception 
of those in financial services.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews 
relevant prior literature and section three provides the research hypotheses. Sample 
selection, variables and methods are reported in section four. Section five reports the 
empirical results and is followed by the results of additional analyses in section six. 
Section seven concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Literature review  
 
2.1. Risk reporting requirements in different institutional settings 
 
In the IFRS era (from 2005 onwards) risk disclosure regulation is most advanced in 
the US, Canada, the UK, Germany, and Finland (cf., Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011, 
Miihkinen, 2012).4 All five countries demand risk disclosures in both the notes to the 
financial statements and the management report sections.5 Note disclosure 
requirements are very similar across the countries. They emphasize reporting on 
                                                 
4 Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) examine risk disclosure quality in the Italian institutional setting, which 
is voluntary. However, discretion is an inherent part of risk reporting due to its subjective and partly 
nonverifiable nature. Hence risk disclosures by firms can be assumed to be (quasi-)voluntary and 
depend on reporting incentives even under the mandatory risk disclosure requirements (Dobler, 2008; 
Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011).   
5 Dobler (2008) compares risk reporting requirements in the United States of America and according 
to IFRS, with those in Germany. He demonstrates that USA and IFRS have adopted a piecemeal 
regulatory approach on risk reporting. This means that risk disclosure is regulated by risk categories 
as opposed to regulating on overall risk reviews as opposed to Germany, where GAS 5 requires 
information on several risks. Also, Finland takes a comprehensive approach to risk reporting. Both 
Finland and Germany are typical code law countries.  
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financial risks and financial risk management (e.g., SFAS 107, IAS 32, IFRS 7) and 
stipulate relatively broadly on the reporting of estimation uncertainties in valuation 
(e.g., SFAS 5, IAS 1). There are more differences between countries in risk 
disclosure requirements regarding management reports. Domestic standards have the 
greatest impact on risk disclosure in these sections (Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011, 
Miihkinen, 2012).6   
 The Finnish risk disclosure regulation is illustrated in figure 1. The standard 
of the Finnish Accounting Practice Board requires the most advanced risk 
disclosures. At the end of 2004 the Finnish Accounting Act was amended with a 
requirement to provide a fair and extensive description of significant risks in the 
operating and financial review (conceptually similar to a management report). This 
requirement was provided on a general level and left considerable room for 
interpretation. In 2006, the Finnish Accounting Practice Board clarified the risk 
requirements of the Finnish Accounting Act by issuing a detailed and comprehensive 
standard on firms’ overall risk reviews.7 Also, other laws and rules may have had an 
impact on risk disclosures by Finnish listed firms in their annual reports for 2005-
2008. For example, the general requirement to provide a true and fair view of the 
firm’s history and prospects has been included in several laws and rules since 1989.  
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
 Germany has adopted a comprehensive approach to risk reporting in GAS 5. 
It requires firms to provide information on all risk categories, risk management, and 
forecasts. There are similarities between the Finnish risk disclosure standard and 
GAS 5. However, the Finnish standard is more detailed in the sense that it provides 
precise information on the expected risk reporting levels by including disclosure 
examples in the standard. It also differs from GAS 5 by providing a more explicit 
                                                 
6 IFRS Practice Statement: Management Commentary was issued in 2010 to provide guidance to 
IFRS reporters. It provides a framework for the form of management report. It is voluntary and gives 
only general level guidance for risk reporting in this section. Finnish listed firms follow IFRS, but 
have to prepare their parent company financial statements according to the Finnish Accounting Act. 
Hence, Finnish requirements also affect the reporting of firms that report under the IFRS. 
7 Hence, the requirement to provide overall risk reviews in the operating and financial reviews has 
affected reporting since the 2004 annual reports. As reported in Miihkinen (2012), the new detailed 
risk disclosure standard, which affected reporting since the 2006 annual reports, increased the quality 
of the risk disclosures of Finnish listed firms. 
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framework for different risk topics and by underlining the importance of a balance 
between disclosures on each topic.  
 Comparison between the US and the Finnish risk disclosure requirements 
with respect to firms’ overall risk reviews reveals significant differences. The 
Finnish standard on overall risk reviews focuses on guiding firms to provide a 
balanced description of their major risks. It is six pages long, devotes equal space to 
each risk topic, and offers illustrative disclosure examples. In the US, the SEC has 
required corporate overall risk reviews in annual and quarterly reports since 2005.8 
However, these requirements are short, vague, and lack disclosure examples, thereby 
leaving substantial room for interpretation by managers. It is not surprising that in 
2010 the SEC warned companies about risk disclosures that are too broad and 
generic.9 The SEC has in fact provided a detailed standard for disclosure on market 
risks (FRR 48). It is over 100 pages long, in keeping with the rules-based accounting 
tradition. This causes an imbalance between regulation of disclosure on market risks 
and other risk topics in the US. Thus, compared with the US, the Finnish 
requirements on firms’ overall risk reviews are more detailed and require more 
balanced disclosure on different risk topics.  
 
2.2.  Unique features of the Helsinki Stock Exchange (OMX Helsinki) 
 
In addition to the detailed risk disclosure guidance, there are also other unique 
features in Finland which make OMX Helsinki an interesting test setting for the 
research questions. The Finnish stock markets have evolved considerably during the 
last few decades. The general internationalization and deregulation of the financial 
markets started in the early 1980s - a few years later than in the rest of the Nordic 
countries. The process proceeded gradually from liberalization of the money market 
to the abolishment of all restrictions on capital movements to and from Finland. 
Finally, in 1993 the restrictions on foreign ownership of Finnish stocks were 
removed. For international investors small markets are interesting because they may 
                                                 
8 The SEC requires firms to disclose all identifiable risk factors in the first pages of 10-K filings 
(Section 1A). These factors have to be reported as described in Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K 
provided under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
9 The US SEC reviews disclosures for adequacy. Similarly, in Finland the Finnish Accounting 
Practice Board issued more detailed guidance on risk disclosures in the overall risk reviews because it 
was not satisfied with the willingness and ability of firms to report their risks based on the 
requirements of the Finnish Accounting Act. 
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provide considerable diversification benefits although the co-movements between the 
Finnish and global markets may have increased in recent years (see, Kallunki, 
Martikainen, Martikainen, & Yli-Olli, 1997). 
 The trading of shares in Finland is concentrated in the largest companies 
(e.g., Nokia Plc, Stora Enso Plc, Nordea Plc). Thin markets increase volatility and 
reduce liquidity, especially among smaller firms. The low number of trades also 
typically results in larger spreads between the two quotes (see, Kallunki, 
Martikainen, Martikainen, & Yli-Olli, 1997). 
 
2.3.  Review of prior risk disclosure literature 
 
Risk information asymmetry may cause several problems in capital markets such as 
high transaction costs, thin markets, low liquidity, lower gains from trade, and 
unprofitable investments for defenseless minority investors (Lev, 1988). Considering 
the valuation and stewardship role of accounting information (see, Beyer, Cohen, 
Lys, & Walther, 2010), risk disclosure provides useful information for both purposes. 
It facilitates more accurate valuation but can also be used as a coarse proxy for 
management’s sense of direction.10 Recently standard-setters have also emphasized 
the importance of risk reporting as can be seen from the IFRS Practice Statement on 
Management Commentary in which risk information is one content element of a 
decision-useful management commentary (see note 6). One objective of the 
statement is to harmonize risk reporting, which is a challenging task in view of the 
variety of different institutional corporate disclosure environments (cf., Haller, 
Ernstberger, & Froschhammer, 2009; Adelopo, 2011). 
 Prior risk disclosure literature has mainly focused on analyzing the regulatory 
and non-regulatory determinants of risk disclosure (e.g., Elmy, LeGuyader, & 
Linsmeier, 1998; Roulstone, 1999; Marshall & Weetman, 2002; Beretta & Bozzolan, 
2004; Lajili & Zeghal, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Abraham & Cox, 2007). 
These papers demonstrate that several firm-specific motives and corporate 
governance factors affect the quality of risk reporting. In addition, some studies have 
analyzed the risk disclosures provided in firms’ prospectuses (Deumes, 2008; Hill & 
                                                 
10 Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal (2012) found that environmental performance and environmental risk are 
negatively associated. They examine environmental risk by content analyzing firms’ environmental 
risk disclosures in 10-K filings. Consequently, high quality environmental risk disclosure probably 
helps investors in the valuation of firms and in the assessment of management’s work. 
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Short, 2009; Taylor, Tower, & Neilson, 2010) or in different institutional settings 
(Amran, Bin, & Hassan, 2009; Hassan, 2009). These papers have demonstrated 
several deficiencies in the quality of risk disclosure. Prior literature suggests that the 
quality of risk disclosure should be analyzed along several dimensions (Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008). This is an important issue for 
transparent and well-functioning capital markets. High quality of disclosure has been 
documented to provide useful information to analysts (Bozzolan, Trombetta, & 
Beretta, 2009). 
 Accounting literature provides only meager empirical evidence on the 
economic consequences of narrative risk disclosures. The existing evidence is mainly 
limited to the analyses of the value relevance of risk disclosures provided in line with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission's requirement FRR No.48. It requires firms 
to provide quantitative and qualitative disclosures about exposure to market risk and 
to disclose how they account for derivatives (see, Rajgopal, 1999; Linsmeier, 2002; 
Jorion, 2002; Liu, Ryan, & Tan, 2004; Lim & Tan, 2007; Pérignon & Smith, 2010). 
Rajgopal (1999) demonstrates that the market risk disclosures of oil and gas 
producers affect their stock return sensitivities to oil and gas price movements. Lim 
& Tan (2007) document that higher quantitative value-at-risk estimates are 
associated with weaker return-earnings relation and higher future stock return 
volatility.  
 Recent studies on firms’ mandatory overall risk reviews in US have provided 
evidence that these disclosures are informative to investors despite the reporting 
deficiencies (Huang, 2011; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & 
Steele, 2013). Campbell at al. (2013) demonstrates that risk disclosures associate 
negatively with information asymmetry. Kravet & Muslu (2013) analyze 10-K filings 
and show that increases in qualitative risk factors in corporate annual reports are 
associated with increases in stock return volatility and trading volume around and 
after the filings. 
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2.4.  Risk disclosure, information risk, and the cost of capital 
 
There has been considerable discussion on the relationship between corporate 
disclosure and the cost of capital in recent years (see, Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 
2010). The earlier theoretical models suggest that asymmetric information increases 
adverse selection, thereby leading to higher bid-ask spreads (e.g., Copeland & Galai, 
1983; Glosten & Milgrom, 1985). Researchers have presented mixed views since 
then.  
 Easley & O’Hara (2004) argue that differences in the composition of 
information between public and private information affect the cost of capital, with 
investors demanding a higher return to hold stocks with greater private information. 
Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) model the equilibrium strategies of managers 
for voluntary disclosure of information about firm risks and show that a disclosing 
firm has a lower risk premium and beta ex post than a non-disclosing firm. Hughes, 
Liu, & Liu (2007) argue that in large economies the information risk associated with 
idiosyncratic factors is fully diversifiable. Also, Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia (2007) 
argue that the information effect developed in Easley & O’Hara (2004) is 
diversifiable when the number of traders becomes large.  
 Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia (2012) suggest that information precision and 
information asymmetry are components of information quality. They state that better 
corporate disclosure decreases the cost of capital because the average precision of 
investors’ information increases, not because information asymmetry decreases. 
Christensen, De La Rosa, & Feltham (2010) and Bertomeu, Beyer, & Dye (2011) 
have also brought their contribution to this discussion. Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther 
(2010) urge empirical researchers to analyze the relationship between information 
quality, information risk, and cost of capital. The theoretical models should not be 
interpreted as suggesting that information asymmetry cannot play a role in imperfect 
competition settings. 
 Finally, it is important to take into account the peculiar characteristics of risk 
disclosure compared with other forms of disclosures. Risk disclosure influences both 
the numerator and denominator of the simple discounted cash flow model and hence 
there are several avenues for opportunistic behavior on the part of managers. For 
example, a manager may be motivated to provide lower-quality risk disclosures if the 
market currently perceives the firm to be less risky than it actually is. This is so 
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because increased disclosure might result in a higher cost of equity capital and lower 
stock price. Moreover, some risk information may be so sensitive that withholding it 
is prudent because disclosing it might have a negative effect on the future cash flows 
of the firm. For instance, a manager may be unwilling to give away proprietary 
information or information which makes the firm vulnerable to legal action.  
 
3.  Hypotheses development  
 
3.1.  The impact of risk disclosure on information asymmetry 
 
The majority of risk reports consist of qualitative descriptions of risk exposures (see, 
Schipper, 2007). Qualitative annual report risk disclosure may be difficult to take 
into account in firm valuation because it does not provide any direct currency units. 
Sribunnak & Wong (2006) demonstrate that qualitative information increases the 
usefulness of quantitative risk information on foreign exchange risk. However, the 
existing behavioral accounting literature demonstrates the complexity of investors’ 
risk judgments (e.g., Hodder, Koonce, & McAnally, 2001; Daniel, Hirshleifer, & 
Teoh, 2002; Koonce, McAnally, & Mercer, 2005; Koonce, Lipe, & McAnally, 
2005).  
 Risk disclosure is one of the most interesting information items to investors 
for two main reasons. First, it provides direct information on the risk-profile of a 
firm, which affects the applied discount rate in the valuation models. Second, risk 
transparency decreases the information risk of investors because the risk of adverse 
selection becomes lower when a firm provides high-quality risk information 
(Akerlof, 1970; Scott 2009). Lower information risk decreases the applied discount 
rate, which in turn increases the market value of a firm. Consequently, from an 
investor’s point of view information risk cannot be diversified because it always has 
a negative effect on firm value. Welker (1995), Leuz & Verrecchia (2000), and 
Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele (2013) provide empirical evidence that 
asymmetric information leads to higher bid-ask spreads. We predict that investors 
will benefit from the high-quality risk disclosure provided in firms’ annual reports 
because it alleviates information asymmetry problems in capital markets and thus 
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leads to lower bid-ask spreads and higher trading volumes. We test the following 
hypothesis:  
 
 H1: There is a negative association between information asymmetry and the 
quality of firm risk disclosure.  
 
3.2. Firm riskiness and the usefulness of risk disclosure  
 
The three factor model of Fama & French (1992) suggests that small firms tend to do 
better than the market as a whole. From the perspective of efficient market theory 
(see, Fama, 1970, Fama 1991), this finding suggests that smaller firms are more risky 
for investors. Because it is expected that investors require more risk information 
from risky firms, we predict that the association between the quality of risk 
disclosure and information asymmetry is higher among small firms than large firms. 
 Lin, Owens, & Owers (2010) demonstrate that firms’ exposure to risk affects 
their choice of risk disclosure format. Because some industries are more risky than 
others, investors have different information needs. High tech firms are usually 
difficult to value because much of their value is determined by intangible assets. It is 
difficult to value operating assets (e.g., property, plant, and equipment) because they 
have a primary purpose of supporting and enhancing within-the-firm activities, and 
have only limited and peripheral value as independent, freestanding, and marketable 
stores of value (see,  Dichev, 2008: 467). Synergies between operating assets and 
intangible assets determine firms’ future cash flows. Some firms, such as those 
operating in high tech industries, have a higher level of intangible assets; this makes 
it difficult to value them correctly because intangible assets are inherently more risky 
and perishable than operating assets. We predict that risk disclosures of the high tech 
firms are especially useful to investors. Considering the above mentioned 
predictions, we hypothesize as follows:   
 
H2: The negative association between information asymmetry and the quality 
of risk disclosure is higher among firms with high inherent risk.  
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3.3. Investors interest and the usefulness of risk disclosure 
  
Also, the information environment affects information asymmetry between firms and 
management. Investor interest is lower towards firms with low analyst coverage. 
Investors are not entirely dependent on the information provided by firms; they also 
receive information from financial analysts who in turn collect it from public and 
private sources, evaluate the current performance of the firms that they follow, make 
forecasts about their future prospects, and recommend that investors buy, hold, or 
sell the stock (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Easley & O’Hara (2004) suggest that firms 
can impact their cost of capital by increasing the precision and quantity of 
information available to investors. This can be accomplished for example by 
attracting active analysts to follow a company. Because of the cost of information 
acquisition, analysts tend to follow those firms that provide a lot of information in 
capital markets. The positive association between analyst coverage and corporate 
disclosure has been empirically demonstrated (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Francis, 
Hanna, & Philbrick, 1997; Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999). 
 In particular, the less extensively followed firms should benefit from high-
quality corporate disclosure. Botosan (1997) demonstrates that greater overall 
disclosure is associated with a lower cost of equity capital for firms that attract a low 
analyst following. However, she does not find this relation for firms with a high 
analyst following. She suggests that one explanation may be that her disclosure 
measure is limited to the annual report and accordingly may not provide a powerful 
proxy for overall disclosure level when analysts play a significant role in the 
communication process. Moreover, Hope (2003) shows that the level of annual 
report disclosure is more important to the following analysts when the analyst 
coverage of the firm is low.   
  There are many firms in Finland that are followed by only a few analysts or 
none at all. It is much more difficult for investors to evaluate the future potential of 
these firms. Since investors cannot benchmark their views to analysts’ forecasts, their 
information risk increases. Consequently, to decrease the risk of adverse selection 
investors are responsive to the risk information provided by less extensively followed 
firms in their annual reports. We predict that this should increase the usefulness of 
risk disclosure among those firms. We hypothesize as follows: 
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H3: The negative association between information asymmetry and the quality 
of risk disclosure is higher among firms with low investor interest.  
 
3.4. Market condition and the usefulness of risk disclosure  
 
General market condition, i.e., whether stock markets are rising, falling, or 
recovering, is one element that may influence the usefulness of risk disclosure to 
investors. First, during rising stock markets investors tend to forget the real risks of 
their investments. Asset price bubbles - periods in which prices rise and then fall by 
significant amounts - are much easier to spot from hindsight than they are to predict 
(Ball, 2009). After many years of rising stock prices, investors easily become risk-
neutral or even risk-taking. They may ignore the existing and potential risks of their 
investments, which decreases their demand for the risk information provided by the 
firms. This lowers risk information asymmetry in the stock markets without any 
economic reason and leads to overvalued stock markets because investors do not 
incorporate relevant risk information into their discount rates.  
 In contrast, during an economic downturn investors easily become risk averse 
and begin to analyze the risks of their investments. At the extreme, a global crash in 
the stock markets may lead to a total loss in investor confidence. When investors fear 
and encounter substantial uncertainty in the stock markets, their demand for 
information on the risks of the firms is likely to increase. Hence, in falling and 
recovering stock markets investors should value high-quality risk disclosure more 
than in rising stock markets. On the basis of these arguments, we hypothesize as 
follows: 
 
H4: The negative association between information asymmetry and the quality 
of risk disclosure is higher during an economic downturn with falling or 
recovering stock markets. 
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4.  Research design 
 
4.1. Sample selection  
 
We retrieved the target sample of firms and data on variables from the Thomson One 
Banker Financial and IBES databases and from the register of Euroclear Finland Oy. 
The risk disclosure data were hand-collected. The research population consists of 
504 firm-year observations of the firms quoted on OMX Helsinki in 2006-2009. 
However, we excluded some firms from the analysis to ensure a consistent sample. 
First, 13 firms from the financial services industry were excluded from the 
population because their accounting practices, financial statements, and related 
disclosure requirements differed from those of the rest of the population. Second, we 
lost 32 firm-year observations due to initial listing, delisting, or restructuring 
between 2005 and 2009. Third, three firms were deleted because of their differing 
fiscal periods. At this point the data included 408 observations on firms that had 
released their annual reports for content analysis purposes. Finally, in our main 
regressions we lose some observations because of missing data for some variables. 
Hence the final sample includes 386 (302) firm-year observations in the Spread 
(Volume) model.11 Table 1 describes the sample selection.  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
4.2.  Description of the market conditions  
 
We hypothesized that the usefulness of risk disclosure may also depend on the 
general economic conditions in the stock markets. Annual reports for 2005 and 2006 
were published during a period of high investor confidence (in 2006 and 2007). On 
the contrary, investor confidence started to decrease in 2008, when the annual reports 
for 2007 were issued. In the latter part of 2008 the capital markets collapsed. 
Consequently, the 2008 annual reports (published in 2009) provided risk information 
for existing and potential investors who had lost their confidence because of the 
slump. Figure 2 illustrates trends in the OMXH index from 2005 to 2009. It 
                                                 
11 These models will be described later in this section. 
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demonstrates that annual reports for 2005 and 2006 were published during years of 
rising stock markets, annual reports for 2007 during a year of falling stock markets, 
and annual reports for 2008 during a year of recovering stock markets.  
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
4.3.  Estimation of information asymmetry 
 
The extant accounting and finance literature has used various measures of 
asymmetric information such as stock return volatility, analysts’ earnings forecast 
dispersion, proportion of intangible assets, debt rating, stock bid-ask spread, and 
accounting information quality (see, Lee & Masulis, 2009). In this paper we apply an 
approach similar to Leuz & Verrecchia (2000) and Leuz (2003) and use the 
following two alternative proxies for information asymmetry: relative bid-ask spread 
and trading volume. Previously, for example Venkatesh & Chiang (1986), Welker 
(1995), Leutz (2003), and Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele (2013) have used 
bid-ask spread as a measure of information asymmetry. It is expected that lower 
information asymmetry reduces spread. The formula for the daily relative bid-ask 
spread is as follows: 
  
  100*2riceBidPriceAskP
riceBidPriceAskPSpread



                                                (1) 
where AskPrice = closing ask price, and BidPrice = closing bid price 
  
 Trading volume is our second empirical measure for information asymmetry 
(cf., Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Leuz, 2003). The intuition behind the measure is that 
lower information asymmetry increases trading volume. The formula for the variable 
is the following: 
 
100*
NbrShares
ngVolumeDailyTradiVolume                                                    (2) 
where DailyTradingVolume = number of shares traded in a dayi, 
and NbrShares = number of shares outstanding  
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 We examined information asymmetry in a three-month window starting from 
May and ending to July. This is so because the annual reports of the sample firms are 
available to investors from May onwards. The three-month window is in line with 
the extant literature (see, Leutz, 2003). Consequently, in the empirical tests we used 
three-month mean values computed from the daily values of the information 
asymmetry indicators. 
 
4.4.  Analysis of risk disclosure  
 
Risk disclosure data are manually collected from the following sections of annual 
reports: operating and financial review, separate risk disclosure section, notes to the 
financial statements, and corporate governance section. All Finnish listed firms are 
required to disclose a risk section in their operating and financial reviews as 
suggested by the Finnish Accounting Act and the 2006 standard of the Finnish 
Accounting Practice Board (see, figure 1). However, it is expected that the location 
of information provided in the annual reports does not affect its usefulness to 
investors (cf., Al Jifri & Citron, 2009) and hence also other risk sections are taken 
into account in the analyses. The detailed risk disclosure standard published by the 
Finnish Accounting Practice Board in 2006 is the foundation of our risk disclosure 
framework. The standard provides examples of different risk disclosure topics and 
subtopics. It suggests that the following risk categories are typical of all firms: 
strategic risks, operations risks, financial risks, damage risks, and risk management. 
However, because the standard is only principles-based and hence does not describe 
all the subtopics of different risk categories, some subtopics have been adopted from 
the risk disclosure framework of Linsley & Shrives (2006).12 Finally, a subsample of 
annual reports has been pre-tested to determine whether some of the subtopics for the 
risk categories examined are missing. Risk disclosure framework is provided in 
Appendix B. 
 The annual report risk information was examined along two quality 
dimensions, quantity and coverage. The reliability of the applied indicators of 
disclosure quality was assured by following a rigorous approach in coding. The 
measurement of disclosure quantity was very objective in nature. For that reason, the 
                                                 
12 Linsley & Shrives (2006) use a risk disclosure categorization developed by a professional 
accountancy firm and subsequently used by Kajüter (2001) in a risk disclosure study. 
18 
 
only decision to be made relating to the quality dimension was to determine what is 
meant by risk disclosure. We decided to collect risk disclosures from the overall risk 
reviews published in annual reports. The coding of the coverage of the risk 
information provided contained more subjective elements. Assignment of the risk 
information sentences to the various risk disclosure topics (categories) examined 
required clear decisions. First, the applicability of the constructed risk disclosure 
framework was evaluated by coding a pilot sample of annual reports. The purpose 
was to create clear decision rules for coding. At this point, prior literature and other 
scholars were consulted to make the final decisions on coding practices. The risk 
disclosure sentences were coded by two scholars; one coded the annual reports for 
2005 and 2006, and the other those for 2007 and 2008.  
 The reliability of coding can be evaluated from several perspectives, two of 
which are discussed here (Krippendorf, 1980). First, stability measures the capability 
of the researcher to code similarly over time. The coding was conducted during two 
different periods so that the annual reports for 2005 and 2006 were coded about nine 
months earlier than the latter sample of annual reports. Internal checks documented 
that the coding remained consistent across these time intervals. 
 Second, reproducibility is another component of the reliability of the coding 
and should be controlled for when there are multiple coders. The purpose is to assess 
coding errors between individuals. Clear decision rules are expected to decrease 
controversies between coders. In addition to clear decision rules, we addressed the 
reproducibility ex post by cross-coding a subsample of annual reports and comparing 
the results with the original ones.13 Two measures of inter-coder reliability were 
calculated: the first was the simple coefficient of agreement and the other the alpha 
coefficient of agreement proposed by Krippendorf (1980). The first subsample was 
very consistently coded. The simple coefficient of agreement was 0.93 and the alpha 
coefficient of agreement 0.90. The second subsample included more internal 
inconsistencies. The coefficient values were 0.85 and 0.81, respectively. The major 
reason for these differences was a disagreement concerning the coding of strategic 
and operations risks. The simple coefficient of agreement was 0.90 and the alpha 
coefficient of agreement was 0.87 for all the coded subsamples. The extant literature 
suggests a threshold level of 0.75 for the alpha coefficient of agreement (Milne & 
                                                 
13 Both scholars cross-coded two subsamples that consisted of three randomly selected annual reports. 
The selected firms represented different industries. 
19 
 
Adler, 1999).  Consequently, the reliability of the coding is expected to be 
sufficiently high in this study.   
 
4.5. Empirical indicators for quality of risk disclosure 
  
Table 2 describes the results of the content analysis. The number of reported risk 
disclosure words is categorized across five topics (strategic, operations, financial, 
damage, and risk management). Adding up the yearly disclosures of each topic gives 
the total number of risk disclosure words. The results show that the number of 
disclosers has increased in every disclosure topic during the sample years. However, 
the unpaired t-test statistics are significant only in the risk management category. 
This finding implies that the increased pressures for improved risk disclosures in 
Finland during the sample period have influenced most managers’ descriptions of 
their risk management practices. In 2006, the mean value of words on risk 
management was 109.2 whereas in 2009 it was 202.9. Several prior studies implicitly 
assume that disclosure quantity is a valid proxy for disclosure quality (see, Botosan, 
2004: 290). Hence we use the natural logarithm of the total number of risk disclosure 
words as our first empirical indicator for the quality of risk disclosure.  
 
QUANTITY= ln (total number of risk disclosure words)                         (3) 
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Coverage of the provided risk information is our second quality dimension (see, 
Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004). A balanced description of a firm’s major risks 
is important to investors because it reduces their information risk and adverse 
selection problems. Risk disclosure is more useful for existing and potential owners 
if they understand the overall risk profile of a firm. We used the Herfindahl index to 
measure the concentration of corporate disclosures across risk topics. It is computed 
as follows:  
 
 COVERAGE = [(1/H)/the number of main risk topics],                                (4) 
 
where H represents the Herfindahl measure of concentration across  
risk topics calculated as  
    , where pi is the proportion of risk disclosures in topic i. The 
inverse of H will be used to make a greater Herfindahl index value reflect 
more extensive disclosure coverage. This value has been scaled by dividing it 
with the number of main risk topics. The main risk topics are strategic risks, 
operations risks, financial risks, damage risks, and risk management. 
 
 Table 2 shows that there has been a significant improvement in the coverage 
of risk reviews between 2006 and 2007. After that there has not been any significant 
improvement in the mean values of that quality dimension. 
 Finally, we used factor analysis to condense our empirical measures of 
quality dimensions into one factor.14 We estimated the factor loadings for each year 
based on the yearly Quantity and Coverage ratios. Every year two factors are 
generated. The first factor has the highest eigenvalue and accounts for most of the 
variance of the quality indicators in all yearly analyses.15 Finally, the regression-
based factor score is computed for each observation by using the loadings of the 
factor with the highest eigenvalue (factor 1). SAS statistical software package is used 
in the computation of the score (cf., DiStefano, Zhu, & Mindrila, 2009). 
                                                 
14 Term factor analysis covers both common factors analysis and principal component analysis (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995). We use principal component analysis and hence set all prior 
communality estimates to one.  
15 In 2006-2009 the variance in quality indicators explained by the first factor is 97.735, 98.379, 
98.902, and 98.763, respectively. Moreover, in 2006-2009 the eigenvalue of the first factor varies 
between 1.955 and 1.978 whereas the eigenvalue of the second factor varies between 0.022 and 0.045.  
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Consequently, the following composite measure of individual quality indicators was 
expected to improve the overall validity and reliability of the measurement of quality 
of risk disclosure: 
 
RDISC = the score of the principal component with the highest  
eigenvalue computed from the firm-specific risk disclosure  
quantity and coverage ratios     (5) 
  
The scoring of the risk disclosure quality indicators is demonstrated in Appendix C. 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
4.6.  Regression models  
 
We regressed our empirical indicators of information asymmetry on risk disclosure 
and several contingency factors. The contingency factors measure firm riskiness, 
investor interest, and market condition. The control factors measure volatility, 
earnings quality, ownership structure, media coverage, and the extent of annual 
report disclosure. The following multivariate regressions will be estimated: 
 
  (6) 
where yit = {Spreadit ; Volumeit} and Xhit = Contingency factors 
              
In the equation,  represent the regression parameters to be estimated, e represents 
the regression residual, subscript h refers to the contingency factors, and subscripts i 
and t refer to the firm and year, respectively. We controlled for the impact of 
industry-fixed effects in every regression. The impact of year-fixed effects was 
largely controlled for by including the indicator variables for market condition in the 
regressions. The P-values of parameter estimates were computed from the 
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heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm level (see, Petersen, 
2009).16  
 The dependent variables are Spread and Volume, which are our empirical 
indicators of information asymmetry. They describe three-month average values 
computed from the daily values for May, June, and July. Volume was also used as a 
control variable in the models in which Spread is the dependent variable. Rdisc is an 
empirical measure of the quality of risk disclosure. We expected a negative 
regression coefficient for the variable in the Spread models and a positive regression 
coefficient in the Volume models.17  
 The empirical measures of firm riskiness are Mcap and Htech. Mcap is a 
three-month average market value of a firm. We expect that the variable associates 
negatively with Spread and positively with Volume. The variable is also a robust 
proxy for the quality of forms of corporate disclosure other than risk disclosure. The 
extant literature documents that larger firms disclose better (e.g., Cooke, 1989; Lang 
& Lundholm, 1993; Cahan, Rahman, & Perera, 2005). Htech is an indicator variable 
for high tech firms and it obtains a value of 1 if the firm is a high tech firm. High 
tech firms are selected on the basis of their three-digit SIC codes as suggested by 
Francis & Schipper (1999). 
 Analysts is the measure of investor interest. It describes the analyst coverage 
of a firm. The extant literature demonstrates that analysts’ interest associates 
positively with quality of corporate disclosure (see, Healy & Palepu, 2001). In 
addition, it has also been documented that high-quality annual report disclosures 
have economic consequences if they are provided by the less extensively followed 
firms (Botosan, 1997; Hope, 2003).  
 Falling and Recovering are empirical indicators of market conditions. Falling 
(Recovering) obtains a value of 1 if risk disclosures are published during a year of 
falling (recovering) stock markets in 2008 (2009). Accordingly, the rising stock 
markets during 2006 and 2007 are used as a benchmark.  
 We predicted that the contingency factors described above influence the 
usefulness of annual risk disclosures. Contingency factors were interacted with Rdisc 
                                                 
16 The Hausman test provided evidence that fixed effects regressions should be used in both the 
Spread and the Volume models.  
17 More detailed definition for these variables is provided on pages 16-21. 
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in the main tests. We expect that the interaction variables are statistically significant 
determinants of information asymmetry.  
 Control variables. In the Spread model we controlled for the impact of 
volatility and volume which were expected to be associated with information 
asymmetry (see, Stoll, 1978; Venkatesh & Chiang, 1986; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; 
Leutz, 2003). Moreover, we controlled for earnings quality, foreign ownership, 
media coverage, and overall annual report disclosure. In the Volume model we also 
controlled for the impact of ownership concentration. 
 Volatility is a three-month average standard deviation of daily stock returns 
multiplied by 100. It is expected that higher volatility associates positively with 
Spread and Volume (cf., Leuz, 2003: 459).  
 ErnQual describes the earnings quality of a firm.18 It is the score of the 
principal component with the highest eigenvalue computed from two alternative 
measures of earnings quality (AQ and ErnVar). The absolute values of the principle 
component scores are multiplied by -1 to adjust higher scores to reflect higher 
earnings quality.  
 AQ is the first proxy for earnings quality. Following Francis, Lafond, Olsson, 
& Schipper (2007) and Francis, Nanda, & Olsson (2008) it is computed by regressing 
working capital accruals on cash from operations in the current period, prior period, 
and future period, as well as the change in revenues and property, plant, and 
equipment. AQ is the standard deviation of the residual, with larger standard 
deviations indicating worse accruals quality. This proxy for accruals quality is based 
on McNichols (2002) modification of Dechow & Dichev’s (2002) model. The 
regression equation is as follows: 
                                                 
18 Empirical evidence documents that earnings quality should be taken into account when analyzing 
the association between voluntary disclosure and cost of capital. Francis, Nanda, & Olsson (2008) 
investigate the relations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of capital and 
document that firms with good earnings quality have more expansive voluntary disclosures than firms 
with poor earnings quality. They also find that more voluntary disclosure is associated with a lower 
cost of capital. However, they show that the disclosure effect on cost of capital is substantially 
reduced or disappears completely (depending on the cost of capital proxy) once they control for the 
influence of earnings quality on the results. 
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[TCAj,t/Assetsj,t]   =0,j + 1,j [CFOj,t-1/Assetsj,t]  + 2,j [CFOj,t/Assetsj,t]    
+ 3,j [CFOj,t+1/Assetsj,t]   + 4,j [Revj,t/Assetsj,t]   + 5,j [PPEj,t/Assetsj,t]+ ej,t               (7)  
 
    where:  
               TCAj,t = firm j’s total current accruals in year t = (CAj,t  CLj,t   
       Cashj,t + STDEBTj,t)  
           Assetsj,t  = firm j’s average total assets in year t and t1 
              CFOj,t  = firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t,  
    measured as CFOj,t = NIBEj,t  TAj,t 
      TAj,t  = firm j’s total accruals in year t, measured as (CAj,t  CLj,t   
     Cashj,t +  STDEBTj,t  DEBNj,t) 
              CAj,t  = firm j’s change in current assets between year t1 and year t 
              CLj,t  = firm j’s change in current liabilities between year t1 and year t 
           Cashj,t  = firm j’s change in cash between year t1 and year t 
     STDEBTj,t  = firm j’s change in short-term debt in current liabilities between 
                         year t1 and  year t            
           DEPNj,t  = firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense in year t 
            NIBEj,t  = firm j’s net income before extraordinary items in year t 
          REVj,t  = firm j’s change in revenues between year t1 and year t 
              PPEj,t  = firm j’s book value of property, plant and equipment in year t 
 
ErnVar is the second proxy for earnings quality. It is the standard deviation of the 
firm’s earnings over 2003-2009. Earnings is defined before extraordinary items and 
scaled by total assets as in Francis, Nanda, & Olsson (2008). Larger standard 
deviations indicate lower earnings quality.  
 In addition, we controlled for the impact of information environment on the 
results. ForOwn describes the percentage of shares owned by foreign owners (cf., 
Cormier, Magnan, & Van Velthoven, 2005). The impact of institutional ownership 
on information asymmetry is an empirical issue because institutions are 
heterogeneous in nature and use various trading strategies that offset each other’s 
trades (see, Lakonishok, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1992; Kini & Mian, 1995). The 
majority of foreign owners that invest in Finnish firms are institutional investors. 
Clshs depicts the percentage of shares owned by firm insiders (cf., Leutz, 2003). It is 
expected that higher ownership concentration (lower free cash flow) increases 
information asymmetry between the management and owners. This variable has been 
included in the Volume models because free cash flow has a significant impact on 
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trading volumes. It has been omitted from the Spread models because the variable 
has an adverse effect on the sample size. 
  Our firm size variable partly captured the impact of other reporting on the 
results. However, we also used more specific indicators. The purpose of these 
measures is to ascertain that the predicted association between Rdisc and information 
asymmetry is not driven by any omitted forms of information. MedCov describes 
how widely a firm is cited in the media. We did not have direct access to databases 
that would provide us with information on how extensively the firm was discussed in 
the press. Hence, we used the number of Google hits relating to a firm as a coarse 
proxy for its media coverage (cf., Fang & Peress, 2009). We used the search word 
‘firm name plc announcement’ to limit our Google hits to relevant firm 
announcements. PageCount measures the extent of overall disclosure in the annual 
report of a firm. The variable is line with that used by Zechman (2010). Table 3 
presents a more detailed description of the variable definitions. 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
 
5.   Empirical results 
 
5.1.  Summary statistics 
 
Panel A of table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for the information asymmetry 
indicators and quality of risk disclosure. As the mean and median values of Rdisc are 
close to each other, they provide evidence that the variable is distributed fairly 
symmetrically. Rdisc has a lower standard deviation in 2007 (0.203) than in 2006 
(0.319). Moreover, the F-test reveals that the difference in the standard deviations is 
significant (not reported in detail). One reason may be that the Finnish risk disclosure 
standard has harmonized risk reporting in Finland.19 In 2008 and in 2009 the 
standard deviation of Rdisc does not decrease anymore (0.170 and 0.174).  
 Regarding our empirical measures for information asymmetry, the results 
provide evidence that information asymmetry was lower between the firms and 
                                                 
19 Miihkinen (2012) provides evidence that the Finnish detailed risk disclosure standard increased the 
quality of Finnish listed firms’ overall risk reviews. 
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investors in 2007 than in other sample years. This can be seen from the lower mean 
value for Spread (1.210) and the higher mean value for Volume (0.321). On the 
contrary, in 2009, during the months of recovery after the global stock markets 
slump, Spread obtained a higher mean value (2.362) and Volume a lower mean value 
(0.223) than in other sample years.  
 We conducted a paired t-test and compared information asymmetry between 
2006 and 2007. The results (not reported in detail) show that Spread is significantly 
higher in 2006 than in 2007. Volume is demonstrated to be significantly lower in 
2006. Similarly, we compare information asymmetry between 2008 and 2009 and 
report that Spread is significantly lower in 2008 than in 2009. Volume is higher in 
2008 but the difference is only weakly significant. 
 The results suggest that information asymmetry has been lower when there 
was a positive momentum in the stock markets. We provide two explanations for this 
finding. One interpretation is that investors have been more aware of the risks of the 
firms during the rising stock markets, which has decreased their information risk and 
reduced information asymmetry. Another interpretation is that investors have been 
blind to the real risks of the firms during years of rising stock markets, which has 
improved market liquidity and trading volume without any fundamental reason.  
 Panel B reports descriptive statistics for other variables. The mean and 
median values of the continuous variables are close to each other; this suggests that 
these variables are fairly symmetrically distributed. The untabulated yearly statistics 
of Mcap and Volatility show that Mcap obtains lower values and Volatility higher 
values in 2008 and 2009 than in 2006 and 2007.20   
  
(Table 4 about here) 
 
                                                 
20 The untabulated statistics for the absolute number of analysts following a firm are as follows: mean 
= 5.9, median = 7.0, std.dev. = 2.5, min = 0.0, max = 53.0. Not surprisingly, Nokia Corporation has 
the highest investor interest in the dataset. 
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5.2. Correlation analysis 
 
Table 5 reports the correlation matrix for the variables. As expected, the empirical 
indicators of information asymmetry (Spread and Volume) correlate negatively and 
significantly with each other. This finding is in line with our prediction that 
information asymmetry associates positively with bid-ask spread and negatively with 
trading volume. Similarly, the quality of risk disclosure (Rdisc) correlates negatively 
and significantly with Spread and positively and significantly with Volume. The 
finding is in line with hypothesis 1 and provides preliminary evidence that annual 
risk disclosures are useful information to investors.  
 Spread and Volume are also significantly correlated with most of the 
contingency factors (firm riskiness, investor interest, and market condition) with 
expected signs. This finding is consistent with our prediction that information 
asymmetry may be higher among small firms, high tech firms, and firms followed by 
few analysts. In addition, difficult market conditions may increase information 
problems in the stock markets.21  
 Mcap correlates positively and significantly with every proxy for the 
information environment, i.e., Rdisc, MedCov, and PageCount. On one hand, this 
finding supports our view that these variables are good measures of the information 
environment of the firms. On the other, the relatively low mutual correlations 
between the variables suggest that they should capture differences in firms’ 
information environment effectively without severe multicollinearity problems. 
 Interestingly, the correlation coefficient between ErnQual and Rdisc is 
positive and significant (Pearson correlation coefficient). This finding suggests that 
the quality of earnings and risk disclosure are positively associated. Firms having 
higher earnings quality also disclose their risks better. In the extant literature some 
studies have demonstrated a positive association between earnings quality and 
voluntary disclosure (Lennox & Park, 2006; Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 2008), 
whereas others have provided evidence on a negative relationship (Lougee & 
Marquard, 2004; Chen, DeFond, & Park, 2002).    
                                                 
21 The Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficient between Spread and Recovering is significant at the 
five (ten) percent significance level. The Spearman correlation coefficients between Volume and 
Falling, and Volume and Recovering are significant at the five percent significance level.  
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 Mcap correlates strongly with Analysts as expected. Other correlation 
coefficients suggest that serious multicollinearity problems cannot be suspected in 
the main regressions. 22 
  
(Table 5 about here) 
 
5.3. Association between the quality of risk disclosure and information 
 asymmetry: multivariate analyses 
 
Spread model 
 
Panel A of table 6 reports the determinants of Spread in the pooled sample. The 
number of observations is 386 in all models and the adjusted R2 varies between 
69.10-72.70 percent. Rdisc has a negative and significant regression coefficient 
which provides evidence that high-quality annual report risk disclosure lowers bid-
ask spread in the stock markets. This finding is consistent with the results of Welker 
(1995) and Leuz & Verrecchia (2000) in general, and Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, 
& Steele (2013) in particular. Mcap is negatively associated with Spread as expected. 
Other contingency factors do not have direct influence on information asymmetry.  
 The contingency factors become more significant determinants of 
information asymmetry after taking into account risk disclosure’s indirect effect on 
Spread via contingency factors.23 The interaction variables between Rdisc and 
contingency factors (Mcap, Htech, Analysts, Falling, and Recovering) are all 
significant with expected signs. This finding suggests that the negative impact of risk 
disclosure on information asymmetry is stronger if the disclosing firm is small, 
operates in a high tech industry, and is followed by only a few analysts. In addition, 
risk information which is provided during the falling and recovering stock markets is 
more useful than information which is reported during the rising stock markets.  
 With regard to the control variables, Volatility and Volume are the most 
significant determinants of information asymmetry. Volatility is positively associated 
                                                 
22 Our sensitivity tests document that the regressions are free from multicollinearity problems. In the 
Spread model Mcap has the highest VIF-value (4.729) and the VIF-value of Rdisc is 1.181 (no 
interaction variables included). Also in the Volume model Mcap has the highest VIF-value (4.475). 
The VIF-value of Rdisc is 1.187 (no interaction variables included).  
23 We included only one interaction variable between Rdisc and contingency factors at a time in the 
regressions because otherwise they would suffer from multicollinearity problems. 
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with Spread and Volume negatively. Interestingly, ErnQual is positive and weakly 
significant in some of the regressions. This finding suggests that higher earnings 
quality does not necessarily reduce information asymmetry problems in the stock 
markets. The negative and significant regression coefficient of MedCov 
demonstrates that firms which have higher media coverage exhibit lower levels of 
information asymmetry. 
 
Volume model 
 
Panel B reports the determinants of Volume in the pooled sample. The number of 
observations is 302 in every model and the adjusted R2 varies between 0.576-0.581. 
Main results support those provided in panel A. Rdisc is positively associated with 
Volume which provides evidence on the direct influence of risk disclosure on 
information asymmetry. On the contrary, compared with the Spread model, we did 
not find equally strong evidence of the indirect influence of risk disclosure on 
information asymmetry via contingency factors. The positive and significant 
regression coefficient of Rdisc*Falling suggests that investors have considered firms’ 
risk disclosures more useful in falling stock markets than in rising stock markets. 
Other interaction variables have a non-significant regression coefficient. One 
explanation may be a type two error due to a weak sample. Volatility, ForOwn, 
Clshs, and PageCount are significant control variables.24 25  
   
(Table 6 about here) 
 
Impact of quality dimensions 
 
Our indicator for the overall quality of risk disclosure takes into account two quality 
dimensions, quantity and coverage. The extant literature suggests that disclosure 
quantity correlates positively with the quality of disclosure (see, Botosan, 2004). 
                                                 
24 We also run the Volume model regressions for ‘high volume’ and ‘low volume’ firms by using 
median as the cut-off point. The untabulated results suggest that Rdisc is non-significant in both 
models. This finding is consistent with the view that the association between risk disclosure and 
trading volume is linear and thus not driven by the most liquid firms. 
25 Also the standardized regression coefficients are computed (untabulated) for the independent 
variables of the Spread and Volume models (interaction variables not included). In the Spread model 
Rdisc has the third highest coefficient (-0.146) after Volatility (0.520) and Mcap ( -0.337). In the 
Volume model Rdisc has the seventh highest coefficient (0.101) after ForOwn (0.299), Volatility 
(0.231), PageCount (0.206), Analysts (0.202), Mcap (0.195), and Recovering (-0.126). 
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Coverage measures firms’ ability to give a balanced description of certain 
information item (see, Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004). For example, high 
coverage affects the usefulness of risk information because risk information that is 
scattered evenly across risk disclosure topics is easier for investors to interpret. 
Nowadays, there is so much information available to investors that shorter 
summaries on key factors would be highly appreciated. In addition, balanced risk 
disclosure facilitates effective longitudinal comparison not only between the fiscal 
years of a firm but also between the competitors in the same industry, or against 
other possible target investments acting in other industries. Because increased 
comparability should serve the needs of investors, empirical evidence on the 
relationship between coverage of risk information and information asymmetry offers 
valuable information for regulators.  
 A comparison between Quantity and Coverage as a determinant of 
information asymmetry is provided in Appendix A. The results demonstrate that both 
quality dimensions are significantly associated with information asymmetry in the 
Spread and Volume models. The results are in line with the existing literature (e.g., 
Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004) which suggests that 
the quality of corporate disclosure should be examined from several perspectives. 
For a reporting firm this finding may provide valuable insights on the possible 
avenues to increase the relevance of its risk reporting.  
 
5.4. Association between the quality of risk disclosure and information 
asymmetry: subsample analyses 
 
Table 7 reports the results of the subsample analyses regarding the contingency 
factors.26 Panel A shows the results of the comparison between large and small firms. 
Large (small) firms subsample consists of firms that belong to the highest (lowest) 
tercile on the basis of firm size (Mcap). Rdisc is a significant determinant of Spread 
and Volume among small firms but a non-significant determinant among large firms. 
This finding implies that smaller firms are more risky to investors, which increases 
the relevance of their risk disclosures. 
                                                 
26 We report only the regression coefficient of Rdisc. Other variables are included in the regressions 
although not reported. Inferences relating to contingency factors and control variables remain 
qualitatively similar to those stated for the results of table 6. Regressions do not include interactions 
between Rdisc and contingency factors.   
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 Panel B shows the comparison between high tech and non-high tech firms. 
High tech firms were selected on the basis of their three-digit SIC codes as suggested 
by Francis & Schipper (1999). We report a negative and highly significant regression 
coefficient for Rdisc among high tech firms in the Spread model. However, we did 
not find any relationship in the Volume model. For non-high tech firms the results 
are much weaker in the Spread model although the sample size is much larger. In the 
Volume model Rdisc has a positive and weakly significant regression coefficient. 
Our inference is that high tech firms benefit more from risk disclosures than non-
high tech firms. The finding is consistent with the results that we provided for small 
firms in panel A. Because high tech firms are risky, investors require and value high-
quality risk information.  
 The impact of investor interest on the usefulness of risk disclosure has been 
demonstrated in panel C. High (low) analyst coverage subsample consist of firms 
that belong to the highest (lowest) tercile on the basis of the number of analysts 
following a firm (Analysts). We found that Rdisc is significantly associated with 
Spread (p-value 0.035) and Volume (p-value 0.077) in the least covered firms. 
However, we did not find this relation among the firms that were followed more 
extensively. This finding is in line with those of Botosan (1997) and Hope (2003) 
and suggests that investors are more dependent on the annual report risk disclosures 
of the less extensively followed firms.27 
 Panel D demonstrates the influence of market conditions on the relevance of 
annual risk disclosures. Interestingly, in the Spread models we document a negative 
and significant regression coefficient for Rdisc in rising, falling, and recovering stock 
markets. The results are weakly significant or non-significant in the Volume models. 
However, the small sample size probably makes the results vulnerable to type-two 
errors. The results imply that risk disclosures provide useful information to investors 
in every market condition. This finding coupled with those reported in table 6 
provides evidence that investors require high-quality risk information regardless of 
the momentum of the stock markets.  
                                                 
27 This analysis has been complemented by analyzing a subsample which consists of firms followed 
by two or more analysts. There are altogether 312 observations in the subsample and altogether 297 
observations are used in the regression (Spread model). Interestingly, the regression coefficients of 
Rdisc, Analysts and Rdisc*Analysts have the expected signs but they are all non-significant. This may 
be due to the lost degrees of freedom. However, a more probable explanation is that those firms which 
are followed by a single analyst or which are not followed at all benefit most from high quality risk 
disclosure. The finding is in line with those of Botosan (1997) and Hope (2003). 
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(Table 7 about here) 
 
 To summarize, the results provided in tables 6 and 7 suggest that annual 
report risk disclosures have a direct negative influence on information asymmetry as 
suggested in the hypothesis 1. In addition, we demonstrate that the usefulness of risk 
disclosure depends on several contingency factors as predicted in hypotheses 2, 3, 
and 4. High firm riskiness and low investor interest increase the relevance of risk 
disclosures. In addition, risk disclosures provided during falling and recovering stock 
markets are more useful to investors than those provided during rising stock markets. 
 
6.  Additional analyses 
 
6.1. Alternative measures of information asymmetry and risk disclosure quality 
 
None of the empirical measures for information asymmetry that have been used in 
the extant literature are perfect measures for the information gap between the 
management and investors (see, Lee & Masulis, 2009). The measures may include 
noise which decreases the significance of the regression results. In addition, they 
may be affected by other economic effects beyond asymmetric information.  
 The measurement of bid-ask spread has been widely discussed in the 
accounting and finance literature. One of the first approaches to measure the bid-ask 
spread is to use the implicit measure of the effective bid-ask spread in an efficient 
market (Roll, 1984). The advantage of this approach is its cost-effectiveness. Bid-ask 
spread is directly inferred from a time series as an autocovariance of percentage 
returns. We measured the covariance of present and one day lagged percentage 
returns and used that variable as our dependent variable in the regression analysis. 
The results show (not reported in detail) that Rdisc has a positive and significant 
regression coefficient. This implies that firms which have higher quality risk 
disclosure exhibit lower information asymmetry as measured by the autocovariance 
of returns.  
 We also tested whether our results are robust if we replaced relative bid-ask 
spread with effective spread in the regression analyses. Effective spread was 
computed as the difference between the trade price and the average of bid and ask 
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price.28 The untabulated results remained qualitatively the same. Rdisc is 
demonstrated to be negatively associated with this alternative measure of information 
asymmetry. 
 This paper also analyses the usefulness of annual report risk disclosure from 
the viewpoint of analysts by examining whether risk information asymmetry 
increases dispersion in analysts’ forecasts (cf., Leutz, 2003). We include those firms 
in the sample which are followed by two or more analysts. There are altogether 312 
observations in this ‘analysts’ subsample. We compute analysts’ forecast deviation as 
a three (ten) months average deviation measured from May, June, and July (May-
December). However, the regression coefficient of Rdisc is non-significant in both 
models. One reason for this finding may be that the analysts have specialized in the 
firms that they follow. They may also have some private sources of information. 
Because they have a lot of prior information, it is a challenge to the firms to fulfill 
the analysts’ information needs with relevant risk disclosures. This coupled with the 
fact that the annual reports examined lacked risk descriptions in monetary terms may 
explain why we cannot find the expected relationship. The finding suggests that 
annual risk disclosures are more useful to investors than to analysts.29  
 Finally, comparability of information is one quality criterion in the FASB’s 
2010 conceptual framework. Botosan (2004) urges empirical research to invent new 
measures to capture that quality dimension. Hence, we constructed a new indicator 
for quality of risk disclosure which attempts to measure the consistency of reporting 
across time.30 We examined the absolute value of yearly percent changes in Quantity 
                                                 
28 The difference has been multiplied by two and the absolute value has been used (see, Boehmer, 
Broussard, & Kallunki, 2002: 129). 
29 We also tested the impact of potential outlier observations on the results in the pooled sample. Firm-
years falling outside three standard deviations from the mean of any variable were eliminated. The 
results remain qualitatively the same (not reported in detail). We can also demonstrate a negative 
association between the quality of risk disclosure and information asymmetry by using this reduced 
sample. Moreover, we ran winsorized regressions and computed the top one percent and bottom 99 
percent percentiles for Spread and Volume. After that we tested how many firms have a higher or 
lower value for the corresponding variables. Five (five) firms have a higher (lower) value for bid-ask 
spread than the top one (bottom 99) percent percentile. Five (five) firms have a higher (lower) value 
for trading volume than the top one (bottom 99) percent percentile. Although the number of outlier 
firms is the same in both models, the outliers differ between the models. Next, the variable values of 
these outlier firms were replaced with the percentile values. We ran the main regressions by using 
these outlier corrected values for information asymmetry and document qualitatively similar results 
with the main tests. The regression coefficient of Rdisc is -1.235 (sig. 0.021) in the Spread model (no 
interaction effects included) and 0.130 (sig. 0.024) in the Volume model (no interaction effects 
included). 
30 It does not make sense to measure the comparability of information between 2005 and 2006 
disclosures (annual reports for 2004 and 2005) because only a few firms provided overall risk reviews 
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and Coverage between 2006 and 2009 disclosures (Abs.Change). Next, we took the 
natural logarithm of the inverse ratio of Abs.Change. Higher variable values mean 
lower yearly increases or decreases in Quantity or Coverage and hence reflect higher 
quality with respect to comparability. First, we used the original Rdisc measure to 
run a regression for this three-year subsample (the fiscal years 2007-2009). Rdisc is 
significant with expected signs in both Spread and Volume models (interaction terms 
not included) and the statistical significance is even higher than in the four-years-
sample. Second, we constructed a new composite measure for quality by using the 
factor analysis to combine Quantity, Coverage and Comparability. However, 
including this dimension in the analysis makes the composite measure for quality of 
risk disclosure non-significant regardless of whether we measure comparability of 
Quantity, Coverage, or both quality indicators at the same time (results 
untabulated).31 32  
 
6.2. Additional risk factors 
 
Next we extend our subsample analyses by examining the impact of three additional 
contingency factors on the usefulness of risk disclosure. These factors reflect firm 
riskiness and they are book-to-price ratio, beta, and financial leverage (results not 
reported in detail). All subsamples consist of firms in the highest (lowest) tercile of 
the measured variable. 
 Book-to-price ratio is one component of the Fama & French (1992) three 
factor model. Fama & French (1992) show that firms with a high book-to-price ratio 
have tended to do better than the market as a whole. From the perspective of the 
efficient market theory (see, Fama, 1970; Fama, 1991), this finding implies that these 
firms are more risky to investors. Interestingly, we demonstrate that Rdisc is 
negatively and highly significantly associated with Spread in the low ‘book-to-price’ 
subsample. In the high ‘book-to-price’ subsample the corresponding relationship is 
non-significant. Rdisc is non-significant in both Volume models. We interpret that 
                                                                                                                                          
in their 2004 annual reports and hence improvements in the 2005 annual report disclosures would 
signal bad quality regarding comparability (cf., Miihkinen, 2012). 
31 Also, regressions which incorporate only the Comparability dimension in the analysis are non-
significant.  
32 We also test the robustness of Rdisc by using industry-mean-adjusted Quantity and Coverage ratios 
in the computation of the composite indicator. The regression results are qualitatively similar to those 
reported in table 6. 
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many investors consider firms with low book-to-price ratio risky because of their 
high growth prospects, which increases the relevance of their annual risk disclosures. 
 Beta describes the systematic risk of the firm which is undiversifiable. Some 
firms have higher systematic and/or idiosyncratic risks which may affect the 
usefulness of risk disclosures provided to investors. Idiosyncratic risks should not 
have any pricing implications because they are diversifiable (e.g., Lintner, 1965). 
However, information risk affects investors’ decision making regardless of the type 
of the reported risk. It cannot be diversified because its impact on firm value is 
always negative (see, Akerlof, 1970). 
 Interestingly, Rdisc has a negative and moderately significant regression 
coefficient (p-value 0.054) in the Spread model among the firms with high beta.33 On 
the contrary, the regression coefficient is negative and highly significant (p-value 
0.016) among the firms with low beta. In the Volume model we documented a 
positive and non-significant regression coefficient for Rdisc in both subsamples.  
 Our findings provide weak evidence that annual report risk disclosures are 
more useful to investors if the systematic risk is lower. We interpret that firms with 
low beta may provide more information on their idiosyncratic risks, which increases 
the uniqueness of their risk reporting compared with other firms. Hence, the 
relevance of these firms’ risk disclosures is higher.  
 Financial leverage is one risk factor because it reflects the capital structure of 
firms. On one hand, prior research documents a negative association between 
financial leverage and corporate disclosure (e.g., Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995; Eng 
& Mak, 2003; Troberg, Kinnunen, & Seppänen, 2010). In addition to the motive of 
hiding the risk of bankruptcy, one potential explanation for the negative association 
is that highly leveraged firms use private financing to protect their proprietary 
information and consequently have less incentive for providing public financial 
information (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983; Healy & Palepu, 1993). On the other hand, 
Marshall & Weetman (2007) document that the information gap between 
management and investors is lower among firms with greater leverage.  
 We tested whether financial leverage affects the usefulness of the annual risk 
disclosures of firms. We demonstrate that Rdisc is significantly associated with 
                                                 
33 Beta is computed from the share and market index returns of the 36 months preceding publication 
of risk disclosures. OMXH was used as the market index. OMXH is a benchmark index made up of 
equities listed on OMX Helsinki. 
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information asymmetry in both models (Spread and Volume) among firms with high 
financial leverage. The results for firms with low financial leverage show that Rdisc 
associates negatively and significantly with Spread and non-significantly with 
Volume. Thus, we found some evidence that higher leverage increases the relevance 
of firms’ risk reports.34  
 
6.3. Instrumental variable method: two-stage regressions 
  
It is possible that omitted factors affect both risk disclosure and information 
asymmetry (i.e., correlated omitted variables bias). To control for this endogeneity 
problem we applied the instrumental variable method (cf., Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000; Hail, 2002; Barton & Waymire, 2004). We argue that firms’ risk disclosures 
may be driven by firm riskiness, and that firm riskiness may also affect information 
asymmetry. The following instruments of firm riskiness are used: Leverage, Beta, 
EP, and Idio_risk. Leverage is the financial leverage of the firm computed as 
follows: 1-(common equity/total assets). It proxies the bankruptcy risk of the firm. 
High bankruptcy risk increases firms’ vulnerability to risks and may decrease 
managers’ willingness to provide risk information (Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011; 
Miihkinen, 2012). Beta is the beta of the firm. It is computed from the share and 
market index returns of the 12 months preceding publication of the risk disclosure. 
OMXH Cap was used as the market index.35 Beta is an empirical measure of the 
firm’s market risk. High market risk may motivate managers to improve their risk 
disclosures (cf., Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011; Miihkinen, 
2012). EP is the earnings-to-price ratio of the firm. It describes the firm’s growth 
prospects and risks. Higher growth prospects may increase managers’ motives to 
disclose risks (Kanto & Schadewitz, 1997; Miihkinen, 2008, Miihkinen, 2012). 
Idio_risk measures the idiosyncratic risk of the firm. It is the standard deviation of 
the firm’s abnormal returns of the 12 months (t-1) preceding the risk disclosure. It is 
expected that this measure correlates positively with the level of potential 
                                                 
34 In panel D of table 7 we document that risk disclosure is useful to investors under all market 
conditions. In additional tests we found that after the slump analyst coverage no longer affected the 
usefulness of risk disclosure. This finding provides evidence that under abnormal market conditions, 
the loss of confidence increases investors’ information needs. Hence, they demand higher quality risk 
disclosures and all firms appear to be equally risky investments to them regardless of analysts’ 
interests. 
35 OMXH Cap index consists of equities listed on OMXH Helsinki. In this index the highest weight 
for a share is ten percent. 
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information to disclose firm-specific risks (cf., Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & 
Steele, 2013). We used a 12-month beta estimated from the share and market index 
(OMXH Cap) returns two years (t-2) before the risk disclosure in the computation of 
abnormal returns. Depending on the manager’s disclosure incentives, the impact of 
firm-specific risk on risk disclosure can be positive or negative (see, Beyer, Cohen, 
Lys, & Walther, 2010).  
 First, we regressed Rdisc on all other explanatory variables of the main tests 
and the four instruments and computed the OLS estimates. Table 8 demonstrates that 
three (four) instruments out of four are significant at the five percent significance 
level in the Spread (Volume) model.36 Second, we regressed the measures of 
information asymmetry (Spread and Volume) on the explanatory variables of the 
main tests (see, table 6) and an additional regressor that describes the fitted values of 
the error term of the first-stage regression. The OLS estimates show that the error 
term is significant in both models (Hausman test), which implies that the null 
hypothesis on the exogeneity of Rdisc can be rejected. Consequently, we ran second-
stage regressions which are otherwise identical to those presented in table 6 but 
Rdisc variable is now replaced with its predicted values from the first-stage 
regression. It is expected that the predicted values of Rdisc are purged of correlation 
with omitted factors.  
     The results of the 2SLS regressions are reported in table 8. They corroborate 
the primary findings by demonstrating that Rdisc is still significantly associated with 
information asymmetry in both models. The sign and significance of the control 
variables are qualitatively similar to those reported in table 6. We also ran the 
regressions which examine the interaction effect between the contingency factors and 
the predicted values of Rdisc. The untabulated results are robust for the primary 
findings with some minor differences. In the Spread model the interaction effect 
between high tech firms and risk disclosure is no longer significant. Recent 
accounting literature discusses the problems of the use of instrumental variables and 
selection models in accounting research (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Lennox, Francis, 
& Wang, 2012). In this paper the instrumental variable method was used to 
                                                 
36 The untabulated Pearson correlation coefficients between the instruments (Leverage, Beta, EP, 
Idio_risk) and measures of information asymmetry (Spread and Volume) are as follows (significance 
provided in parentheses): Spread-Leverage 0.430 (0.000), Spread-Beta -0.357 (0.000), Spread-
Idio_risk 0.660 (0.000), Spread-EP -0.357 (0.000), Volume-Leverage -0.082 (0.099), Volume-Beta 
0.626 (0.000), Volume-Idio_risk -0.135 (0.008), and Volume-EP 0.062 (0.219). 
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demonstrate that the endogeneity problem should not drive the results. The 2SLS 
regressions provide evidence on the robustness of the results of the primary tests. 
Thus, problem of correlated omitted variables does not appear to be severe. This 
conclusion builds on the assumption of high-quality instruments and our 
understanding of managers’ risk disclosure choices.  
 
(Table 8 about here) 
 
7.  Discussion, summary and conclusions 
 
7.1. Discussion 
 
The results obtained within the framework of this paper provide evidence that high-
quality risk disclosure reduces information asymmetry in the stock markets. The 
existing literature documents that there are significant deficiencies in the reporting of 
firms’ quantitative risk disclosures across countries (e.g., Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 
Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011, Miihkinen, 2012). Consequently, firms’ emphasis on 
the narrative risk disclosures may be one reason why few studies have examined the 
economic consequences of firms’ overall risk reviews. It is difficult to find a setting 
in which the potential relevance of firms’ overall risk reviews can be documented. 
Our results are in line with those of Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele (2013), 
who demonstrate a negative association between information asymmetry and 
corporate risk disclosures in the US.37 Thus, although risk disclosures are partly 
inadequate even in the most advanced risk reporting settings it seems evident that the 
overall risk reviews provided in the US and Finland reflect at least some of firms’ 
risks and are hence useful to investors.  
 It is expected that these results could be also generalized to Canada, the UK, 
and Germany which have more pronounced risk standards than average countries 
(Dobler, Lajili, & Zéghal, 2011). This is so because more comprehensive risk 
reporting requirements are expected to increase investors’ trust in the overall 
reliability of firms’ risk disclosures and hence they are more willing to use that 
                                                 
37 Huang  (2011) and Kravet & Muslu (2013) also provide evidence that mandatory overall risk 
reviews are informative to investors although these papers do not address the effect of risk disclosures 
on information asymmetry. 
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information in their decision making. On the contrary, generalizing the results to the 
South-European countries (e.g., Greece and Italy) is not so obvious. Beretta & 
Bozzolan (2004) demonstrate that larger firms do not provide high-quality risk 
information in the Italian voluntary risk disclosure environment which may hint that 
the quality of risk disclosure is not that high in these countries. Lower quality 
disclosures may reduce the information value of firms’ risk reviews across South-
European reporting environments.  
 Finally, it must be taken into account that the impact of firms’ risk disclosures 
on information asymmetry depends on several contingency factors. Riskier firms are 
expected to benefit more from high-quality overall risk reviews in all advanced risk 
reporting environments. Similarly, the risk reviews of less extensively followed firms 
are probably more useful to investors in these countries. In difficult economic 
conditions the need for risk transparency increases and this finding should be 
generalizable to all countries with stock markets.  
 
7.2. Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper examines whether the mandatory risk disclosures provided in firms’ 
annual reports contain useful information to investors and whether the usefulness of 
this type of information depends on contingency factors related to firm riskiness, 
investor interest, and general market conditions. Risk disclosure provides critical 
information to investors because information asymmetry regarding firm risks 
effectively hampers firm valuation. Hence, investors should benefit from high-
quality risk disclosures. So far, the extant accounting literature has focused on 
examining the regulatory and non-regulatory determinants of risk disclosure (e.g., 
Roulstone, 1999; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006) or the value 
relevance of market risk disclosures (e.g., Rajgopal, 1999; Linsmeier, 2002; Jorion, 
2002; Lim & Tan, 2007). Recently, concurrent studies on firms’ mandatory overall 
risk disclosures in the US have provided evidence that these disclosures are 
informative to investors despite the reporting deficiencies (Huang, 2011; Kravet & 
Muslu, 2013; Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2013). However, we do not 
have evidence on the usefulness of overall risk reviews in a highly regulated risk 
disclosure environment. Filling this gap is the purpose of this paper.  
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 Finland is the test-setting of the study. In Finland, firms’ risk disclosures are 
guided by a specific standard issued in 2006. The standard provides firms with an 
extensive description of expected risk reporting and also gives some disclosure 
examples.  
 Using a sample of risk disclosures by Finnish firms listed in the OMX 
Helsinki during 2006-2009 we demonstrate that information asymmetry decreases 
with the quality of firms risk disclosure. This result is robust for alternative 
indicators of asymmetric information.  In addition, we document that risk disclosures 
are more useful if they are provided by small firms and high tech firms. Also, low 
investor interest and the severe economic downturn during the research period 
increase the usefulness of firms’ risk reports. Overall, the findings provide evidence 
that annual report risk disclosures provide useful information to investors.
 This paper contributes prior risk disclosure literature by examining the role of 
mandatory risk disclosures in lowering information asymmetry in a highly regulated 
risk disclosure environment, Finland. In general, the results are in line with the extant 
literature which documents that soft accounting information is useful to investors 
(e.g., Abrahamson & Amir, 1996; Kothari, Li, & Short, 2009; Demers & Vega, 
2010). In specific, the results are consistent with the current US evidence (Huang, 
2011; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2013).  
 We also add to the concurrent risk disclosure literature in the US setting 
(Huang, 2011; Kravet & Muslu, 2013; Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 
2013) by including several relevant contingency factors into the analyses. Our results 
show how different firm riskiness, investor interest, and market conditions influence 
the relevance of firms’ risk reports. The finding that the riskiness of the firms and 
stock markets affects the relevance of risk disclosures is consistent with the efficient 
market theory (see, Fama, 1970; Fama & French, 1992). The results are also 
interesting from the perspective of the studies that suggest that analyst coverage and 
corporate disclosure are positively associated (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Francis, 
Hanna, & Philbrick, 1997; Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999). We demonstrate that 
there are differences in the economic consequences of risk disclosures provided by 
firms with high and low investor interest (cf., Botosan, 1997; Hope, 2003; Easley & 
O’Hara, 2004). The finding suggests that the risk profiles of the less extensively 
followed firms are vague to investors, which increases the reactions of investors to 
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their risk disclosures. The result is also consistent with the view that the information 
environment of the more extensively followed firms differs from that of other firms. 
 The findings of the study have implications for regulators, firms, and 
investors. First, it is important for regulators to note that the usefulness of risk 
reporting to investors has been documented in an institutional setting where risk 
reporting is regulated through detailed risk disclosure guidance augmented with 
illustrative examples. A similar approach can provide a promising solution for 
increasing the relevance of risk disclosure to investors also in other countries. Our 
results demonstrate that the significant differences in the Finnish and US institutional 
settings do not alter the conjecture that high-quality overall risk reviews are useful to 
investors. Second, firms can utilize the results when they want to reduce the 
information asymmetry component of their cost of capital. Finally, investors benefit 
from the study through an increased awareness of the association between 
information asymmetry and risk disclosure. Thus, the results may help them to 
develop more effective trading strategies. 
 One limitation of the analysis of risk disclosures is that it is difficult verify 
their validity. Disclosures relating to financial risks can be more easily verified (cf., 
Dobler, 2008) but it is more difficult to give verifiable information on strategic risks. 
Managerial discretion is an inherent part of risk reporting due to its subjective and 
partly nonverifiable nature and may decrease some investors trust on certain risk 
disclosures. This means that the documented statistically significant relation between 
information asymmetry and quality of risk disclosure would be actually even 
stronger if we assume that every firm would give credible information and all 
investors would trust that information.  
 Finland belongs to the Scandinavian institutional setting where investor 
protection is lower than in the Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g., US and UK) but higher 
than in southern Europe (e.g., Greece and Italy) (La Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 
2000). The results of this study suggest that investors need transparent risk 
information in a country of semi-strong investor protection. The information needs 
can be expected to be even higher in countries of low investor protection. Analyzing 
the impact of high-quality risk disclosures on information asymmetry in countries of 
low investor protection is a promising avenue for future research.  
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Figure 2. The behavior of the OMX Helsinki stock index in 2005-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ar05- Ar08 denote the average publication dates for annual reports from 2005 through 2008.  
 
 
Ar05 Ar06 Ar07 Ar08 
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Table 1. Sample selectiona 
 
 
Selection criteria Spread model Volume model
1. The research population consists of firms quoted on 
OMX Helsinki in 2006-2009.
504 504
2. Members of the financial services industry are 
excluded. 52 52
3. Lost firm-year observations due to initial listing, 
delisting or restructuring of the firm between 2005 and 
2009.
32 32
4. Firms with differing fiscal periods are excluded. 12 12
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of observations with released annual 
reports
408 408
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Firms with missing data are excluded 22 106
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of observations in the main tests 386 302
 
 
a This table describes the data selection steps. In the first step, we identify firms quoted on OMX Helsinki in 
2006-2009. Second, we deleted firms that are members of financial services industry to increase the 
homogeneity of the sample. Third, we excluded firms that were initially listed or restructured between 2005 and 
2009. Fourth, we omitted firms that did not have calendar year as their fiscal year to control for the timing of the 
released risk disclosures. After these exclusions the target sample comprised 408 firm-year observations which 
had released annual reports available for content analysis. Finally, in the main regressions we excluded 
observations for which we could not retrieve all the values of the examined variables. 
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Table 2. Content analysis results for each yeara 
 
 
T-tests for equal means
2006 
(n=99)
2007 
(n=99)
2008 
(n=105)
2009 
(n=105)
 06 vs. 07 
(sig.)
07 vs. 08 
(sig.)
08 vs. 09 
(sig.)
06 vs. 09 
(sig.)
Strategic risks
  # Firms disclosing 36 85 102 103
  Quantity (words)
    Mean 196.0 180.2 205.5 230.0 (0.694) (0.392) (0.376) (0.372)
    Maximum 785 1095 820 1040
    Minimum 15 12 3 11
Operations risks
  # Firms disclosing 47 86 98 95
  Quantity (words)
    Mean 144.4 150.4 155.4 178.8 (0.834) (0.836) (0.371) (0.242)
    Maximum 646 885 857 974
    Minimum 9 9 6 3
Financial risks
  # Firms disclosing 45 79 87 91
  Quantity (words)
    Mean 147.7 139.1 119.2 155.7 (0.824) (0.480) (0.132) (0.812)
    Maximum 797 1359 659 778
    Minimum 11 9 5 3  
a This panel provides yearly values for the mean, maximum, and minimum number of words for each main topic 
of the risk disclosure framework (strategic, operations, financial, damage, and risk management). # Firms 
disclosing describes the number of firms that provided some information on a specific risk topic. For example, in 
2006 there were altogether 36 firms out of 99 which provided information on strategic risks. All risks describes 
yearly statistics for firms which reported each of the five risk topics in their risk reviews. The yearly statistics for 
Coverage are also provided. Coverage is the inverse of the Herfindahl index value divided by the number of 
main risk topics. No disclosure depicts the number of firms which do not give any risk information on a specific 
year. The panel also reports the results of the unpaired t-tests (two-tailed significance).  
53 
 
Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
T-tests for equal means
2006 
(n=99)
2007 
(n=99)
2008 
(n=105)
2009 
(n=105)
 06 vs. 07 
(sig.)
07 vs. 08 
(sig.)
08 vs. 09 
(sig.)
06 vs. 09 
(sig.)
Damage risks
  # Firms disclosing 52 77 82 82
  Quantity (words)
    Mean 46.2 59.0 55.2 56.3 (0.175) (0.667) (0.891) (0.241)
    Maximum 173 320 266 268
    Minimum 4 4 5 5
Risk management
  # Firms disclosing 81 92 98 98
  Quantity (words)
    Mean 109.2 159.4 163.0 202.9 (0.007) (0.864) (0.084) (0.000)
    Maximum 440 721 702 809
    Minimum 10 9 5 13
All risks
  # Firms disclosing 24 55 67 70
  Quantity (words)
    Mean 759.0 793.9 782.8 926.0 (0.821) (0.922) (0.151) (0.231)
    Maximum 2207 3281 2435 2715
    Minimum 212 132 154 140
Coverage
    Mean 0.493 0.610 0.633 0.628 (0.000) (0.344) (0.816) (0.000)
    Maximum 0.952 0.976 0.930 0.962
    Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
No disclosure
  # Firms disclosing 4 1 1 1  
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Table 3. Variable definitions 
 
 
Dependent variables  
    Spread 
An empirical measure for information asymmetry in the stock 
markets. It is the three-month average relative spread of a firm. 
Relative spread is computed as follows: [(ask price - bid 
price)/((ask price + bid price)/2)]*100. Ask price and bid price are 
closing prices.  
    Volume 
An empirical measure for information asymmetry in the stock 
markets. It is a three-month average daily share turnover. Share 
turnover is computed as follows: (daily trading volume/number of 
shares outstanding)*100. 
Independent variables  
    Rdisc 
An empirical measure for the quality of annual report risk 
disclosure. It is the score of the principal component with the 
highest eigenvalue computed from the firm-specific risk disclosure 
quantity and coverage ratios. 
    Quantity The first dimension of risk disclosure quality. It is the natural logarithm of the total number of risk disclosure words. 
    Coverage 
The second dimension of quality of risk disclosure. It is the inverse 
of the Herfindahl index value divided by the number of main risk 
topics. The main risk topics are strategic risks, operations risks, 
financial risks, damage risks, and risk management. 
    Mcap 
An empirical measure for firm size capturing the impact of 
riskiness and overall quality of corporate disclosure on information 
asymmetry. It is the natural logarithm of the market value of a firm. 
The three-month average of the daily value is used.   
    Htech 
Indicator variable = 1, if the firm is a high tech firm, otherwise 0. 
High tech firms are selected on the basis of their three-digit SIC 
codes as suggested by Francis and Schipper (1999). 
    Analysts An empirical measure for investor interest. It is computed as follows: ln(1 + number of analysts following a firm). 
    Falling Indicator variable = 1, if firms’ risk disclosures are published during the falling stock markets of 2008, otherwise 0. 
    Recovering Indicator variable = 1, if firms’ risk disclosures are published during the recovering stock markets of 2009, otherwise 0. 
 
55 
 
    Volatility 
An empirical measure for the total market risk of a firm. It is a 
three-month average standard deviation of daily stock returns 
multiplied by 100.  
    ErnQual 
An empirical measure for the earnings quality of a firm. It is the 
score of the principal component with the highest eigenvalue 
computed from two alternative measures of earnings quality (AQ 
and ErnVar). The absolute values of the principle component scores 
are multiplied by -1 to adjust higher scores to reflect higher 
earnings quality. 
    AQ 
The first proxy for earnings quality. It is computed by regressing 
working capital accruals on cash from operations in the current 
period, prior period, and future period, as well as the change in 
revenues and property, plant, and equipment. AQ is the standard 
deviation of the residual, with larger standard deviations indicating 
poorer accruals quality (cf., McNichols, 2002; Francis et al., 2007; 
Francis et al., 2008). 
    ErnVar 
The second proxy for earnings quality. It is the standard deviation 
of the firm’s earnings over 2003-2009. Earnings are computed 
before extraordinary items and scaled by total assets as in Francis et 
al. (2008). 
    ForOwn 
An empirical measure for foreign ownership and institutional 
ownership. It provides the percentage of shares owned by foreign 
owners. 
    Clshs This measure describes ownership concentration. It is the percentage of shares owned by firm insiders. 
    MedCov 
An empirical measure for the media coverage of a firm. It is the 
natural logarithm of the number of Google hits relating to the firm. 
The search word ‘firm name plc announcement’ is used in the 
Google inquiries. 
    PageCount 
An empirical measure for the extent of overall disclosure in the 
annual report of a firm. It is the natural logarithm of the number of 
pages in a firm’s annual report. 
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Table 4. (continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Other variablesb 
 
 
 
Nobs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
    Mcap 386 19.171 18.992 1.933 15.094 25.110
    Htech 386 0.337 0.000 0.473 0.000 1.000
    Analysts 386 1.781 1.946 0.916 0.000 3.970
    Falling 386 0.249 0.000 0.433 0.000 1.000
    Recovering 386 0.244 0.000 0.430 0.000 1.000
    Volatility 386 2.464 2.249 1.249 0.697 14.685
    Volume 386 0.236 0.122 0.260 0.003 1.741
    ErnQual 386 0.093 0.331 0.677 -2.401 0.956
    ForOwn 386 22.790 15.140 22.451 0.016 91.100
    Clshs 302 30.628 31.053 21.689 0.000 99.259
    MedCov 386 10.133 10.236 1.322 6.472 12.983
    PageCount 386 4.434 4.431 0.347 3.401 5.380  
 
b This panel provides the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum 
values of other variables in the pooled sample. Mcap is a three-month average market value of a firm. Htech is an 
indicator variable for high tech firms. High tech firms are selected on the basis of their three-digit SIC codes as 
suggested by Francis and Schipper (1999). Analysts is computed as follows: ln (1+ number of analysts following a 
firm). Falling is an indicator variable for the falling stock markets. Recovering is an indicator variable for the 
recovering stock markets.  Volatility is a three-month average standard deviation of daily stock returns multiplied 
by 100. Volume is a three months average share turnover which is computed as follows: (daily trading 
volume/number of shares outstanding)*100. The three months of examination are May, June, and July. ErnQual is 
an empirical measure for the earnings quality of the firm (for more detailed definition, see table 3). ForOwn 
describes how many percent of the shares are owned by foreign owners. Clshs is the percentage of shares owned 
by firm insiders. Please note that the number of observations for this variable is lower than for other variables, 
which also lowers the degrees of freedom in the Volume model. MedCov is computed as follows: ln (number of 
Google hits relating to a firm). PageCount is computed as follows: ln (number of pages in the annual report of a 
firm).  
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Table 6. Determinants of information asymmetry in the stock markets: pooled sample 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable = Spreada 
 
Ind.Variables Pred Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
    Intercept 13.600 0.000 37.850 0.000 13.060 0.000 17.600 0.000 13.680 0.000
Test variables
    Rdisc - -1.636 0.010 -24.660 0.000 -0.589 0.136 -5.205 0.001 -0.888 0.110
    Mcap - -0.440 0.000 -1.738 0.000 -0.487 0.000 -0.479 0.000 -0.507 0.000
    Htech + 0.051 0.814 0.117 0.592 3.297 0.016 0.116 0.605 -0.003 0.991
    Analysts - -0.222 0.290 -0.122 0.552 -0.226 0.296 -2.345 0.001 -0.140 0.502
    Falling + 0.185 0.243 0.300 0.041 0.197 0.199 0.222 0.135 3.712 0.000
    Recovering + -0.228 0.289 -0.043 0.792 -0.184 0.304 -0.162 0.359 2.461 0.011
    Rdisc*Mcap + ----- ----- 1.230 0.000 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
    Rdisc*Htech - ----- ----- ----- ----- -3.334 0.012 ----- ----- ----- -----
    Rdisc*Analysts + ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 2.223 0.001 ----- -----
    Rdisc*Falling - ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -3.582 0.000
    Rdisc*Recovering - ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -2.728 0.002
Control variables
    Volatility 1.051 0.000 0.817 0.000 0.934 0.000 0.911 0.000 0.999 0.000
    Volume -1.404 0.020 -1.303 0.016 -1.291 0.021 -1.458 0.013 -1.266 0.023
    ErnQual 0.217 0.059 0.147 0.207 0.227 0.066 0.127 0.309 0.214 0.061
    ForOwn 0.011 0.061 0.010 0.067 0.011 0.048 0.010 0.062 0.013 0.028
    MedCov -0.161 0.039 -0.143 0.062 -0.135 0.079 -0.127 0.101 -0.149 0.051
    PageCount -0.561 0.240 -0.566 0.194 -0.498 0.297 -0.574 0.207 -0.509 0.278
    Model F-value (prob)
    Adjusted R2
    Nobs
51.980 (.000)
0.704
386
55.490 (.000)
0.706
386
57.840 (.000)
0.715
386
54.690 (.000)
0.691
386
61.260 (.000)
0.727
386  
a This panel provides regression results for the determinants of Spread in the pooled sample. Spread is a three-month average 
relative spread of a firm computed as follows: [(ask price - bid price)/((ask price + bid price)/2)]*100. Rdisc is the score of the 
principal component with the highest eigenvalue computed from the firm-specific risk disclosure quantity and coverage ratios. It 
is derived from the newest annual reports that are published before May. For example, 2005 annual reports are published in 
2006. Mcap is a three-month average market value of a firm. Htech is an indicator variable for high tech firms. High tech firms 
are selected on the basis of their three-digit SIC codes as suggested by Francis and Schipper (1999). Analysts is computed as 
follows: ln (1+number of analysts following a firm). Falling is an indicator variable for the falling stock markets. Recovering is 
an indicator variable for the recovering stock markets (for both of these indicator variables rising stock markets during 2006 and 
2007 serve as a benchmark). Volatility is a three-month average standard deviation of daily stock returns multiplied by 100. 
Volume is a three months average share turnover which is computed as follows: (daily trading volume/number of shares 
outstanding)*100.The three months of examination are May, June, and July. ErnQual is an empirical measure for the earnings 
quality of the firm (for more detailed definition, see table 3). ForOwn describes how many percent of the shares are owned by 
foreign owners. MedCov is computed as follows: ln (number of Google hits relating to a firm). PageCount is computed as 
follows: ln (number of pages in the annual report of a firm). Industry-fixed effects are controlled for although not reported. The 
panel reports two-tailed significance levels and regression coefficients significant at five percent or higher are shown in 
boldface. P-values of parameter estimates are computed from the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level (see, Petersen, 2009).  
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable = Volumeb 
 
Ind.Variables Pred Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
    Intercept -1.562 0.000 -2.600 0.001 -1.563 0.000 -1.743 0.000 -1.554 0.000
Test variables
    Rdisc + 0.123 0.042 1.091 0.068 0.125 0.074 0.298 0.034 0.090 0.115
    Mcap + 0.030 0.123 0.085 0.024 0.030 0.126 0.031 0.103 0.033 0.100
    Htech - 0.039 0.440 0.038 0.440 0.045 0.703 0.037 0.459 0.041 0.418
    Analysts + 0.072 0.058 0.066 0.073 0.072 0.059 0.169 0.065 0.068 0.075
    Falling - -0.041 0.049 -0.046 0.032 -0.041 0.054 -0.043 0.042 -0.221 0.010
    Recovering - -0.080 0.004 -0.087 0.003 -0.080 0.005 -0.084 0.004 -0.182 0.121
    Rdisc*Mcap - ----- ----- -0.051 0.111 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -----
    Rdisc*Htech + ----- ----- ----- ----- -0.006 0.956 ----- ----- ----- -----
    Rdisc*Analysts - ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- -0.095 0.210 ----- -----
    Rdisc*Falling + ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.178 0.035
    Rdisc*Recovering + ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.102 0.372
Control variables
    Volatility 0.049 0.001 0.061 0.000 0.049 0.001 0.057 0.000 0.052 0.000
    ErnQual -0.034 0.258 -0.032 0.283 -0.034 0.258 -0.032 0.287 -0.033 0.275
    ForOwn 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.002
    Clshs -0.001 0.039 -0.001 0.041 -0.001 0.038 -0.001 0.039 -0.001 0.040
    MedCov 0.002 0.897 0.001 0.962 0.002 0.895 0.001 0.957 0.001 0.929
    PageCount 0.179 0.024 0.176 0.025 0.179 0.023 0.174 0.026 0.175 0.027
    Model F-value (prob)
    Adjusted R2
    Nobs
26.680 (.000)
0.577
302
25.500 (.000)
0.581
302
23.810 (.000)
0.577
302
25.020 (.000)
0.576
302
25.300 (.000)
0.579
302  
b This panel provides regression results for the determinants of Volume in the pooled sample. Volume is a three-month average share 
turnover which is computed as follows: (daily trading volume/number of shares outstanding)*100. Rdisc is the score of the principal 
component with the highest eigenvalue computed from the firm-specific risk disclosure quantity and coverage ratios. It is derived 
from the latest annual reports that are published before May. For example, annual reports for 2005 are published in 2006. Mcap is a 
three-month average market value of a firm. Htech is an indicator variable for high tech firms. High tech firms are selected based on 
their three-digit SIC codes as suggested by Francis and Schipper (1999). Analysts is computed as follows: ln (1+number of analysts 
following a firm). Falling is an indicator variable for the falling stock markets. Recovering is an indicator variable for the recovering 
stock markets (for both of these indicator variables rising stock markets during 2006 and 2007 serve as a benchmark). Volatility is a 
three-month average standard deviation of daily stock returns multiplied by 100.  The three months of examination are May, June, and 
July. ErnQual is an empirical measure for the earnings quality of the firm (for more detailed definition, see table 3). ForOwn 
describes how many percent of the shares are owned by foreign owners. Clshs is the percentage of shares owned by firm insiders. 
MedCov is computed as follows: ln (number of Google hits relating to a firm). PageCount is computed as follows: ln (number of 
pages in the annual report of a firm). Industry-fixed effects are controlled for although not reported. The panel reports two-tailed 
significance levels and regression coefficients significant at five percent or higher are shown in boldface. P-values of parameter 
estimates are computed from the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level (see, Petersen, 2009). 
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Table 7. Contingency factors and the usefulness of annual report risk disclosure 
(Dependent variable = Spread or Volume)a 
 
 
Panel A: Large firms vs. Small firms 
 
 
Large firms Small firms
Spread Volume Spread Volume
Ind.Variables Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
    Intercept 3.878 0.000 -1.498 0.054 32.010 0.000 -0.253 0.668
    Rdisc 0.078 0.305 -0.089 0.508 -2.617 0.016 0.134 0.024
    Other variables included
    Model F-value (prob)
    Adjusted R2
    Nobs
22.260 (.000)
0.740
113
1.720 (.0626)
0.083
113
18.060 (.000)
0.664
139
13.310 (.000)
0.572
139  
 
a This table provides regression results for the subsamples based on the following contingency factors: large vs. small firms, 
high tech vs. non-high tech firms, high vs. low analyst coverage firms, and rising, falling, and recovering stock markets. The 
‘large (small) firms’ subsample consists of firms in the highest (lowest) tercile on the basis of firm size (Mcap). High tech 
firms are selected on the basis of their three-digit SIC codes as suggested by Francis & Schipper (1999). The ‘high (low) 
analyst coverage’ subsample consists of firms in the highest (lowest) tercile on the basis of the number of analysts following 
a firm. Spread is a three-month average relative spread of a firm computed as follows: [(ask price - bid price)/((ask price + 
bid price)/2)]*100. Volume is a three-month average share turnover, which is computed as follows: (daily trading 
volume/number of shares outstanding)*100. Rdisc is the score of the principal component with the highest eigenvalue 
computed from the firm-specific risk disclosure quantity and coverage ratios. It is derived from the latest annual reports, 
which are published before May. For example, the annual reports for 2005 were published in 2006. Other variables are 
included in the regressions (cf., table 6) but not reported. Regressions do not include interactions between Rdisc and 
contingency factors. Industry-fixed effects are controlled for although not reported. The panels report two-tailed significance 
levels and regression coefficients significant at five percent or higher are shown in boldface. P-values of parameter estimates 
are computed from the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level (see, Petersen, 2009). 
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Panel B: High tech vs. Non-high tech firms 
 
 
High tech firms Non-high tech firms
Spread Volume Spread Volume
Ind.Variables Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
    Intercept 7.610 0.016 -0.037 0.958 16.340 0.000 -1.217 0.004
    Rdisc -2.685 0.000 0.003 0.971 -0.249 0.446 0.100 0.082
    Other variables included
    Model F-value (prob)
    Adjusted R2
    Nobs
28.410 (.000)
0.542
256
34.470 (.000)
0.568
256
88.660 (.000)
0.882
130
13.370 (.000)
0.490
130  
 
 
Panel C: High vs. Low analyst coverage firms 
 
 
High analyst coverage Low analyst coverage
Spread Volume Spread Volume
Ind.Variables Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
    Intercept 5.190 0.001 -1.774 0.067 25.070 0.000 -0.034 0.931
    Rdisc 0.211 0.307 -0.149 0.263 -2.170 0.035 0.126 0.077
    Other variables included
    Model F-value (prob)
    Adjusted R2
    Nobs
22.220 (.000)
0.739
106
5.040 (.000)
0.334
106
10.500 (.000)
0.499
144
11.580 (.000)
0.509
144  
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Panel D: Rising, falling and recovering stock markets 
 
 
Rising stock markets Falling stock markets
Spread Volume Spread Volume
Ind.Variables Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
    Intercept 10.296 0.000 -1.043 0.003 23.690 0.000 -1.467 0.007
    Rdisc -1.471 0.034 0.106 0.091 -3.447 0.002 0.236 0.114
    Other variables included
    Model F-value (prob)
    Adjusted R2
    Nobs
Recovering stock markets
Spread Volume
Ind.Variables Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
    Intercept 15.873 0.000 -1.023 0.018
    Rdisc -1.651 0.045 0.121 0.211
    Other variables included
    Model F-value (prob)
    Adjusted R2
    Nobs
31.090 (.000)
0.819
94
7.270 (.000)
0.467
94
20.760 (.000)
0.744
96
7.850 (.000)
0.484
96
21.170 (.000)
0.592
196
14.600 (.000)
0.476
196
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Table 8. Determinants of information asymmetry: 2SLS regressionsa 
 
 
     2SLS: Spread      2SLS: Volume
      First-stage       Second-stage       First-stage       Second-stage
Ind.Variables Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
    Intercept 0.609 0.032 15.591 0.000 0.766 0.028 -1.719 0.000
    Rdisc -7.958 0.038 0.407 0.053
Instruments
    Leverage -0.002 0.021 ----- ----- -0.003 0.001 ----- -----
    Beta 0.095 0.019 ----- ----- 0.145 0.001 ----- -----
    EP -0.098 0.015 ----- ----- -0.088 0.031 ----- -----
    Idio_risk -2.592 0.091 ----- ----- -3.997 0.024 ----- -----
Control variables
    Mcap -0.014 0.332 -0.471 0.000 -0.026 0.118 0.032 0.158
    Htech 0.005 0.857 0.253 0.279 -0.025 0.455 0.041 0.414
    Analysts -0.019 0.470 -0.205 0.449 -0.033 0.335 0.074 0.102
    Falling 0.042 0.117 0.339 0.049 0.029 0.328 -0.053 0.021
    Recovering 0.081 0.011 0.087 0.738 0.060 0.078 -0.097 0.001
    Volatility -0.017 0.212 0.811 0.000 -0.002 0.889 0.061 0.000
    Volume 0.090 0.142 -0.531 0.450 ----- ----- ----- -----
    ErnQual 0.027 0.183 0.358 0.012 0.046 0.059 -0.043 0.188
    ForOwn 0.000 0.568 0.012 0.020 0.000 0.467 0.003 0.003
    Clshs ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.000 0.567 -0.001 0.054
    MedCov 0.009 0.332 -0.099 0.257 0.005 0.615 0.001 0.975
    PageCount 0.130 0.007 0.415 0.501 0.168 0.002 0.138 0.166
    Model F-value (prob)         5.410 (.000)
    Adjusted R2
    Nobs 368 368 295 295
56.150 (.000) 6.050 (.000) 26.860 (.000)
0.186 0.706 0.246 0.585
 
 
a This table provides 2SLS regressions for the determinants of Spread and Volume. Rdisc is treated as an endogenous 
variable and at the first stage it is regressed on all other explanatory variables of the main tests and four additional 
instrument variables. Next the Hausman test was conducted and the results demonstrate that the empirical measure of 
information asymmetry may be endogenous in both models. Hence two-stage regressions are computed by replacing the 
values of Rdisc with its predicted values from the first-stage regression. The instrument variables are empirical 
measures of firm riskiness and hence are expected to affect firms’ propensity to disclose risks. Leverage is the financial 
leverage of the firm computed as follows: 1-(common equity/total assets). Beta is the beta of the firm. It is computed 
from the share and market index returns of the preceding 12 months before the publication of the risk disclosure. 
OMXH Cap has been used as the market index. EP is the earnings-to-price ratio of the firm. Idio_risk measures the 
firm’s idiosyncratic risk. It is the standard deviation of the firm’s abnormal returns for the 12 months (t-1) preceding the 
risk disclosure. In the computation of abnormal returns the 12-month beta estimated from the share and market index 
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(OMXH Cap) returns two years (t-2) before the risk disclosure was used. The table reports two-tailed significance 
levels and regression coefficients significant at five percent or higher are shown in boldface. First-stage regression is an 
OLS regression in which industry has been controlled for but not reported. Second-stage regression is a fixed effects 
regression in which the p-values of parameter estimates are computed from the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level (see, Petersen, 2009). For the definition of other variables, see the preceding tables. Please 
note that the number of observations in this table differs slightly from that of table 6. This is so because the values of the 
instrument variables could not be computed for all observations examined in table 6. 
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Appendix A.  Comparison between Quantity and Coverage as a determinant of  
information asymmetrya 
 
Panel A: Risk disclosure dimension = Quantity 
Spread Volume
Ind.Variables Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
    Intercept 13.110 0.000 -1.480 0.000
    Rdisc = Quantity -0.311 0.038 0.033 0.004
    Other variables included
    Model F-value (prob)
    Adjusted R2
    Nobs
53.840 (.000)
0.687
386
27.380 (.000)
0.584
302  
 
 
Panel B: Risk disclosure dimension = Coverage 
Spread Volume
Ind.Variables Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
    Intercept 13.790 0.000 -1.606 0.000
    Rdisc = Coverage -1.707 0.006 0.155 0.028
    Other variables included
    Model F-value (prob)
    Adjusted R2
    Nobs
53.770 (.000)
0.687
386
26.770 (.000)
0.578
302  
 
a This appendix provides regression results for the determinants of Spread and Volume in the pooled 
sample by using the risk disclosure quality dimensions as proxies of Rdisc. Spread is a three-month 
average relative spread of a firm computed as follows: [(ask price - bid price)/((ask price + bid 
price)/2)]*100. Volume is a three-month average share turnover which is computed as follows: (daily 
trading volume/number of shares outstanding)*100. Quantity is the natural logarithm of the total 
number of risk disclosure words. Coverage is the inverse of the Herfindahl index value divided by the 
number of main risk topics. The scores for both quality dimensions are derived from the latest annual 
reports, which are published before May. For example, the annual reports for 2005 were published in 
2006. Other variables (cf., table 6) are included in the regressions but not reported. Regressions do not 
include interactions between Rdisc and contingency factors. Industry-fixed effects were controlled for 
although not reported. The panel reports two-tailed significance levels and regression coefficients 
significant at five percent or higher are shown in boldface. P-values of parameter estimates were 
computed from the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at firm level (see, Petersen, 
2009). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Risk Disclosure Framework 
 
This appendix summarizes the main topics and subtopics examined for risk 
disclosure. The basis for the classification of the main topics and subtopics derives 
from the Finnish detailed risk disclosure standard issued in 2006. The risk disclosure 
framework applied was made more comprehensive by adding a number of risk 
disclosure subtopics from the risk disclosure framework presented by Linsley & 
Shrives (2006). Finally, a subsample of annual reports was pre-tested to uncover any 
missing subtopics for the risk categories examined. Those subtopics mentioned 
explicitly in the Finnish standard or provided unambiguously in its disclosure 
examples are marked with an asterisk.  
  
 
 1. Strategic risks 
 a.  Market competition* 
 b.  Market areas* 
 c.  Position in the production chain* 
 d.  Dependence on customers*  
 e.  Dependence on suppliers*  
 f.  Changes in customer preferences* 
 g.  Technological development (e.g., threat of competing commodities)* 
 h.  Regulatory changes* 
 i.  Political changes* 
 j.  Mergers and acquisitions* 
 k.  Economical changes 
 l.  Pricing 
 m. Industry specific changes  
 n.  Launch of new products 
 o.  Business portfolio 
 p.  Life cycle (growth and profitability) 
 q.  Management 
 r.  Research and development 
   
 2. Operations risks 
 a.  Dependence on the know-how of the personnel* 
 b.  Uncommon business fluctuations in demand* 
 c.  Interruptions in the delivery chain*  
 d.  Price fluctuations of the factors of production (e.g., raw materials)* 
 e.  Patents and other industrial property rights* 
 f.  Information technology risks* 
 g.  Customer satisfaction 
 h.  Reputation and brand name development   
 i.  Stock obsolescence and shrinkage 
 j.  Product and service failure 
 k.  Environmental 
 l.  Health and safety 
 m. Project deliveries 
 n.  Quality controls  
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3. Financial risks 
 a.  Interest rate* 
 b.  Exchange rate* 
 c.  Liquidity* 
 d.  Credit* 
 e. Commodity 
  
 4. Damage risks 
  a.  Insurances* 
 b.  Significant legal actions* 
   
 5. Risk management  
 a.  Risk management policy* 
 b.  Risk management organization* 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Risk Disclosure Examples 
 
This appendix demonstrates the scoring of the risk disclosure quality indicators. 
More detailed scoring principles are available from the authors upon request.  
 
 
1) Quantity = ln (total number of risk disclosure words) 
 
Nokia Corporation provides 932 words risk information in its 2006 operating and 
financial review. 
 
 Disclosure score = Quantity = ln (932) = 6.84 
  
2) Coverage = [(1/H)/the number of main risk topics] 
 
The risk information provided by Nokia Corporation in its 2006 operating and 
financial review can be divided across risk topics as follows: 
 
Strategic risks: 415 words 
Operations risks: 398 words 
Financial risks: 51 words 
Damage risks: 68 words 
Risk management: 0 words   
(Total 932 words) 
 
 Herfindahl index = H = (415/932)^2 + (398/932)^2 + (51/932)^2 + 
 (68/932)^2 + (0/932)^2 = 0.389 
 
           Disclosure score = Coverage = (1/0.389)/5 = 0.51 
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Efficiency of Authoritative Disclosure Recommendations 
 
Evidence from IFRS Transition Disclosure in Finland 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper explores the potential for disclosure recommendations given 
by authoritative supervisory bodies to reduce information asymmetry between the 
management and shareholders.  
Design/methodology/approach – There is only meagre existing evidence 
concerning firms’ responses to disclosure recommendations. This paper uses 
descriptive statistics and OLS regression analysis to test if firms behave more 
similarly to voluntary or to mandatory disclosure when they follow the CESR 
(Committee of European Securities Regulators) disclosure recommendation for IFRS 
transition. Second, it analyses the determinants of and incentives for recommended 
transition disclosure. 
Findings – Recommended disclosure is documented to have more mandatory 
characteristics than purely voluntary disclosure. Moreover, the certain disclosure 
incentives for managers and corporate governance factors prove to have an impact on 
recommended disclosure. Firm size, growth prospects, and independent board 
members associate positively with recommended disclosure whereas there is a 
negative relationship between financial leverage and recommended disclosure. 
Research limitations/implications – The paper does not provide evidence on the 
cost differences between disclosure laws and authoritative disclosure 
recommendations. This could be examined by future research.  
Practical implications – Authoritative disclosure recommendations reduce 
information asymmetry. In some cases they may be a faster and more cost-efficient 
way to achieve disclosure enhancements than regulation.  
Originality/value – This paper is the first to explore the efficiency of authoritative 
disclosure recommendations in situations where urgent disclosure improvements are 
needed. The results have implications for regulatory bodies evaluating different 
strategies to reduce asymmetric information in these situations.  
 
Keywords  Disclosure, Regulation, Corporate governance 
 
Paper type  Research paper 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since January 1st 2005 all firms issuing securities admitted to trading on a regulated 
market of any Member State of the European Union have been required to prepare 
their consolidated financial statements in conformity with the IFRS (International 
Financial Reporting Standards). Relating to that regulation, at the end of 2003, the 
CESR (Committee of European Securities Regulators) published a Recommendation 
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for Additional Guidance Regarding the Transition to IFRS which provided 
guidelines on how listed firms should manage their disclosure on the adoption of 
IFRS. Given this background and the lack of prior empirical evidence, this paper 
examines the compliance of firms with the CESR transition disclosure 
recommendation.  
Disclosure regulation is one way to reduce information asymmetry 
(McLaughlin and Safieddine, 2008). However, it is important to get more 
information on alternative ways to affect firms’ transparency because disclosure 
regulation may also cause significant costs for some firms (Bushee and Leuz, 2005). 
The aim of the present study is to provide new insights into compliance with 
disclosure recommendations given by authoritative supervisory bodies. Based on 
prior consolidated evidence on voluntary and mandatory disclosure, and on the 
differences between them, the specific objective of the paper is to answer the 
following research questions:  
 
1. In relation to the CESR transition disclosure recommendation, is the 
behaviour of firms more similar to voluntary or to mandatory 
disclosure? 
 
2. What are the firm incentives for and corporate governance-related 
determinants of compliance with the CESR transition disclosure 
recommendation? 
 
Recent decades have witnessed wide research interest in corporate disclosure 
issues. Previously, many studies have concentrated on voluntary disclosure (Cooke, 
1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Cahan et al., 2005). Others have examined 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements (Inchausti, 1997; Gray and 
Street, 2002). In the light of prior consolidated evidence on voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure, and on their differences (Kanto and Schadewitz, 1997; Al-Razeen and 
Karbahari, 2004), it seems evident that the quality of mandatory disclosure associates 
with the level of reporting and disclosure requirements whereas voluntary disclosure 
is driven by the disclosure incentives for managers such as the reduction of agency 
costs and asymmetric information. Moreover, previous analytical research has also 
linked disclosure quality to corporate governance (Williamson, 1985). Some 
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empirical studies (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Glaum and Street, 2003) have documented 
a positive association between certain corporate governance mechanisms and 
mandatory disclosure. Also voluntary disclosure is demonstrated to associate 
positively with some corporate governance mechanisms (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Patelli 
and Prencipe, 2007) although some studies (Hossain et al., 1995; Eng and Mak, 
2003) have not found any relationship between corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure. 
Empirical evidence suggests that regulation reduces information asymmetry 
(McLaughlin and Safieddine, 2008). However, in spite of many previous corporate 
disclosure studies, only few of them provide evidence on the compliance of firms 
with disclosure recommendations. Mangena and Tauringana (2007) examine 
compliance with the ASB Statement on interim reports among firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. However, they do not focus on the mandatory 
characteristics of recommended disclosure. Moreover, ASB Statement provides 
voluntary best practice guidance. It is not driven by regulators’ urgent need to 
achieve fast changes. Thus, Mangena and Tauringana evaluate disclosures which are 
released at least four years after the publication of the disclosure recommendation.  
This study sheds light on whether disclosure recommendations given by 
authoritative supervisory bodies reduce information asymmetry by increasing 
corporate disclosure. The study contributes to the existing corporate disclosure and 
financial regulation literature in several ways. First, the paper focuses on examining 
recommended disclosure in a setting where the purpose of the disclosure 
recommendation is to achieve fast disclosure enhancements. Hence, firms are 
insistently urged to make transition disclosure improvements accordant with the 
CESR disclosure recommendation after its publication. Second, this study 
contributes prior literature by analysing the mandatory characteristics of authoritative 
disclosure recommendations. Basically, compliance with disclosure 
recommendations is voluntary for firms but can also be expected to exhibit 
characteristics of mandatory disclosure because disclosure recommendations are 
usually published by influential organisations. Third, the current study is beneficial 
for scholars because in addition to analysing the determinants of and incentives for 
recommended disclosure, this paper also provides evidence on the (dis)similarities 
between the determinants of recommended and purely voluntary disclosure.  
This paper has also practical implications. Further information on the factors 
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influencing compliance with disclosure recommendations would be very welcome 
for example to regulatory bodies which must decide whether to issue disclosure 
recommendations or rules. This information could be useful among other things in 
the development of firms’ corporate governance practices. Starting with the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, many countries have experienced an unprecedented 
amount of governmental and institutional intervention and are now in the process of 
restructuring their current laws, regulations and enforcement capabilities within the 
framework of the best corporate governance practices (Aksu and Kosedag, 2006).  
Compliance by Finnish listed firms with the CESR transition disclosure 
recommendation is a suitable setting for analysing the determinants of and incentives 
for recommended disclosure. Early transition disclosure on the first-time adoption of 
IFRS is important because the users of financial statement information may not 
immediately observe the signals disclosed by firms concerning changes in their 
financial reporting (Healy and Palepu, 1995). For that purpose the CESR has 
published an official recommendation to ensure that listed firms in the European 
Union are sufficiently transparent regarding the adoption of new accounting 
principles.  
Finland is a unique institutional setting because the disclosure regulation 
intensity of Finland is low compared to many other countries such as United States 
and United Kingdom (Roe, 2006). In Finland accounting standards are promulgated 
by professional accounting bodies within guidelines established by government 
legislation (King, 1999). Finnish managers tend to consider that compliance with 
applicable laws and the true and fair view requirement is important and also a matter 
of honour. The high compliance and disclosure ratios of Finnish firms have been also 
empirically documented (King, 1999; Dargenidou et al., 2006).   
Another reason to test compliance with recommended disclosure in Finland is 
that Finnish listed firms have been properly informed of the CESR disclosure 
recommendation from the outset. The Finnish Financial Supervision Authority (FIN-
FSA) has been active in providing information on the recommendation, and has also 
urged Finnish firms to follow it. Furthermore, the relatively small number of Finnish 
listed firms makes it possible to cover the majority of the population of listed firms in 
a single European country and still use hand-collected data.  
In this study, the term recommended disclosure refers to disclosure that is 
specified in the CESR transition disclosure recommendation for first-time adoption 
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of IFRS whereas voluntary disclosure refers to disclosure over and above the 
recommendation. The study design involves examining the recommended and 
voluntary disclosure of Finnish listed firms published in 2004 and 2005. The pooled 
sample consists of 85 firms in 2004 and 88 firms in 2005. The transition disclosure 
data are hand-collected from financial statement releases, financial statements, 
annual reports, and separate IFRS stock exchange releases. The main estimation 
method is multivariate regression analysis. The data for disclosure incentives are 
retrieved mainly from the Thomson One Banker Worldscope database. Corporate 
governance variables are hand-collected.  
The results indicate that recommended disclosure has more mandatory 
characteristics than voluntary disclosure. Relating to the incentives for recommended 
disclosure, the main regression demonstrates three significant disclosure incentives: 
firm size, financial leverage, and growth prospects. After controlling for other 
relevant factors, firm size associates positively with recommended disclosure. The 
positive effect of firm size supports the previous empirical findings of voluntary 
disclosure literature (Cooke, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Cahan et al., 2005), 
but is contrary to some empirical mandatory disclosure studies (Glaum and Street, 
2003). Financial leverage has a negative relation to recommended disclosure, which 
is in line with prior literature (Gary et al., 1995; Eng and Mak, 2003). It implies that 
debt financing is used to avoid pressures for disclosing proprietary information 
(Verrecchia, 1983). The current paper also documents the growth prospects of firms 
to be a significant positive determinant of recommended disclosure; this supports the 
argument that growth firms have an incentive to reduce information asymmetry and 
thus avoid the adverse consequences of poor disclosure (Akerlof, 1970).  
This paper demonstrates one significant corporate governance factor that 
associates with the quality of recommended disclosure. The proportion of 
independent board members in corporate boards relates positively to recommended 
disclosure. The finding is consistent with the argument that an independent board 
member increases the monitoring power of the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983), 
thereby improving disclosure quality. Similar empirical results have also been 
documented previously (Ajinkya, 2005; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007). Interestingly, 
the impact of a global accounting firm remains insignificant. Prior literature has 
shown that this variable has a positive effect on mandatory disclosure (Wallace and 
Naser, 1995; Glaum and Street, 2003) but an insignificant effect on voluntary 
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disclosure (Hossain et al., 1995; Eng and Mak, 2003).   
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The institutional setting is 
described in section 2, followed by the study hypotheses in section 3. Thereafter, 
data and methods are discussed in section 4 and empirical results reported in section 
5. Section 6 summarises and concludes.  
 
2. Institutional setting  
 
2.1. Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)  
  
The European Union is seeking to harmonise the supervision and regulation of the 
European financial markets. With respect to that objective, the European Parliament 
approved in 2002 the Lamfalussy model, which is a regulation structure consisting of 
four levels.  The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)[1] works at 
level 3 of the Lamfalussy model. It is responsible for deepening the cooperation 
between national securities regulators and for harmonising supervision of the 
European financial markets. CESR has a subcommittee in every member state of the 
European Union. The Finnish subcommittee of the CESR is CESR-Fin. Together, the 
subcommittees of the CESR formulate different recommendations to increase 
harmonisation in the European financial markets[2]. CESR does not have the 
authority to impose sanctions if a firm fails to comply with its recommendations. 
Adoption of IFRS is one of the major events in the history of financial 
reporting and will make IFRS a widely accepted financial accounting model at least 
in the Member States of the European Union. The CESR wanted to harmonise 
disclosure by European listed firms during their transition to IFRS. Thus, on 30th 
December 2003, it published the Recommendation for Additional Guidance 
Regarding the Transition to IFRS (CESR/03-323e). The CESR considered it essential 
for the adoption of IFRS to be monitored carefully by regulators to ensure that every 
company continues to meet its reporting requirements. Moreover, CESR emphasised 
that investors should be able to understand the effect of the new reporting standards 
on the financial position of listed companies. The recommendation contained several 
proposals whereby publicly traded European firms were encouraged to provide 
markets with appropriate and useful information during the transition from the local 
accounting law or standards to IFRS. In its recommendation, the CESR provided a 
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narrative transition disclosure format for the publication of 2003 financial statements 
and a quantified transition disclosure format for the publication of 2004 financial 
statements. CESR emphasised that quantified information should not be published 
without sufficient quality control and where applicable, audit checks. 
 
2.2. Finnish Financial Supervision Authority (FIN-FSA) 
 
Similarly to the SEC in the US, FIN-FSA supervises financial markets in Finland. If 
the FIN-FSA notices that a listed firm does not meet the disclosure requirements of 
the securities market, it investigates the matter and requests an explanation. Such 
cases are usually resolved after the firm has responded, although stricter sanctions 
are sometimes needed. Moreover, the FIN-FSA publishes binding and non-binding 
local standards and informs firms about international recommendations such as the 
CESR disclosure recommendation. The FIN-FSA cannot impose any direct sanctions 
on firms which do not follow disclosure recommendations. However, it may attempt 
to improve recommended disclosure by firms by actively providing information on 
disclosure recommendations. Moreover, the FIN-FSA sometimes sends private 
letters to firms and thereby encourages them to make the recommended disclosure. It 
should also be taken into account that if a recommended disclosure item should be 
disclosed on the grounds of the ongoing disclosure requirements of the Securities 
Market Act, FIN-FSA can impose sanctions on firms which do not meet the 
requirements. 
 
2.3. Disclosure requirements in Finland  
 
Several laws and rules stipulate disclosure requirements for Finnish firms. The 
Accounting Act is the local accounting law and it requires firms to provide financial 
information that gives a true and fair view of their performance and financial 
position. The disclosure requirements of the Accounting Act are specified in the 
Accounting Ordinance. However, since the beginning of 2005, Finnish listed firms 
have had to prepare consolidated financial statements by applying the IFRS. 
Moreover, the Act on the Financial Supervision Authority stipulates that from 2005 
onward, the FIN-FSA will be responsible for the supervision of financial statements 
prepared in line with IFRS. The FIN-FSA had not previously been in charge of 
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financial statement supervision. 
Disclosure by Finnish listed firms is also regulated in the Securities Market 
Act. Accordingly, dissemination of untruthful and misleading information is illegal 
and violations will be punished. The Securities Market Act stipulates that listed firms 
shall meet the regular and ongoing disclosure requirements. Regular disclosure 
requires interim reports, financial statement releases, and annual financial reports. 
Ongoing disclosure requirements call for publicly traded firms to disclose all the 
facts that will have material influence on the value of their securities. That kind of 
information is mainly provided through stock exchange releases. 
The Helsinki Stock Exchange (currently a member of OMX Nordic Exchange) 
also regulates disclosure by listed firms in Finland. The purpose of the regulation is 
to assure that all market participants have contemporaneous access to true and fair 
information. The Rules of the Helsinki Stock Exchange require listed firms to 
promptly disclose any decisions taken by them and any facts and circumstances 
pertaining to them that may materially affect their market capitalisation. The 
Helsinki Stock Exchange oversees compliance by listed firms with its rules. All 
violations are reported to the Finnish Financial Supervision Authority (FIN-FSA), 
which also oversees compliance with the Securities Market Act by listed firms. 
 
2.4. CESR transition disclosure recommendation in the Finnish institutional setting  
 
Finland offers an interesting institutional setting to test compliance with the CESR 
disclosure recommendation. This is because the Finnish Financial Supervision 
Authority (FIN-FSA) took an active role in the IFRS transition process from the very 
beginning. After the CESR had published its draft recommendation for comments in 
October 2003, the FIN-FSA released a press release where it announced that the 
CESR was preparing a recommendation. The FIN-FSA recommended that Finnish 
listed firms should comment on the draft recommendation to the CESR.  
After the final recommendation was confirmed in the end of December 2003, 
FIN-FSA invited managers of listed firms to briefings on efficient transition 
disclosure. Moreover, representatives of accounting firms were invited to ensure that 
these supervisory bodies would be informed of the CESR disclosure 
recommendation[3]. Altogether, two briefings were arranged and a representative of 
almost every listed firm attended one of them. In these sessions FIN-FSA 
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recommended that listed firms comply with the CESR transition disclosure 
recommendation. Moreover, FIN-FSA also stated that it would monitor the transition 
disclosure of firms on the IFRS although it would not supervise it. One important 
fact emphasised by the FIN-FSA in the briefings was that it would supervise the 
IFRS reporting of Finnish listed firms from 2005 onward. This surprised many of 
those attending the briefings because the FIN-FSA had never supervised compliance 
with the Finnish Accounting Act.   
In the beginning of January 2004, FIN-FSA provided the same information 
once again via a press release. The FIN-FSA also showed continuous interest in the 
transition of listed firms to IFRS by sending letters in which it inquired how the 
adoption of the new accounting principles was proceeding. As different 
communication means were actively used from the beginning, Finnish listed firms 
should have been aware of the recommended disclosures. Moreover, they should 
have been very motivated to provide transparent and valid recommended disclosure 
because the FIN-FSA and the accounting firms followed the compliance of listed 
firms with the recommended disclosure items. Furthermore, from 2005 onward FIN-
FSA would supervise compliance with IFRS, which should also increase the 
motivation of managers to ensure transparency in the transition phase. The 
arguments presented above underline that in the Finnish institutional setting the 
CESR disclosure recommendation should have plenty of mandatory characteristics 
although it is voluntary. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
 
This study develops a framework where recommended disclosure of the firms is 
expected to be influenced by three types of forces: regulatory pressures, firm-specific 
disclosure incentives, and monitoring forces. Regulatory pressures derive from the 
CESR disclosure recommendation. Authoritative disclosure recommendation 
increases firms’ pressures for reducing information asymmetry.  However, it is 
expected that observance of the CESR disclosure recommendation also has 
characteristics of voluntary disclosure because firms will not be subject to sanctions 
if they do not follow the recommendation. Hence, recommended disclosure should 
also reflect managers’ attitudes towards agency costs, information asymmetry, and 
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proprietary costs. On the one hand, transparent financial disclosure reduces 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts between the management and 
shareholders. On the other hand, it is not always sensible to disclose proprietary 
information to the capital markets. Finally, recommended disclosure is also 
influenced by firms’ own monitoring forces. Efficient corporate governance 
mechanisms are predicted to have a positive impact on compliance with the CESR 
disclosure recommendation. 
 
3.1. The mandatory nature of the CESR disclosure recommendation 
 
As noted in the introduction, prior literature on compliance by firms with disclosure 
recommendations is very scarce. Mangena and Tauringana (2007) demonstrate that 
full compliance is not achieved trough disclosure recommendation among the sample 
firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. However, their results suggest that firms 
react to disclosure recommendations, and give a reason to presume that there are 
differences between purely voluntary disclosure and recommended disclosure.  
It is expected that regulatory pressures affect Finnish listed firms’ transition 
disclosure decisions. This is because of the general importance and authoritative role 
of the CESR in the European institutional setting, and the FIN-FSA in the Finnish 
institutional setting. Moreover, after the publication of the recommendation the FIN-
FSA insistently urged Finnish listed firms to disclose the recommended items. Prior 
empirical evidence has also documented high average percentage compliance for 
Finland (King, 1999). Hence, it is reasonable to presume that the CESR disclosure 
recommendation has more mandatory characteristics than purely voluntary 
disclosure. It therefore is expected that:  
 
H1: Recommended disclosure is more mandatory in nature  
 than voluntary disclosure. 
 
3.2. The impact of the disclosure incentives of managers  
 
Voluntary disclosure is expected to increase with firm size for several reasons. First, 
larger firms have higher agency costs compared with smaller firms because 
monitoring is inherently more difficult and expensive in larger organisations (Jensen 
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and Meckling, 1976). Second, the proprietary costs appear to be lower for larger 
firms because they have more resources to defend themselves against the adverse 
actions of competitors (Prencipe, 2004). Moreover, firm size is expected to increase 
disclosure if the disclosure has both fixed and variable components and hence the 
unit cost of disclosure decreases when the firm size grows (Lang and Lundholm, 
1993). Other reasons such as higher political and litigation costs and intensive 
pressure from analysts (Cooke, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Inchausti, 1997) 
have also been stated for the positive impact of size. Several empirical studies (Cerf, 
1961; Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 1989, Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Cahan et al., 2005) document that firm size associates positively with voluntary 
disclosure. Given that the CESR recommendation is basically not binding, it can be 
expected that compliance increases with firm size. Accordingly, this paper 
hypothesises that:  
 
H2a: Recommended disclosure increases with firm size. 
 
Signalling theory suggests that more profitable firms have higher risks for adverse 
selection than less profitable firms because good firms have more to lose than bad 
firms (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973). Furthermore, empirical evidence documents a 
positive relationship between firm performance and disclosure level (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993). The CESR disclosure recommendation includes both narrative and 
numeric financial information relating to the differences between the present 
accounting policies and IFRS. Hence, managers of more profitable firms should be 
willing to reduce the information asymmetry caused by technical changes in the 
accounting practises through recommended disclosure. On the basis of the previous 
arguments, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H2b: Recommended disclosure increases with firm profitability. 
 
The managers of highly leveraged firms may use private financing to protect their 
proprietary information and consequently also have less incentive for providing 
public financial information (Verrechia, 1983; Healy and Palepu, 1993). Firms may 
also benefit from debt if it reduces the agency costs of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986) 
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and thus the need for disclosure. Debt financing relies more on private 
communication with banks and debtors, and therefore the pressures for public 
disclosure are not so high. The negative impact of financial leverage on voluntary 
disclosure has also been documented empirically (Gary et al., 1995; Eng and Mak, 
2003). Consequently, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H2c: Recommended disclosure is negatively associated with financial 
leverage. 
 
Firms in growth industries are expected to be more active disclosers (Gibbins et al., 
1992). High growth prospects may increase voluntary disclosure if specific 
knowledge relating to growth can not be efficiently transferred through normal 
accounting information (Lev and Sougiannis, 1999). Hence, firms with high growth 
prospects should have an incentive for voluntary disclosure if they want to reduce 
information asymmetry and thereby prevent adverse selection. The positive impact of 
growth potential on voluntary disclosure has been also documented empirically 
(Kanto and Schadewitz, 1997). Hence, this paper hypothesises that: 
 
H2d: Recommended disclosure increases with the growth prospects of the 
firm.  
 
3.3. The impact of corporate governance-related factors  
 
Larger accounting firms may have more to lose if they discover a breach in a client’s 
records and fail to report it. Hence, the size of the accounting firm is a surrogate of 
better audit quality (De Angelo, 1981). Prior literature demonstrates an audit fee 
premium for larger accounting firms (Moizer, 1997; Niemi, 2004). Moreover, 
empirical mandatory disclosure studies (Wallace and Naser, 1995; Glaum and Street, 
2003) document that the global accounting firm has a positive influence on 
mandatory disclosure. However, the positive impact of the global accounting firm on 
voluntary disclosure is not altogether clear (Hossain et al., 1995; Eng and Mak, 
2003). Supposedly, larger accounting firms want to preserve their reputation 
advantage by monitoring their clients’ recommended disclosure. For them client 
firms that follow recommendations transparently are the best guarantee for it. Thus, 
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there are sufficient grounds to expect that major accounting firms advise their clients 
to comply with the CESR disclosure recommendation. Consequently, it is 
hypothesised that: 
 
H3a: Recommended disclosure is positively associated with the global    
accounting firm. 
 
The voluntary disclosure literature argues that informative disclosure increases 
institutional ownership because it decreases asymmetric information (Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991). The positive association between voluntary disclosure and 
institutional ownership has also been demonstrated empirically (Healy et al., 1999; 
Bushee and Noe, 2000). However, institutional investors also have a role after their 
initial investments in firms because institutions desire and demand more disclosure. 
Hence, they continue to demand further augmentation of disclosure from the firms 
(Ajinkya et al., 2005). This increases pressures for financial transparency and has a 
positive impact on information asymmetry reduction among firms with institutional 
owners. Empirical support for this argument has been provided for example by 
Ajinkya et al. (2005).  Hence, this study hypothesises that: 
 
H3b: Recommended disclosure increases with the institutional ownership of 
the firm. 
 
Board composition may also have influence on the recommended disclosures of 
firms. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that a higher proportion of independent board 
members on corporate boards is likely to result in more efficient monitoring of 
boards and also limit managerial opportunism. The monitoring role of independent 
board members extends also to the financial reporting processes. Their positive 
impact on the comprehensiveness of financial disclosures by firms has been 
documented empirically (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Ajinkya, 2005; Patelli and Prencipe, 
2007). Hence, it is hypothesised that:  
 
H3c: Recommended disclosure associates positively with the proportion of 
independent board members.  
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The extent of board monitoring of the financial reporting process is not only a 
function of its composition. Also audit committees may have impact on the 
disclosure practices of the firms (Mangena and Tauringana, 2007). Audit committees 
are the core decision making bodies that are expected to monitor financial reporting 
practices (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Agency theory suggests that setting up of 
audit committees as a means of reducing agency costs (Forker, 1992). Because audit 
committees supervise the quality of financial reporting, they are expected to 
associate positively with transparent disclosure. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) have 
provided prior empirical evidence on the positive impact of audit committee 
structures on voluntary financial disclosure practices. Consequently, it is 
hypothesised that  
 
H3d: Recommended disclosure associates positively with the existence of an 
audit committee. 
 
4. Data and methods 
 
4.1. Sample 
 
The target population of the study comprises all listed Finnish firms during the 
research period. Accordingly, 135 firms listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
(currently a member of the OMX Nordic Exchange) during the study period are 
included in the target population. In this paper, recommended and voluntary 
disclosures are measured separately for 2004 and 2005, and the observations are 
pooled across these two years.  
Firms that are members of financial services industry (Worldscope SIC starting 
with 6) are excluded from the primary population because their accounting practices, 
financial statements, and related disclosure requirements differ from the rest of the 
population. In addition, firms that have adopted IFRS before 2005 as well as firms 
delisted from the Helsinki Stock Exchange during the study period or shortly after it 
are deleted. Moreover, some observations are lost because of the lack of data for 
some explanatory variables. After these eliminations, the study sample consists of 
177 firm-years. Finally, four outlier firms are eliminated from the sample because 
some of their variables are outside three standard deviations from the mean of the 
 15
measured variable. In total, 173 firm-year observations remain in the final sample for 
the empirical tests. The firm-year observations consist of 85 firms in 2004 and 88 
firms in 2005. 
 
4.2. Construction of recommended and voluntary disclosure indices 
 
Recommended and voluntary disclosure indices are the dependent variables of the 
study. Because no database is available on transition disclosure of the sample firms, 
the data have to be hand-collected. This study examines transition disclosure that has 
been published in 2004 and 2005 before first-time adoption of IFRS by the firms. 
The disclosure data for 2004 is collected from financial statement releases, financial 
statements, and annual reports for 2003, which are published in 2004. Similarly, the 
disclosure data of 2005 include financial statement releases, financial statements, and 
annual reports of 2004, but also separate IFRS stock exchange releases published in 
2005 before the first interim reports[4].    
In the data collection process, all references to IFRS are first identified for each 
firm. Then a transition disclosure scoresheet is constructed. Criteria for the 
evaluation of recommended disclosures by the firms derive from the disclosure 
recommendation of the CESR. In 2004, the recommended disclosure items comprise 
narrative information and in 2005 numerical information. Criteria for voluntary 
disclosures are based on information over and above the recommended disclosures. 
They are indentified by pre-testing a subsample of financial statements. 
Altogether, 46 items are identified and included in the transition disclosure 
scoresheet. Ten items measure recommended disclosure and 36 items voluntary 
disclosure. The complete transition disclosure scoresheet can be found in the 
Appendix. All disclosure items are considered to be equally valuable. However, the 
level of detail of disclosures has been weighted. The reason is that there are 
significant differences in the level of given information.  Thus, in the scoresheet, a 
firm can be assigned a maximum of one point for each disclosure item. If a firm 
discloses information insufficiently, it is awarded 0.5 points. The index is similar to 
that in Kanto and Schadewitz (1997).  
On the basis of the transition disclosure scores of the firms, two disclosure 
indices are created. Index 1 measures recommended disclosure and index 2 voluntary 
disclosure. The index value is the ratio of the actual points assigned to the firm to the 
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maximum points it can achieve[5]. The maximum points differ somewhat between 
sample firms because a couple of firms have only one business segment and 
therefore their maximum points are lower. This study awards the firm only once per 
disclosure item to avoid double measurement of disclosure.  
 
4.3. Independent variables 
 
The independent variables of the study consist of control variables, disclosure 
incentives, and corporate governance factors. Control variables are proxies for 
reporting year and industry. Disclosure incentives are empirical measures for firm 
size, profitability, financial leverage, and growth prospects. Corporate governance 
factors are empirical measures for the accounting firm, institutional ownership, board 
composition, and audit committee[6]. The values for the disclosure incentives are 
retrieved from the Thomson One Banker Worldscope database. The data for the 
corporate governance variables are hand-collected from annual reports of the firms. 
Table I presents the dependent and independent variables of the main tests in more 
detail. 
Take in Table (No.I) 
 
4.4. Regression models 
 
The main tests of the present paper involve separate estimation of the following 
multivariate regressions for recommended disclosure (index 1) and for voluntary 
disclosure (index 2)  (in equation 1, β represent the regression parameters to be 
estimated, e represents the regression residual, subscripts i and t refer to the firm and 
year, respectively):  
 
 Disclosure indexit = 0 + ∑c c Control variablesit                        (1) 
  + ∑i i Managers’ disclosure incentivesit 
                          + ∑g g Corporate governance factorsit + eit 
 
 17
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table II shows descriptive statistics of the test variables. The statistics demonstrate 
that the amount of recommended disclosure varies greatly among the sample firms; 
some firms have disclosed in exemplary fashion while others have not provided any 
information. As a first test to examine whether recommended disclosure is more 
mandatory in nature than voluntary disclosure, the mean and standard deviation of 
both forms of disclosure are examined. The mean and standard deviation are proper 
statistical measures for examining the differences between recommended and 
voluntary disclosure because the scale of the disclosure indices is between 0-1, and 
thus the indices do not include any outlier variables. It is expected that recommended 
disclosure should have a higher mean and lower standard deviation compared with 
voluntary disclosure if it has more mandatory characteristics. This is because purely 
mandatory disclosure should have a mean close to 1 and standard deviation close to 
0.  
Take in Table (No.II) 
 
Table II demonstrates that the mean is higher for recommended disclosure than 
for voluntary disclosure. The t-test also confirms that the difference is significant 
(not reported in detail). Moreover, recommended disclosure is demonstrated to have 
a clearly higher median, and lower and upper quartile values. The higher mean of 
index 1 is the first evidence of the hypothesised (H1) mandatory characteristics of 
recommended disclosure.   
Unexpectedly, the standard deviation is similar for both forms of disclosure. 
One plausible reason for similar standard deviations may be the fact that some firms 
have followed the CESR disclosure recommendation in 2004 and/or in 2005 exactly 
whereas some firms have not disclosed any of the recommended items[7]. Poorly 
disclosing firms have supposedly interpreted the CESR disclosure recommendation 
to be purely voluntary in nature, and thus have not been motivated for recommended 
disclosure. Consequently, although recommended disclosure has been on average 
better than voluntary disclosure, the weak disclosure scores of some firms have 
increased the standard deviation of recommended disclosure. The mandatory 
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characteristics of recommended disclosure will be examined in more detail in section 
5.3.3. 
The statistics of independent variables demonstrate that firms in the 
manufacturing industry and firms audited by global accounting firms have large 
proportions in the studied sample whereas only minority of the firms have a separate 
audit committee. All the continuous empirical measures for the disclosure incentives 
by managers and corporate governance factors are fairly symmetrically distributed. 
This is because the mean and median of these variables are close to each other.  
 
5.2. Correlation matrix 
 
Table III provides the correlation matrix for the variables. Measured with Pearson 
correlation, recommended disclosure (index 1) and voluntary disclosure (index 2) are 
positively and significantly correlated with the reporting year (2005), net sales, 
institutional ownership, independent board members, and audit committee. The 
results are very similar when measured with the Spearman rank correlation. The 
reporting year, net sales, independent board members, and audit committee correlate 
positively with the disclosure indices. Moreover, price-to-book and institutional 
ownership correlate positively with index 1.  
Not so surprisingly, the correlation between recommended disclosure and 
voluntary disclosure is positive and significant. That result indicates that 
recommended and voluntary disclosure by firms are at least partly determined by 
similar factors. As a preliminary diagnostic check, the Pearson (and Spearman) 
correlations between the independent variables are also estimated. The results 
demonstrate that the independent variables do not have high mutual correlations. 
Thus, serious multicollinearity problems cannot be suspected in the regression 
analysis.   
 
Take in Table (No.III) 
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5.3. Regression results 
 
5.3.1. The disclosure incentives for recommended disclosure 
 
Regression results for recommended disclosure are reported in Table IV. F-values 
are very significant for all estimated regressions. The adjusted R-square is 24.6 
percent when the recommended disclosure is regressed only on the control variables. 
The disclosure incentives of managers increase the adjusted R-square to 37.5 percent 
and the corporate governance factors to 39.7 percent. In respect of control variables, 
the reporting year (2005) has a significant positive regression coefficient and 
transportation etc. a significant negative regression coefficient. The significant 
impact of the reporting year falls in line with the view that the sample firms have 
significantly improved their recommended disclosure in 2005 as the deadline for 
adoption of the new reporting principles has drawn closer. Perhaps managers have 
interpreted the CESR disclosure recommendation to be more mandatory in 2005. 
 
Take in Table (No.IV) 
 
With regard to the disclosure incentives of managers, net sales and price-to-
book have significant positive regression coefficients whereas financial leverage has 
a significant negative regression coefficient. The positive impact of firm size on 
recommended disclosure is as hypothesised (H2a) and it is consistent with the prior 
findings of voluntary disclosure literature (Cerf, 1961; Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 1989; 
Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Eng and Mak, 2003; Cahan et al., 2005). The result may 
imply that bigger firms want to reduce agency costs by complying with 
recommended disclosures (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Another explanation may be 
that bigger firms have lower proprietary costs (Prencipe, 2004) and/or unit costs of 
disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1993).  
The sign of the regression coefficient of financial leverage is negative as 
hypothesised (H2c), and thus consistent with some prior empirical findings (Gary et 
al., 1995; Eng and Mak, 2003). The result suggests that highly leveraged firms may 
have high proprietary costs. Thus, managers may be reluctant to disclose the 
proprietary business information of firms and thereby their strategy is to use more 
private debt financing (Verrecchia, 1983; Healy and Palepu, 1993). Moreover, debt 
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financing may reduce the agency costs of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986) and thus 
decrease the need for transparent disclosure in the capital markets. By relying more 
on private communication with banks and debt investors managers can avoid some 
public disclosure. The result supplements the previous study findings on the impact 
of financial leverage on corporate disclosure, which have been somewhat 
contradictory (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Hossain et al., 1995; Gary et al., 1995; 
Eng and Mak, 2003; Prencipe, 2004). 
As hypothesised (H2d), firms with higher growth prospects (price-to-book 
ratios) comply more precisely with recommended disclosures. The result is 
consistent with the arguments of signalling theory (Akerlof, 1970; Spence 1973). 
Accordingly, growth firms may have an incentive to reduce information asymmetry 
through recommended disclosure and thereby to prevent investors from 
misinterpreting the favourable growth prospects of these firms. Moreover, growth 
firms with volatile share prices may increase disclosure to reduce the incidence of 
large one-time stock price changes, thus avoiding the litigation risks based on the 
failure of managers to disclose required information in a timely manner (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993). The present finding is consistent with some previous empirical 
studies (Kanto and Schadewitz, 1997).  
Contrary to the hypothesis (H2b), firm profitability does not have a significant 
association with recommended disclosure. However, the result is in line with some 
prior empirical studies on voluntary disclosure (Prencipe, 2004; Cahan et al., 2005; 
Patelli and Prencipe, 2007). On the one hand, the result may indicate that a stable, 
well performing firm believes that a high return on assets is a sufficient indicator of 
the firm’s present and future performance and thus may not see any need for 
providing additional information in the capital markets. On the other hand, prior 
literature on the signalling theory (Akerlof, 1970) and proprietary costs theory 
(Verrecchia, 1983) yields confounding conclusions concerning the effect of 
profitability on disclosure. 
 
5.3.2. The corporate governance-related determinants of recommended disclosure  
In line with the hypothesis (H3c), the results of corporate governance variables 
document a positive and significant regression coefficient for independent board 
members. This result is consistent with the argument that a higher proportion of 
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independent board members on corporate boards is likely to result in more efficient 
monitoring of boards (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This may limit managerial 
opportunism and thus increase pressures to comply with recommended disclosures. 
Similar results have also been documented previously (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; 
Ajinkya, 2005; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007) although some prior empirical studies 
have provided contrary results (Forker, 1992; Eng and Mak, 2003).  
Unexpectedly, the sign of the regression coefficient of a global accounting firm 
is not significant (H3a). While this result is consistent with some previous empirical 
voluntary disclosure studies (Hossain et al., 1995; Eng and Mak, 2003), it differs 
from the prior mandatory disclosure findings (Wallace and Naser, 1995; Glaum and 
Street, 2003) which document a positive regression coefficient for the global 
accounting firm. The result implies that global accounting firms do not differ from 
local accounting firms in relation to encouragement for recommended disclosures 
and/or in relation to the impact of their advices.  
In addition, the findings do not indicate a statistically significant effect for 
institutional ownership (H3b) and audit committee (H3d). Accordingly, after 
controlling for other relevant factors, increased institutional ownership does not seem 
to motivate firms to reduce information asymmetry through recommended 
disclosure. This finding is inconsistent with the argument of Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) and with the results of some previous empirical studies (Healy et 
al., 1999; Ajinkya et al., 2005). It may imply that Finnish listed firms are partly 
owned by passive foreign institutional investors. The insignificant coefficient of 
audit committee suggests that the audit committees of the firms have not functioned 
efficiently enough during the sample period. Hence, they have had only a minor 
positive impact on the quality of financial reporting. This result supports the finding 
of Forker (1992). 
 
5.3.3. The mandatory characteristics of recommended disclosure   
As already discussed, e.g. higher agency costs, lower proprietary costs, and lower 
unit costs are said to increase voluntary disclosure by larger firms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Verrecchia, 1983, Lang and Lundholm, 1993). The positive 
association has also been documented in numerous empirical studies (Cerf, 1961; 
Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 1989; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Eng and Mak, 2003; Cahan 
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et al., 2005).  
Firm size should not be as important an explanatory factor for mandatory 
disclosure. This is because the law requires firms to disclose mandatory disclosure 
items. Hence, all firms that want to avoid sanctions should disclose without 
discretion and the impact of size should decrease. In mandatory disclosure literature 
some empirical studies (Wallace and Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997) have 
demonstrated a positive and significant regression coefficient for firm size while 
others (Glaum and Street, 2003) do not find such an association. Moreover, Kanto 
and Schadewitz (1997) document that firm size and other disclosure incentives of 
managers have lower explanatory power for mandatory than for voluntary disclosure.  
Based on the above arguments, this paper examines whether: 
 
(1) The overall impact of control factors, disclosure incentives, and corporate 
governance factors is smaller on recommended disclosure than on 
voluntary disclosure.  
 
(2)  Firm size has a smaller impact on recommended disclosure than on 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
Table V presents regression results for voluntary disclosure. The results 
document almost the same significant explanatory variables for voluntary disclosure 
as for recommended disclosure. Net sales, financial leverage, and price-to-book have 
significant regression coefficients also in this model. The reporting year (2005) is 
now the only significant control variable. With regard to the corporate governance 
factors, independent board members is no longer a significant variable[8]. In terms of 
F-values, the overall findings indicate that all three regressions of voluntary 
disclosure are statistically very significant[9]. The adjusted R-square is 44.9 percent 
when the control variables alone are included in the regression model and it increases 
to 57.0 percent when the disclosure incentives of managers are added to the model. 
Finally, the inclusion of the corporate governance factors increases the adjusted R-
square marginally to 57.4 percent. 
 
Take in Table (No.V) 
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 A comparison between the adjusted R-squares of the disclosure models reveals 
that the recommended disclosure model has an explanatory power that is about 18 
percentage points lower than that of the voluntary disclosure model. Moreover, the 
F-value of the recommended disclosure model is clearly lower (9.7 versus 18.8). This 
finding is consistent with the hypothesis (H1) and it falls in line with the prior 
findings of Kanto and Schadewitz (1997). The result implies that the mandatory 
characteristics of recommended disclosure decrease the explanatory power of the 
recommended disclosure model.  
The empirical results provide also evidence that firm size is a less significant 
variable in the recommended disclosure model than in the voluntary disclosure 
model. In the recommended disclosure model, the (non-tabulated) t-value of net sales 
is 2.5 whereas in the voluntary disclosure model the corresponding figure is 4.1.  
Next, the voluntary disclosure model is augmented with index 1 to get further 
information on the impact of firm size variable on recommended disclosure (not 
reported in detail). Index 1, the reporting year, and net sales have significant positive 
regression coefficients in the augmented model. In contrast, the coefficients of 
financial leverage, price-to-book, and independent board members remain 
insignificant. This result suggests that only the reporting year and net sales have 
significant incremental impact on voluntary disclosure whereas the influence of 
financial leverage, price-to-book, and independent board members are included in 
recommended disclosure. This finding, coupled with the significant positive 
correlation between the two disclosure indices, falls in line with the view that 
recommended disclosure and voluntary disclosure are at least partly determined by 
similar factors, although the size impact is lower in the recommended disclosure 
model. The lower impact of firm size on recommended disclosure compared to 
voluntary disclosure is consistent with prior mandatory disclosure findings (Kanto 
and Schadewitz, 1997; Glaum and Street, 2003), and is additional evidence for the 
mandatory characteristics of recommended disclosure. 
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5.4. Additional tests 
5.4.1. Unweighted disclosure indices  
After the primary tests reported above, some additional tests are performed. First, 
recommended disclosure is examined more roughly by applying a disclosure index 
similar to that in Cooke (1989). This index has a scale where scores are not weighted 
according to the level of detail of disclosed information. Thus, firms can be awarded 
either 0 or 1 point. If a firm discloses an issue insufficiently but still discloses 
something, it gets 1 point and is thus equal to a firm that discloses the issue 
sufficiently. The results (not reported in detail) are qualitatively the same with the 
primary tests. The reporting year (2005), net sales, financial leverage, price-to-book, 
and independent board members have significant regression coefficients also in this 
model. However, the adjusted R-square is 12.7 percentage points lower when the 
unweighted disclosure index is applied. This result may indicate that the primary 
disclosure index captures the differences of recommended disclosure better.  
 
5.4.2. Additional regressors 
Furthermore, two additional independent variables potentially associated with 
recommended disclosure are considered. These variables are empirical measures for 
information intermediation and ownership concentration. Data of the proxies for 
these variables are retrieved from the Thomson One Banker Worldscope, IBES 
History, and Datastream databases. 
The proxy for information intermediation is the number of analysts’ earnings 
per share forecasts. The expectation is that greater public interest in firms creates 
pressures to mitigate political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) thereby 
increasing compliance by firms with recommended disclosure.  The ownership 
concentration of the firm is measured by the percentage of closely held shares. 
Closely held shares represent the shares held by insiders. On the one hand, Healy and 
Palepu (2001) suggest that firms with a concentrated ownership structure may have 
an incentive to increase their disclosure to reduce information asymmetry and agency 
problems. On the other hand, some studies (Leuz et al., 2003) suggest that under 
concentrated ownership, insiders may be motivated to conceal detailed performance 
information from outsiders. 
The overall results of the additional tests on these new independent variables do 
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not, however, lend support to the expectations, because augmenting the 
recommended disclosure regression with these variables one at a time does not prove 
to have material effect on recommended disclosure. While firm size, financial 
leverage, price-to-book, and the proportion of independent board members remain 
significant in the augmented regressions, the new independent variables have only an 
insignificant incremental explanatory power for recommended disclosure. 
  
5.4.3. Canonical correlations  
As a final additional test and robustness check, this study uses canonical correlation 
analysis to explore the differences of recommended and voluntary disclosure. 
Canonical correlation analysis is often a useful complement to a multivariate 
regression analysis (Rencher, 2002). It is a multivariate statistical model that 
facilitates the study of interrelationships among sets of multiple dependent variables 
and multiple independent variables. Hence, canonical correlation simultaneously 
predicts multiple dependent variables from multiple independent variables (Hair et 
al., 1995). In this study the purpose of canonical correlation analysis is to provide 
additional evidence on the magnitude of the relationships that exist between 
disclosure indices and independent variables. Canonical correlation analysis has been 
performed for the following two sets of variables. 
   
  CanCor(Set 1; Set 2)                          (2) 
  where 
  Set 1    =     v1 Index 1 
                                         + v2 Index 2 
 
 Set 2    =     ∑cwc Control variables 
                                        + ∑iwi Managers’ disclosure incentives 
                                        + ∑g wg Corporate governance factors 
  
 Canonical correlation analysis provides a correlation between two linear 
composites. It identifies the optimum structure of each variable set that maximizes 
the relationship between independent and dependent variable sets. Each canonical 
function has two separate linear composites, one for the set of dependent variables 
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and one for the set of independent variables[10]. The strength of the relationship is 
given by the canonical correlation (Hair et al., 1995). Using the canonical correlation 
technique, this study estimates the weights (v) for the measures of recommended and 
voluntary disclosure (Set 1), coupled with the weights (w) for control variables, 
managers’ disclosure incentives, and corporate governance factors (Set 2) that 
maximize the simple pair-wise correlation between the linear composites of these 
two sets of variables. Moreover, considering recommended and voluntary disclosure 
indices simultaneously as dependent (Set 1) variables, the estimated standardized 
canonical coefficients enable us to make inferences about the relative importance of 
the independent (Set 2) variables. 
 Table VI provides the results from the canonical correlation analysis. For 
simplicity and to save space, only the first (highest) estimated canonical correlations 
are reported. 
 
Take in Table (No.VI) 
 
 The overall findings confirm that managers’ disclosure incentives and 
corporate governance -related factors, coupled with the control variables, have an 
important impact on recommended and voluntary disclosure. The adjusted canonical 
correlation coefficient is 0.672 when only the control variables are included in Set 2, 
and it increases to 0.757 when the disclosure incentives of managers are also 
considered. Finally, the inclusion of corporate governance factors increases the 
adjusted canonical correlation coefficient to 0.762. These canonical correlations are 
significant, as indicated by the Wilk’s lambda statistics.  
 Further, regarding the standardized canonical coefficients, the findings 
demonstrate that the weight assigned to voluntary disclosure is much higher (0.897 - 
1.058) than the corresponding weight of recommended disclosure (-0.076 - 0.128). 
This finding suggests that the independent variables are more closely related to 
voluntary disclosure than to recommended disclosure, which falls in line with the 
primary regression results. Similarly, consistent with the regression results, the 
reporting year (2005), firm size, price-to-book, and independent board members have 
positive and financial leverage negative standardized canonical coefficients among 
the Set 2 variables.  
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6. Summary and conclusions 
This paper examines recommended IFRS transition disclosure by Finnish listed 
firms. Recommended disclosure is defined to mean disclosure that is specified in the 
CESR transition disclosure recommendation for the first-time adoption of IFRS 
whereas voluntary disclosure refers to disclosure over and above the 
recommendation. The specific objective of the paper is to examine whether in 
relation to the CESR disclosure recommendation for IFRS transition firms behave 
more similarly to voluntary or to mandatory disclosure. Moreover, the paper explores 
what are the firm incentives for and corporate governance-related determinants of 
recommended disclosure. 
The study design involves examining recommended and voluntary disclosure 
of Finnish listed firms published in 2004 and 2005. The pooled target sample 
consists of 85 firms in 2004 and 88 firms in 2005. The disclosure data are hand-
collected from financial statement releases, financial statements, annual reports, and 
separate IFRS stock exchange releases. Using the multivariate regression analysis as 
the main analysis method, recommended and voluntary disclosure indices are 
regressed on control factors, disclosure incentives of managers, and corporate 
governance factors. 
The findings first provide evidence of the mandatory characteristics of 
recommended disclosure by documenting higher mean values for a recommended 
disclosure index compared to a voluntary disclosure index. In addition, the 
explanatory power of control factors, disclosure incentives of managers, and 
corporate governance factors is lower in the recommended disclosure model than in 
the voluntary disclosure model. Finally, firm size is documented to be a less 
important explanatory variable for recommended disclosure than for voluntary 
disclosure. The findings are consistent with the view that the CESR disclosure 
recommendation also has characteristics of a mandatory nature, thereby increasing 
disclosure by firms, lowering the explanatory power of the recommended disclosure 
model, and decreasing the importance of firm size. Previously similar empirical 
results have been documented for the differences between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure (Kanto and Schadewitz, 1997). 
With regard to the disclosure incentives of managers, firm size and growth 
prospects associate positively and financial leverage negatively with recommended 
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disclosure. The positive effect of firm size is consistent with the notion that larger 
firms have higher agency costs, lower proprietary costs, and lower unit costs of 
disclosure. The result falls in line with prior related voluntary disclosure literature. 
The negative impact of financial leverage provides evidence that highly leveraged 
firms may have an incentive to avoid public disclosure by relying more on debt 
financing. This finding is consistent with some prior empirical results (Gary et al., 
1995; Eng and Mak, 2003). The positive relation between recommended disclosure 
and growth prospects is consistent with the view that growth firms have an incentive 
to reduce information asymmetry and thus avoid the adverse consequences of poor 
disclosure (Akerlof, 1970).  
With regard to the corporate governance factors, this study demonstrates that 
the proportion of independent board members in corporate boards increases 
recommended disclosure.  The finding provides additional evidence for the argument 
that independent board members increase the monitoring power of the board (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983) and is similar to some prior empirical studies. Interestingly, the 
sign of the regression coefficient of global accounting firm is insignificant. 
Previously, this variable has proved to have a positive effect on mandatory disclosure 
(Wallace and Naser, 1995; Glaum and Street, 2003) but an insignificant effect on 
voluntary disclosure (Hossain et al., 1995; Eng and Mak, 2003).     
This study makes a contribution for the corporate disclosure and financial 
regulation literature by bringing into discussion a third category of corporate 
disclosure, which is recommended disclosure. The results provide important insights 
into the mandatory characteristics and determinants of recommended disclosure. Yet, 
to date, few studies have addressed these issues because the focus has previously 
been on mandatory and voluntary disclosure. The primary findings indicate that 
largely similar sets of explanatory factors have an impact on recommended 
disclosure and on voluntary disclosure. However, in spite of disclosure 
recommendations being voluntary, managers interpret them to have mandatory 
characteristics. This increases the average level of disclosure and makes therefore 
disclosure recommendations useful also for the purposes of regulatory bodies.  The 
current study suggests that if regulatory bodies want to achieve full compliance with 
disclosure items, disclosure rules are needed. In cases where a lower level of 
compliance is sufficient, disclosure recommendations may be a faster and more cost-
efficient way to ensure the disclosure of transparent financial information.  
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Notes 
1.  More information on the Committee of European Securities Regulators can be found on the  
 CESR’s website; http://www.cesr-eu.org/. 
2.  Examples on recommendations published by CESR are for example (1) Recommendation for 
 additional guidance regarding the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards 
 (examined in this study), (2) the CESR recommendation for the consistent implementation of the 
 European Commission’s Regulation on Prospectuses No 809/2004, and (3) the CESR 
 recommendation on alternative performance measures.  
3.  Also, the Finnish Institute of Authorised Public Accountants focused attention on the CESR 
 transition disclosure recommendation and encouraged authorised public accountants in Finland 
 to recommend that their client firms comply with the CESR disclosure recommendation.  
4.  The section 26 of the CESR disclosure recommendation says as follows: “Where the company 
 intends to present its 2005 interim information on the basis of IAS/IFRS as recommended 
 hereunder, it is necessary that the quantitative information mentioned above is 
 released at the latest before the publication of this interim information. This recommendation 
 follows from the need to have a clear and valid starting point for the preparation and 
 presentation of the interim IAS/IFRS figures.” 
5.  If a firm for example is awarded 7 points when the maximum number of points is 10, the index 
 value is computed as follows: 7/10 = 0.7. 
6.  Prior literature has used many different empirical measures for audit committees (Forker, 
 1992; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). In this study the empirical measure for audit committee is an 
 indicator variable coded 1 if the firm discloses the existence of an audit committee in its annual 
 report. More detailed information on the structure of the audit committees was not easily available 
 and hence it was difficult to  observe. Previously, e.g. Forker (1992) has used a similar variable. 
7.  Further analyses indicate that none of the firms achieved full compliance in 2004 but a couple of 
 firms did in 2005. 
8.  Overall disclosure index (including both recommended and voluntary disclosure) is also regressed 
 on the independent variables. The results corroborate the findings of the primary tests. The 
 reporting year, net sales, financial leverage, and price-to-book have statistically significant 
 coefficients with the expected signs. Independent board members is significant at the five percent 
 significance level if the one-sided test is applied. Audit committee has a positive and significant 
 coefficient at the ten percent significance level if the one-sided test is applied. 
9.  The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) among the independent variables of full-regressions (all 
 variables included) are lower than 2.52 in the recommended and voluntary disclosure model, 
 which indicates that there should not exist any multicollinearity problems. Correspondingly, the 
 Durbin-Watsons are between 2.11 and 2.26, which implies that autocorrelation should not pose 
 any threat to the reliability of the results. 
10. The maximum number of canonical functions that can be extracted from the sets of variables 
 equals the number of variables in the smallest data set, independent or dependent (Hair et al., 
 1995). 
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Table І. Variable definitions 
 
 
Dependent variables  
    Index 1  A measure of the firm's recommended IFRS transition disclosure. 
    Index 2 A measure of the firm's voluntary IFRS transition disclosure. 
Control variables  
    Reporting year Indicator variable = 1, if the disclosure index value describes a transition  disclosure published in 2005, otherwise 0. 
    Construction Indicator variable = 1, if the firm's primary first-digit SIC is 1, otherwise 0. 
    Transportation etc. Indicator variable = 1, if the firm's primary first-digit SIC is 4, otherwise 0. 
    Trade Indicator variable = 1, if the firm's primary first-digit SIC is 5, otherwise 0. 
    Services Indicator variable = 1, if the firm's primary first-digit SIC is 7 or 8,  
 otherwise 0. 
    Manufacturing Benchmark for industry (primary first-digit SIC is 2 or 3). 
The disclosure incentives of managers 
    Net sales Empirical measure for firm size measured by the natural logarithm of the  five-year average net sales in million euros. 
    Return on assets Empirical measure for firm profitability measured by the five-year average of return on assets ratio. 
    Financial leverage Empirical measure for the financial leverage of the firm computed as follows: 1-(common equity/total assets). 
    Price-to-book Empirical measure for the growth prospects of the firm measured by the ratio of year-end market capitalisation to total common equity. 
Corporate governance factors 
    Big 4 Indicator variable = 1, if the auditor of the firm is a global accounting firm,  otherwise 0. 
    Institutional        
    ownership 
Empirical measure for the ownership structure of the firm calculated as  
follows: 1-(percentage owned by households/100). 
    Independent     
    board members 
Proportion of independent members in corporate boards. Board members 
are defined to be independent if they do not have a working relationship 
with the firm, or if they did not have a working relationship with the firm 
during the preceding three years before they started as board members. 
Moreover, if board members significantly cooperate with the firm they are 
defined as not independent.   
    Audit committee Indicator variable = 1, if the firm disclosed the existence of an audit committee in its annual report, otherwise 0. 
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Table ІІ. Descriptive statistics of the variables (n=173) 
 
 
 
Notes: This table provides the frequency (Nobs), mean, median, lower quartile (25 %), upper quartile (75 %), standard deviation, and 
minimum and maximum values of the variables. Index 1 measures recommended transition disclosure. Index 2 measures voluntary 
transition disclosure. Reporting year is an indicator variable for the reporting year 2005. Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation 
etc., Trade, and Services are indicator variables for the industry. Net sales is the natural logarithm of five-year average net sales in 
million euros. Return on assets is the five-year average of return on assets ratio. Financial leverage is computed as follows: 1-
(common equity/total assets). Price-to-book is the year-end price-to-book ratio of the firm. Big 4 is an indicator variable for the global 
accounting firm. Institutional ownership is the percentage of institutional ownership calculated as follows: 1-(percentage owned by 
households/100). Independent board members is the proportion of independent board members in corporate boards. Audit committee 
is an indicator variable for the existence of an audit committee. Firm-years falling outside three standard deviations in the distribution 
of any variable have been eliminated. The number of remaining observations is 173 in the pooled sample and it consists of 85 
observations in 2004 and 88 observations in 2005.
 
N Mean Median
Lower 
quartile 
(25 %) 
Upper 
quartile 
(75 %) 
Std.  
Deviation Min Max 
Dependent variables:         
    Index 1  173 0.479 0.500 0.167 0.750 0.299 0.000 1.000 
    Index 2  173 0.251 0.203 0.000 0.500 0.280 0.000 0.906 
Control variables:         
    Reporting year 173 0.509 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.501 0.000 1.000 
    Construction 173 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.184 0.000 1.000 
    Manufacturing 173 0.549 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
    Transportation etc. 173 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.274 0.000 1.000 
    Trade 173 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.314 0.000 1.000 
    Services 173 0.225 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.419 0.000 1.000 
The disclosure incentives of managers:        
    Net sales 173 5.013 4.599 3.816 6.350 1.666 1.735 9.317 
    Return on assets 173 0.053 0.055 0.023 0.092 0.112 -0.438 0.829 
    Financial leverage 173 0.521 0.533 0.413 0.633 0.166 0.053 0.841 
    Price-to-book  173 2.495 2.014 1.309 3.071 1.791 0.476 12.744 
Corporate governance factors:         
    Big 4 173 0.798 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.403 0.000 1.000 
    Institutional ownership 173 0.570 0.583 0.295 0.838 0.295 0.024 0.999 
    Independent board members 173 0.769 0.833 0.667 1.000 0.268 0.000 1.000 
    Audit committee 173 0.197 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.299 0.000 1.000 
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Table ІІІ. Correlation matrix of the variables (n=173) 
 
 
IND1 0.821* 0.545* 0.018 0.030 0.023 -0.010 -0.065 0.214* 0.012 -0.102 0.189* 0.102 0.171* 0.224* 0.283*
IND2 0.783* 0.703* 0.047 0.034 0.004 -0.051 -0.035 0.269* 0.045 -0.070 0.132 0.060 0.124 0.218* 0.290*
YEAR 0.513* 0.677* -0.031 -0.003 0.012 0.032 -0.005 0.006 -0.024 -0.033 0.062 -0.006 -0.003 0.016 0.137
MAN 0.019 0.036 -0.031 -0.209* -0.388* -0.595* -0.327* 0.177* 0.096 0.102 -0.160* -0.080 -0.007 0.029 0.010
CON 0.022 0.029 -0.003 -0.209* -0.067 -0.102 -0.056 0.231* 0.099 0.237* 0.025 -0.062 0.078 -0.056 0.065
TRA 0.020 0.000 0.012 -0.388* -0.067 -0.189* -0.104 0.085 -0.020 0.086 -0.049 0.039 -0.008 -0.035 -0.081
SER -0.010 -0.053 0.032 -0.595* -0.102 -0.189* -0.160* -0.525* -0.149 -0.305* 0.266* 0.134 -0.182* -0.120 -0.023
TRS -0.056 -0.004 -0.005 -0.327* -0.056 -0.104 -0.160* 0.230* 0.009 0.025 -0.077 -0.062 0.247* 0.206* 0.067
SIZE 0.244* 0.299* -0.004 0.131 0.231* 0.102 -0.459* 0.192* 0.091 0.274* -0.195* -0.008 0.564* 0.351* 0.457*
ROA -0.033 -0.011 -0.076 0.150* 0.034 0.038 -0.229* 0.013 0.120 -0.296* 0.343* -0.063 -0.071 -0.040 -0.052
FLE -0.087 -0.046 -0.037 0.108 0.215* 0.085 -0.313* 0.041 0.254* -0.219* -0.068 0.099 0.198* 0.008 0.112
PB 0.146 0.086 0.039 -0.188* -0.032 -0.087 0.359* -0.087 -0.264* -0.067 0.091 0.227* -0.076 0.158* -0.061
BIG4 0.110 0.076 -0.006 -0.080 -0.062 0.039 0.134 -0.062 0.024 -0.063 0.068 0.184* 0.076 0.218* 0.249*
OWN 0.169* 0.153* -0.001 0.002 0.061 0.004 -0.186* 0.236* 0.528* -0.022 0.188* -0.106 0.056 0.340* 0.309*
BOA 0.285* 0.227* 0.012 0.047 0.010 -0.073 -0.132 0.193* 0.295* -0.079 0.023 0.133 0.202* 0.288* 0.320*
AUC 0.291* 0.327* 0.137 0.010 0.065 -0.081 -0.023 0.067 0.510* -0.025 0.100 -0.112 0.249* 0.288* 0.299*
AUCPB BIG4 OWN BOATRS SIZE ROA FLEMAN CON TRA SERIND1 IND2 YEAR
 
 
Notes: * Denotes correlation coefficients significant at five percent or better (two-sided test). The Pearson correlation 
estimates are below the diagonal and the Spearman rank correlation coefficients are above the diagonal. IND1 measures 
recommended disclosure. IND2 measures voluntary disclosure. YEAR is an indicator variable for the reporting year 2005. 
MAN, CON, TRA, SER, and TRS are indicator variables for the industry. SIZE is the natural logarithm of five-year average net 
sales in million euros. ROA is the five-year average of return on assets ratio. Financial leverage (FLE) is computed as follows: 
1-(common equity/total assets). PB is the year-end price-to-book ratio of the firm. BIG4 is an indicator variable for the global 
accounting firm. OWN is the percentage of institutional ownership calculated as follows: 1-(percentage owned by 
households/100). BOA is the proportion of independent board members in corporate boards. AUC is an indicator variable for 
the existence of an audit committee. Firm-years falling outside three standard deviations in the distribution of any variable 
have been eliminated. The number of remaining observations is 173 in the pooled sample and it consists of 85 observations in 
2004 and 88 observations in 2005. 
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Table ІV. Regression results for CESR recommended disclosure about IFRS transition 
(n=173) 
 
 
Independent Variables Exp. sign Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
    (Intercept)  0.333 0.000 0.113 0.253 0.052 0.663 
Control variables:        
    Reporting year + 0.306* 0.000 0.293* 0.000 0.287* 0.000 
    Construction ? 0.028 0.797 -0.031 0.769 -0.002 0.986 
    Transportation etc. ? -0.063 0.396 -0.113 0.101 -0.137* 0.049 
    Trade ? 0.002 0.979 -0.003 0.958 0.020 0.743 
    Services ? -0.024 0.623 -0.032 0.573 -0.035 0.553 
The disclosure incentives of managers:       
    Net sales +   0.068* 0.000 0.042* 0.013 
    Return on assets  +   -0.210 0.235 -0.125 0.481 
    Financial leverage -   -0.377* 0.004 -0.346* 0.009 
    Price-to-book +   0.041* 0.000 0.034* 0.005 
Corporate governance factors:        
    Big 4 +     0.016 0.745 
    Institutional ownership +     0.051 0.484 
    Independent board members +     0.175* 0.025 
    Audit committee +     0.066 0.257 
        
        Model F-value (prob)                                  12.230 (.000)        12.470 (.000)       9.700 (.000) 
        Adj. R-square                                               .246                       .375                     .397 
 
Notes: * Denotes regression coefficients significant at five percent or better (two-sided test). The dependent variable 
(index 1) measures firms’ compliance with CESR recommended disclosure about IFRS transition, based on the sum of 
scores on items 1-10 in the Appendix. The independent variables are included in the regression in the following three 
blocks: (1) control variables, (2) the disclosure incentives of managers, and (3) corporate governance factors. 
Reporting year is an indicator variable for the reporting year 2005. Construction, Transportation etc., Trade, and 
Services are indicator variables for the industry. Net sales is the natural logarithm of five-year average net sales in 
million euros. Return on assets is the five-year average of return on assets ratio. Financial leverage is computed as 
follows: 1-(common equity/total assets). Price-to-book is the year-end price-to-book ratio. Big 4 is an indicator 
variable for the global accounting firm. Institutional ownership is the percentage of institutional ownership calculated 
as follows: 1-(percentage owned by households/100). Independent board members is the proportion of independent 
board members in corporate boards. Audit committee is an indicator variable for the existence of an audit committee. 
Firm-years falling outside three standard deviations in the distribution of any variable have been eliminated. Number 
of remaining observations is 173 in the pooled sample and it consists of 85 observations in 2004 and 88 observations 
in 2005. 
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Table V. Regression results for voluntary disclosure about IFRS transition (n=173) 
 
 
Independent Variables Exp.sign Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value 
    (Intercept)  0.072 0.007 -0.200 0.010 -0.219 0.002 
Control variables:        
    Reporting year + 0.380* 0.000 0.372* 0.000 0.366* 0.000 
    Construction ? 0.032 0.716 -0.050 0.540 -0.035 0.671 
    Transportation etc. ? -0.015 0.807 -0.066 0.215 -0.072 0.186 
    Trade ? -0.021 0.693 -0.030 0.515 -0.016 0.734 
    Services ? -0.053 0.180 -0.018 0.684 -0.023 0.624 
The disclosure incentives of managers:       
    Net sales +   0.067* 0.000 0.054* 0.000 
    Return on assets  +   -0.076 0.581 -0.034 0.808 
    Financial leverage -   -0.239* 0.019 -0.219* 0.034 
    Price-to-book +   0.028* 0.002 0.024* 0.011 
Corporate governance factors:        
    Big 4 +     0.009 0.808 
    Institutional ownership +     -0.013 0.828 
    Independent board members +     0.095 0.121 
    Audit committee +     0.057 0.215 
        
        Model F-value (prob)                                  29.060 (.000)        26.290 (.000)       18.810 (.000) 
        Adj. R-square                                               .449                       .570                     .574 
 
Notes: * Denotes regression coefficients significant at five percent or better (two-sided test). The dependent variable 
(index 2) measures firms’ voluntary disclosure about IFRS transition, based on the sum of scores on items 11-46 in the 
Appendix. The independent variables are included in the regression in the following three blocks: (1) control variables, 
(2) the disclosure incentives of managers, and (3) corporate governance factors. Reporting year is an indicator variable 
for the reporting year 2005. Construction, Transportation etc., Trade, and Services are indicator variables for the 
industry. Net sales is the natural logarithm of five-year average net sales in million euros. Return on assets is the five-
year average of return on assets ratio. Financial leverage is computed as follows: 1-(common equity/total assets). Price-
to-book is the year-end price-to-book ratio. Big 4 is an indicator variable for the global accounting firm. Institutional 
ownership is the percentage of institutional ownership calculated as follows: 1-(percentage owned by households/100). 
Independent board members is the proportion of independent board members in corporate boards. Audit committee is an 
indicator variable for the existence of an audit committee. Firm-years falling outside three standard deviations in the 
distribution of any variable have been eliminated. The number of remaining observations is 173 in the pooled sample 
and it consists of 85 observations in 2004 and 88 observations in 2005.  
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Table VІ. Results from canonical correlation analysis of recommended and voluntary 
IFRS transition disclosure 
 
 
                                                          Exp. 
Set 1 variables                                  sign          Standardized canonical coefficients (v)      
  Index 1 (recommended disclosure)   +           -0.076                  0.080                      0.128        
  Index 2 (voluntary disclosure)          +            1.058                   0.940                      0.897        
Set 2 variables                                                 Standardized canonical coefficients (w) 
Control variables: 
    Reporting year + 0.997 0.859 0.832 
    Construction ? 0.031 -0.042 -0.026 
    Transportation etc. ? -0.016 -0.090 -0.102 
    Trade ? -0.036 -0.042 -0.017 
    Services ? -0.120 -0.037 -0.047 
The disclosure incentives of managers:    
    Net sales +  0.524 0.406 
    Return on assets  +  -0.045 -0.023 
    Financial leverage -  -0.193 -0.180 
    Price-to-book +  0.240 0.210 
Corporate governance factors:     
    Big 4 +   0.019 
    Institutional ownership +   -0.007 
    Independent board members +   0.130 
    Audit committee +   0.108 
 
        Wilks’s lambda (F-prob)                           .529 (.000)          .388 (.000)              .362 (.000) 
        Adj. canonical correlation                         .672                     .757                         .762 
        Nobs                                                           173                      173                          173 
 
Notes: This table reports the results from canonical correlation analysis. Only the first (highest) canonical 
correlations are reported. Set 1 variables consist of recommended disclosure (index 1) and voluntary disclosure 
(index 2) indices. Set 2 variables include control variables, the disclosure incentives of managers, and corporate 
governance factors.  For variables definitions, see Tables IV and V. 
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Appendix: IFRS transition disclosure scoresheet 
 
This appendix summarises the construction of the IFRS transition disclosure scoresheet. Recommended disclosure 
(index 1) is based on the sum of scores on items 1-10. Voluntary disclosure (index 2) is based on the sum of scores 
on items 11-46. In the scoresheet, a firm can be assigned a maximum of one point for each disclosure item. If a firm 
discloses information insufficiently, it is awarded 0.5 points.  
 
RECOMMENDED DISCLOSURE 
 
I Financial statement release, financial statement, and annual report published in 2004 
1 Firm’s plans in its move towards IFRS 
2 Firm’s degree of achievements in its move towards IFRS 
Major differences between present accounting policies and IFRS 
 3 Areas of change 
 4 Affecting standards 
 5 Recognition differences 
 6 Narrative description of the direction of change 
 
II Financial statement release, financial statement, annual report, and separate IFRS stock 
exchange release published in 2005 
7 A reconciliation of shareholders’ equity 1.1.2004 
8 A reconciliation of shareholders’ equity 31.12.2004 
9 A reconciliation of profit and loss account 31.12.2004 
10 A reconciliation of cash flow statement 31.12.2004 
 
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE 
 
III Financial statement release, financial statement, and annual report published in 2004 
11 Background information 
12 Informs when quantified information will be given 
13 Segment information 
14 A reconciliation of shareholders’ equity/ 
     other balance sheet items at the date of transition 
 
IV Financial statement release, financial statement, annual report, and separate IFRS 
stock exchange release published in 2005 
15 Informs when quantified information has been given 
16 Informs when quantified information will be given 
 17 Gives transition date 
 18 Informs when first IFRS reports will be disclosed 
 19 Informs whether or not the quantified information is audited 
 20 Informs the quantified information to be audited 
 21 Informs the application of IFRS 1 standard 
 22 Segment information: First quarter of 2004       
 23 Segment information: Second quarter of 2004  
 24 Segment information: Third quarter of 2004  
 25 Segment information: Fourth quarter of 2004      
 26 Segment information: Fiscal year 2004 
 27 Influence on ratios   
 28 Gives calculation formulas of ratios 
 29 A reconciliation of shareholders’ equity 31.3.2004 
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 30 A reconciliation of shareholders’ equity 30.6.2004 
 31 A reconciliation of shareholders’ equity 30.9.2004 
 32 A reconciliation of balance sheet 1.1.2004 
 33 A reconciliation of balance sheet 31.3.2004 
 34 A reconciliation of balance sheet 30.6.2004 
 35 A reconciliation of balance sheet 30.9.2004 
 36 A reconciliation of balance sheet 31.12.2004 
 37 A reconciliation of profit and loss account 31.3.2004 
38 A reconciliation of profit and loss account 30.6.2004 
39 A reconciliation of profit and loss account 30.9.2004 
40 Gives profit and loss account for each quarter of 2004 
41 A reconciliation of cash flow statement 31.3.2004 
42 A reconciliation of cash flow statement 30.6.2004 
43 A reconciliation of cash flow statement 30.9.2004 
44 Informs why some of the reconciliations are not stated 
45 A reconciliation of net profit 
46 Extra information to reconciliation calculations 
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